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Foreword – “cum apologia”
The fate of this volume of collected articles needs a slight variant of the usual “habent sua fata libelli”: “habent sua fata auctores libelli”. The focus on the authors’ fate becomes obvious when the 
reader looks back at the event where the papers collected in this vol-
ume were originally presented. This was an international workshop 
the Austrian Academy of Sciences. Sadly, Prof. Ladstätter passed away 
-
er. The loss of the project’s “father” put the task of publication on the 
probably most inadequate shoulders imaginable. After Professor Lad-
stätter’s untimely death, I simply happened to be the only contributor 
available in Vienna to continue the editorial task. Consequently, Prof. 
Dr. Ernst Steinkellner, then Director of the IKGA, asked me to continue 
Professor Ladstätter’s project as a single editor. While the work on the 
of Mrs. Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek from the IKGA, my move from Vienna to 
Cardiff caused considerable delays. In addition, the IKGA was relocated 
and restructured twice during the same time, while Mrs. Peck-Kubaczek 
up hope that the volume could be published at all, when Dr. Bernhard 
Scheid, japanologist at the IKGA, contacted me and offered his assis-
tance. It is therefore due to his efforts that the last obstacles in the com-
plicated  production process of this volume could be solved in the end. 
We had to make a principal decision whether to fully update the contri-
butions or to edit and publish them in the form they had reached up to 
the last major revision by Mrs. Peck-Kubaczek. In order not to postpone 
the publication of the edition any longer and considering the inconve-
nience and – in the case of Professor Zürcher’s essay – impossibility 
for a fundamental revision by the authors, we decided to publish all 
contributions as they were. I have only updated the “Introduction” with 
x Foreword
while Bernhard Scheid brought footnotes and references into a single 
format and took care of the layout and the index. I still hope that the 
essays collected in this volume will be of interest especially since they 
cover such a wide range of Chinese religions, including contributions on 
the so-called Abrahamic traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, 
which are normally either restricted to very specialised contexts or 
treated separately from the standard set of the “Three Teachings” (san-
jiao Daoism and Buddhism – attributed to the 
Middle Kingdom. With this in mind I do not expect to have gained much 
merit (  or gongde -
lication, but at least have repaid a small amount of my “Bringschuld” for 
the support and friendship I have received during my time in Vienna 
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I -ceived a great deal of attention in the last years. This can generally be observed in the popular interest in such esoteric themes such as 
Fengshui , and interest in the intellectual and spiritual background 
of the highly popular Chinese medicine and pre-“wellness” phenome-
na Taiqiquan  and Qigong . Qigong has also brought Chinese 
religions into the headlines of the newspapers: through the controver-
sy between the Chinese government and the Falungong  and its 
leader Li Hongzhi  the public has become aware that there is at 
modern communist-socialist state which, since the coming to power 
of the Communist party and especially after the brutal sweepings of 
the Cultural revolution, was popularly believed to have gotten rid of its 
-
sus-like documents, it seems that the real status quo of religions – those 
organized in state-recognized associations, the religious underground 
as an undercurrent in Chinese traditions – in the Peoples’ Republic is 
rather unclear and in constant motion,  and the notion of “religious 
fever” ( , Ch. zongjiao-re 
described by Roman Malek  still has to be proven in situ. The study of 
religions in mainland China and their development there must counter-
balance the previous focus on Taiwan that has, until recently, dominat-
ed the Western discourse on traditional Chinese religions. This stands 
 The description of the state of religions in mainland China in MacInnis’ Religion in 
 
Religion in China
true, even though religious studies have begun to develop in Taiwan, 
after a long period of state-supported secularity, for a while now. A new 
development is also to be seen in mainland China where Chinese reli-
gions are now not only studied in the context of historical and sociolog-
ical studies but as an academic subject in the framework of an emerging 
Religious Studies discipline, established as independent disciplines e.g. 
at Renmin University (
-
relation in academic research. The number of publications on Chinese 
religions has increased considerably over the last few decades. A jour-
nal exclusively dedicated to the study of Chinese religions published 
in a Western language  is just one indication of this development, and 
introductions and anthologies in the form of textbooks  show that, at 
least in North American universities and colleges, Chinese religions 
have gained a place in the curricula of humanities departments. Exten-
sive bibliographies and overviews on the subject have been published  
and a useful survey on the current state of affairs has been made avail-
able  which, for the earlier periods, has now been complemented by a 
series of monographs . This trend will hopefully continue for the sake 
to maintain a general overview of this branch of Religious Studies, a 
subject that, due to its wealth of historical sources and contemporary 
developments, is virtually exploding in terms of research and publica-
tions. 
In this context, the title of the present volume reads rather presump-
tuous. Collecting representative papers on “Chinese religion” tries to 
achieve the impossible. The contributions to this volume also seem to 
underline this very point: they had to decide between providing a gen-
Owing to the particular history of the present volume (see the Fore-
-
mitted. The question of the religious nature of Confucianism, for in-






stance, would certainly have deserved a chapter of its own.  The reader 
may also wonder why there is no chapter on folk religion or popular 
religion (minjian zongjiao 
done in these areas in recent years,  which was, however, not available 
at the time when the present contributions were written.
To give an outline of this volume, we may divide Chinese religions 
– in a quasi traditional sinocentric manner – into two main groups: 
autochthonous and foreign in origin.  From such a perspective, the 
present volume has a clear emphasis on the latter group: one paper on 
Islam 
article is about an “autochthonous” religion, 
can be brought forward for this imbalance and particular emphasis on 
“minority religions” such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam. From the 
advent of Chinese studies in the West, promulgated by the Jesuit mis-
sionaries in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (see the article by 
Confucianism, was primarily studied as it was conceived by tradition-
al Chinese scholars as well as Western missionaries and scholars of 
sinology as the Chinese mainstream religiosity, whereas Buddhism, as 
a foreign and thus corrupt and inferior religion, was rather neglected.  
scholars Abel Remusat, Édouard Chavannes, and Paul Pelliot – were es-
pecially interested in Buddhist material in Chinese because it provid-
ed sources that documented the connection between China and what 
the Chinese called “Western Regions” (Xiyu 
the study of Chinese Buddhist texts never reached the same degree of 
importance for the study of ( Buddhism as their Tibetan equiv-
alents. Dealing mainly with “foreign” religions, the overall framework 
of this volume can be seen as mirroring the way in which religions have 
The discourse on whether Confucianism is a religion or not reaches back to the 
Jesuit mission and the Rites Controversy but also has been taken up again recent-




it does not take into account the blending of religious traditions often considered 
typical Chinese and called syncretistic. On this point, see the article by Roman 
Malek in this volume. 
  On the “Orientalist” development and background of sinology, see Deeg
4 Max Deeg
been adapted and integrated into Chinese society in the past and in the 
present, how they have become amalgamated with Chinese culture, but 
also how they have kept their own inherent features in the midst of the 
Chinese cultural mainstream discourse. Concentrating on “minority” 
or “marginal” religions12 not only makes sense in quality – the mutual 
cultural process of attraction and repulsion can be studied more eas-
ily in the case of Islam, Judaism and Christianity than with accultur-
ated and historically diversified phenomenon such as Buddhism, with 
its long history in China – but also based on the argument of reversed 
quantity, namely, that neglected topics of study are to be promoted.
The diversity of topics in the papers of this volume definitely has 
the advantage of showing that we should beware of rashly speaking 
of Chinese religion in the singular, postulating, of course, not the ex-
istence of a single Chinese religion, but rather something like a typical 
Chinese “religiosity” projected by the traditional concept of sanjiao heyi 
三教合一, “The three teachings (Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism) 
are one.” A careful approach should, however, not prevent us from look-
ing for unvarying elements in the development of religions in China – 
which leads us back to the topic of the acculturation and adaptation of 
foreign religions into a Chinese environment.
As the only “autochthonous” religion in this volume, Daoism is treat-
ed in an overview by Chiao Wei. After giving a condensed survey of 
the beginnings of Daoism with the (philosophical) writings of Laozi 
(Daodejing) and Zhuangzi, the establishment of institutionalized Dao-
ism through Zhang (Dao)ling and the development of Daoist canonical 
scriptures, Chiao goes on to explain the basic ideas and elements un-
derlying Daoist religion (cosmogony, soteriology, alchemy for longevity 
or immortality, etc.). Chiao describes the development of the different 
branches (or schools) of Daoism (Zhengyi 正一, Quanzheng 全真), their 
present state and their (historical) relationship with the relevant im-
perial rule. He sees a relation between Daoist virtues and the strength 
and endurance of the Chinese in the hard struggle of survival. He then 
discusses basic Daoist concepts (dao, ziran, wuwei) and their meaning 
for the past and, possibly, for the future. Chiao finally points to the re-
vival of Daoism in modern China, especially in the southern provinces; 
the success of Daoism lies in its giving a model or orientation both to 
 12 Cf. Malek in this volume.
the lower classes and the intellectual classes in a world of increasing 
disintegration.
sini-
Buddhism into the Chinese self-aware-
ness of their culture, an awareness that was already strongly developed 
at the time of Buddhism’s appearance. Deeg concentrates on the early 
centuries of reception and acceptance of Buddhism in China, especially 
shows how early Chinese Buddhism tried to make the concrete histor-
ical timetable of Chinese antiquity compatible to the Heilsgeschichte of 
Indian 
 of the Buddha. Deeg argues that a pro-Buddhist interpre-
tation can be found in some of the earliest Chinese efforts of “writing 
times and spaces together:” the death of the Buddha coinciding with 
the shift from the Shang tyranny and the beginning of the reign of the 
Zhou, which thus portentously interconnects traditional Chinese histo-
riography with the Buddhist calculation of time. In the model of history 
that is discussed, the Chinese idea of the rise and fall of dynasties – spe-
Buddhist idea 
of the decay of the Buddhist teaching, the decay of the dharma, which 
itself is closely connected to early Chinese Buddhist messianic ideas 
Buddha Maitreya (
one hand, proved very fertile, but at the same time, in the subsequent 
development of Buddhism it attracted the suspicion and hostility of 
most of the later Chinese dynasties.
Zhuo Xinping, director of the Department of Religious Studies at the 
his article “Religious Policy and the Conception of Religion in China” 
touches on the highly sensitive topic of how and under which circum-
stances religions in the Peoples’ Republic of China are recognized as 
such. Zhuo gives an overview of the different positions of various in-
tellectual and ideological groups towards the concept of religion, espe-
cially the critical voices in late imperial and early republican China. He 
Communist Party 
  To the selected bibliography of mainly German works – the original paper was 
written in German – one might add, in addition to other numerous books on the 
Daoist 
concerning the role and function of religion in a socialist society and 
state, including the recent positive development of the Party’s recog-
society. Most interesting is the fact that a theory such as Huntington’s 
“clash of civilizations” can be considered a factor in the conceptualiza-
tion of an acceptable relationship between religion and a socialist state. 
Zhuo’s paper shows how closely religious policy and the problem of a 
religion are interwoven. At the same time, however, it is astonishing 
how similar the modern approach in the study of religion is to this un-
derstanding of religion in its social and cultural function – despite a 
rather normative tendency. This might point to more liberal tendencies 
in religious policy developing in China, as Zhuo indicates in his paper.
Irene Eber, writing on Jews in China, divides her paper into two main 
Jewish community in Kaifeng be-
ginning with the erecting of a synagogue in the southern Chinese city in 
Jews 
in China to the Tang period, based on indications of Jewish merchants 
having been in China at that time. The Kaifeng community, though still 
attested by early Catholic missionaries in China, ceased to exist at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. Eber sees the slow loss of Jewish 
-
ty. Nevertheless, within the framework of this lineage identity, the Jews 
of Kaifeng managed to retain their Jewish identity by means of sini-
cized practices (holidays, keeping of the 
enough, today there is a revival of Jewish identity through conversion 
in Kaifeng, with some of the converts even studying in Israel. In the sec-
ond section, Eber discusses the case of the Jewish diaspora in Shanghai 
that existed from the middle of the nineteenth century and that was of 
how the different communities developed organizational structures 
(
situation. The Shanghai communities were clearly an atypical case of a 
religious community, as they existed in the atypical environment of the 
most westernized city of China. Today, a small Jewish community has 
survived only in Hong Kong.
Erich Zürcher presents the topic of how early Jesuit missionaries 
and autochthon Christians in the South Chinese area of Fujian acted 
and reacted during the late Ming dynasty in the process of adopting 
and maintaining a religious self-identity. He focuses on the aspects of 
“guilt – sin – remorse – confession – absolution – penance.” Dealing 
some of them – especially the Christian concept of “sin” – have been 
used in the past to show the uniqueness of the Christian world view and 
soteriology, a world view that is not found in this particular way in Chi-
to Jesuit writings but also using original Chinese sources, shows where 
Christianity was able to build upon already existing religious ideas in 
Buddhism, Daoism and Confucianism. He shows thereby which of its 
features were actually incompatible with traditional Chinese religions 
and thus felt to be “foreign” by the Chinese Christians as well as their 
Chinese fellowmen. This has led to the contemporary Chinese judgment 
of Christianity as a “strict” religion. The paper clearly shows that both 
statements concerning typical Chinese religiosity and also questions of 
how far a foreign religion was adapted – sinisized – must be tested and 
validated by thorough and careful study of original sources and docu-
some of his sources as being prescriptive and normative, thus avoiding 
the decontextualization and defunctionalization of sources that is so 
often met with in the study of historical religious documents.
Roman Malek, in his contribution on “Christendom in China,” stress-
es the fact that the history of Christianity, as a foreign and “marginal” 
religion and with regard to its function in the respective historical Chi-
well as Chinese “Christendom.” The term “Christendom” is deliberately 
used throughout because of its broader generic meaning. Malek gives 
an overview of the history of Christianity in China under the rule of 
the Christian orga-
-
ties, but also stresses the fact that Christianity has also taken on other 
forms of social appearance such as so-called Cultural Christianity, Elite 
Christianity, etc. Malek gives a clarifying sketch of a variety of catego-
Christendom” 
Catholic and Protestant forms, and describes in detail developments in 
the Underground 
Church, which is still an open issue in China. He refers to the increas-
ing number of newly founded Christian groups and sects, which are 
primarily located in the countryside and grouped around charismatic 
leaders. One tends to ask – after Malek’s description of these groups in 
the categories used by Christian “cult”-specialists in the West, though 
ortho-
dox” – why these groups are still labeled as Christian. If one retains the 
attribute “Christian,” the problem of sinicization slips in here through 
the backdoor again, and could be expressed by the term “synchretism.” 
The relatively open character of Chinese “Christendom” is also seen 
in the notion of “Cultural Christians,” that is, members mainly of the 
intellectual elite who do not belong to one of the organized forms of 
Christianity in China and who therefore lack the formal “requisites” of 
membership such as baptism, but who derive their “Christendom” in 
the form of a weltanschauung. It seems that “Cultural Christians” form 
the bridge between “formal” Christianity and the phenomenon that 
Malek calls “Christianity as an object of academic research.” For Malek, 
the future of “Christendom” in China is safe, although it is clear that not 
all its forms as described here will survive.
In his paper, Wang Jianping presents an astonishing and detailed 
overview of Muslim activities in today’s China, correcting, as it were, 
the general idea that this religion is concentrated in China’s most West-
ern areas. He shows how in the relatively stable political structure of 
Chinese Muslims, traditionally organized in small, independent com-
munities ( jama’at
backgrounds (Uighurs, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, -
ical” self-awareness of Islamic universality (umma -
velop that crosses ethnic and denominational borderlines and thus 
sometimes is even able to oppose state authority successfully. Wang 
clearly points out that the conditions for this change of attitude and 
options is due to the liberalized economic situation in China during the 
-
dence of Chinese Muslim community members, creating interregional 
as well as international movement (pilgrimage, exchange of akhonds, 
i.e. -
ture (madrasas, i.e. Quran schools, materials distributed by traditional 
media such as books and periodicals, as well as modern media such 
Is-
of the Chinese policy of recognizing Muslims as ethnic minorities with 
the corresponding privileges, this new search for a common identity 
leads to a kind of encapsulation. It has also led to the “radicalization” 
of – for instance – the independence movement in Xin jiang and to so-
cial friction in other regions, problems that the authorities have had 
to deal with. The example of Chinese Muslims shows how a tradition-
the international community is able to become a strong partner in the 
state-religion dialogue, but also how the suspicion of the state can be 
aroused against such semi-independent groups that have a long history 
in China. As Wang stresses at the end of his article, the future of Mus-
lims in China will strongly depend upon how the centralized govern-
ment and the Communist Party navigates between the Scylla of control 
and the Charybdis of tolerance in yielding religious, administrative and 
economical freedom.
What is touched on in Wang’s paper is the very topic of Dru Gladney’s 
contribution: the question of accommodation ( Muslim 
communities into Chinese society, especially the group labeled as the 
Hui. Gladney emphasizes the problems of expressions such as Hui or 
Uighur in terms of ethnicity as well as cultural, historical and linguistic 
Muslim separatism 
within the Uighurs in Xin jiang and the connected problems (alleged ter-
by the Chinese authorities, thus adding, as it were, the puzzle piece of 
Islam in China that was missing in Wang’s paper. Gladney’s focus is on 
Chinese Hui Muslims, their establishment in China and their integration 
the different waves, forms and layers of -
ditional Chinese Islam, called gedimu in Chinese (from Arab. , 
mosque and village-centered structure, and then 
the advent, development and characteristics of the different 
(Qadiriyya, -
al network structures. A third wave was caused by the higher degree of 
mobility and a strengthening of Muslim self-identity after the fall of the 
Qing dynasty and during the republican period. Muslims, coming back 
from pilgrimages to Arabia, introduced Wahhabi reform Islam (Ikhwan 
line with the Chinese reformers’ ideas of nationalism and modernism. 
 Max Deeg
This group also initially supported the communists because of their 
concepts of equity, autonomy and freedom of religion, until being disap-
pointed by the development of religious policy in the PRC. This changed 
again with -
ing, however, a new group of problems similar to the ones caused by the 
rising Han domination of social and economic resources. Gladney does 
not consider the friction and contradiction between orthodox Muslim 
concepts and the adaptation to traditional Chinese practices to be part 
of phenomena such as -
ring to Max Weber – as an ongoing process of “inculturation” of Islam 
in China, a process of making sense of a religious tradition in a cultural 
environment that has not risen from this religious tradition. The out-
come of this process is not at all clear, not least because of the current 
mobility of Chinese Muslims across the borders of China into Islamic 
“internationalism.”
Both articles on Islam in China excel in their detailed knowledge of 
regions, thus delivering a picture of the changing and shifting state of 
this religion, which has existed in China from the days of the Arabian 
conquest of Central Asia during the period of the Tang dynasty. It was 
able to keep its stronghold in this region under centuries of Chinese 
administration, and even spread to parts of China that were culturally 
dominated by the Han ethnicity.
The volume thus presents historical facets of religions in China span-
ning a period of more than two thousand years in an open framework 
that is supplemented by an overview of the state of religions in China 
religions “Christendom” and Islam – an “outside” view (Malek, Glad-
situation in present China – that have been somewhat neglected top-
ics in mainstream Western sinological circles, and also in China itself 
due to the political situation there during most of the second half of the 
twentieth century.
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Daoism in China
Chiao Wei
The original meaning of Dao  was “path.” Laotse  under-stood Dao as the source of all things, and after his time still other meanings such as “method” appeared. Precursors of Daoism can 
be found in the shamanism of antiquity and the idea of eternal life of 
 and  and 
Daoism. But although the Daoist religion uses the 
terms of the Daoist philosophies and regards Laotse’s Daodejing  
and the works of Zhuangzi  to be canonical scriptures, the religion 
Daoist philosophies. For the most part, their 
connection is only the name, which was used by the Daoist religion as a 
recognized placard in order to achieve wider propagation. 
Daoism as a religion emerged only long after the lives of the two 
Daoist philosophers Laotse and Zhuangzi and it took a long time to 
establish itself in China. The religion is said to have been founded by 
Zhang Ling  during the reign of the Emperor Shun of Han 
Zhang Ling venerated Laotse as the true founder of 
the Daoist religion and the Daodejing as its holy scripture. According to 
tradition, Laotse appeared to Zhang Ling while he was meditating in a 
cave on the Heming , and instructed him to be a master and lead 
the people back to the correct path. Subsequently Zhang Ling trained 
many students to become Daoist priests and treated the sick with his 
healing powers. He had patients brought into a quiet room in which 
they had to confess their transgressions. These confessions were then 
written down by a Daoist priest. This confession, which was related to 
their illness, was offered to heaven in three ways: placed on a moun-
tain, buried in the ground and sunk in a river. 
  This chapter was translated from the original German by Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek.
Religion in China
 Chiao Wei
In subsequent generations, the position of the spiritual leader of the 
Daoist religion was inherited and the seat of the leader was moved from 
Heming to Mount Longhu (Lunghu-shan , Dragon Tiger Moun-
Jiangxi . 
Daoist leader went into exile in Taiwan. However, since 
Longhu has again become full of life, as I saw with my own 
Chinese government is interested in letting the Daoist religion spread. 
As a result, today pilgrims are again coming to Jiangxi.
Various factors were important for the emergence of the Daoist re-
ligion. It initially developed out of shamanism and the folk religions of 
the time. In Chinese antiquity the rulers in heaven (Di -
shiped, as was nature, especially mountains, rivers, thunder and stars. 
Ancestor worship also played a large role in the development of Dao-
ism. A forerunner of Daoist amulets is found in the way that offerings 
were presented to the ancestors by priests or shamans. This took place 
in a special manner, the shamans receiving a sign from each spirit that 
was then written down. 
Legends about the shenxian , the immortals, and sorcery are also 
basic elements of Daoism. The belief in shenxian can be considered one 
of the most fundamental features of the Daoist religion. Immortality is 
described as having the following traits: immortals look like normal 
persons, immortality is attainable, and immortality lends supernatural 
powers that allow a person to take on other forms, move mountains, 
cause rain to fall and accomplish other miraculous things. The belief in 
shenxian fangshi 
Wu 
As mentioned above, another source of the Daoist religion was the 
original Daoist philosophy. Both Laotse’s Daodejing and the work of 
Daoist religion. An example is found in the 
chapter : “He who cares for his body and can save his energy will-
live forever.”  Daoist religion was 
Confucianism, especially the concept of loyalty and reverence.
 
 
   
Another factor that must be mentioned with regard to the emergence 
of Daoism is the historical or social environment in which it emerged. 
The social conditions of the period were quite favorable for the religion 
were deeply superstitious and believed in omens and spirits. They thus 
tended to distance themselves from the strictly rational and intellectu-
al world of the Confucianists. This made for fertile ground for the Dao-
-
cinated a long line of emperors, as mentioned above. During the reign 
of Emperor Wu, a number of magicians were trained to this end. This 
aspiration of the rulers to immortality was also emulated by the gen-
of wars were fought that made the life of the people ever more intoler-
able. They sought refuge and shelter in religion. The Daoist religion as 
propagated by Zhang Ling offered the longed-for relief. To spread his 
teachings he used the Taipingjing ,  the “peace text,” a text that 
describes the means for society to return to harmony.
Daoism is a pantheistic religion. Its cosmos not only includes a spir-
itual ruler, but also the “three pure wise ones” sanqing  
or below the earth. In addition to these, there are many xianren , 
immortals, who move in heaven, or live on mountains, islands or other 
special places. There is, however, a well-established hierarchy between 
the spirits and the immortals. Tao Hongjing  
 (Catalogue of the Ranking of the Spirits 
-
en degrees.  The system of degrees mirrors the feudal or ruling system 
of the period. These spirits or heroes were adopted from Chinese folk 
religion, sagas or even Buddhism. 
 The Taipingjing is extant in three versions, by Gan Zhongke , Yu Ji  and 
Zhang Ling 
of traditional Chinese ideas, including, among other things,  and , the the-
regarded to be the fundamental scripture of the Daoist religion, is most likely not 
the work of a single author, but rather a collection of texts by various authors. In 
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Of the few texts from the early period of Daoism that have come 
down to us, the most important are the Daodejing and the 
With time, however, Daoist texts and texts about Daoism became more 
-
umes had been written, but since this time no new works have been 
added to the corpus of Daoist writings.
Although Daoists regard the Daodejing their main text, it does not 
Daoist needs with regard to a holy scripture. Therefore addi-
tional texts were produced, of which the oldest and most important is 
the Taipingjing
of the authors, Yu Ji , by an immortal. The most important topics 
may be summarized as follows: First, 
is the source of the world but it is subordinate to the Dao. Yangqi  
heqi  (
derived from . These three qi
earth and human beings, must be in harmony with one another in or-
der for peace and stability to prevail in the world. Natural phenomena 
are -
ral catastrophes occur when political affairs are not in order, and can 
be prevented only when such affairs are well ordered, as, for example, 
desisting from capital punishment and the rich donating some of their 
wealth to the poor. 
Next, a system of shenxian, supernatural beings, exists. It is divided 
into six categories, of which shenren  occupy the highest position, 
followed by the zhenren , xianren , daoren , shengren  
and xianren . -
tion. In order to help heaven rule the world, the supernatural beings 
communicate with heaven, to which the shenren and zhenren are clos-
est. 
Third, human beings must take responsibility for the transgressions 
and sins of their ancestors and relatives. Because of this concept, hu-
mans must diligently strive to do good deeds. The responsibility of the 
individual extends to the whole society. Ultimately all humans are ex-
horted to do no evil so that the requirements for 
and the world remains in order.
On one hand the Taipingjing asserts that human beings have a prede-
termined destiny that is subject to the power of fate, and on the other 
 
hand it emphasizes that one can master one’s fate through one’s own 
actions.  It is, however, also stated that very few persons can become 
a shenxian, not even one in ten thousand.  But if a person always per-
forms good deeds and strives for the Dao, he or she can reach their 
personal best. For certain chosen ones who strive for the Dao, the 
metamorphosis into a shenxian will be successful, but in any case, the 
average person who strives for the Dao will live a long life. Even sim-
pletons, if they strive for the Dao, will be granted a relatively long life,  
and thus it is clear that in any case striving for the Dao is worthwhile. In 
order to reach the Dao and become immortal, the following points must 
be observed: One must be loyal to one’s rulers, honour one’s teachers 
and revere one’s parents. In this case xiao , reverence, is of particu-
lar importance. In the Taipingjing it is stated: “No one who strives for 
the Dao will succeed in attaining it if they lack piety.”  In addition to 
moral requirements, the care of the body and soul is important: they 
should both be strengthened through mental and physical exercises. 
An immortality potion will be given from heaven to the person who 
has earned it through exceptional achievements. One must test one’s 
conscience, repent one’s transgressions and reprimand oneself daily, 
both in the morning and in the evening. One must be honest at all times. 
In addition, there are other commandments for immortality, but all of 
them will not be listed here.
Taken as a whole, the Taipingjing delineates an ideal world in which 
justice, peace and harmony prevails, a world that will exist when hu-
man beings behave in the manner described. The ideal world of the 
Taipingjing prompted many followers to strive for the Dao. 







  The  is said to have been composed by Wei Boyang  around 
-
duction of an immortality potion. Its three parts deal with the I Ching “Book of 
Changes,” the thoughts of the Yellow Emperor and those of Laotse. The I Ching 
determines the exact point in time that is favourable for the manufacture of the 
immortality potion. The thoughts of the Yellow Emperor and Laotse form the basis 
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tality potion. If translated literally, its title can have a number of mean-
ings. The text deals with alchemy, describing chemical substances, 
their volumes and weights. It also describes details about making such 
A primary goal of Daoist believers is a long or, if possible, eternal life, 
which should be attained in one’s own body. According to the Daoist 
religion, anyone can reach this goal if various methods are followed and 
particular exercises are performed. These include a special diet, breath-
Daoist religious services. Over time, these methods resulted in guides 
for longevity, as well as important practical works in medicine, chem-
istry and pharmacology. The rituals in the Daoist religion are based on 
the idea that one’s life is dependant on one’s own behavior. Whether 
one’s life is short or long is not only dependent on heaven, destiny or an 
outside power, but on human beings themselves and how they shape 
their lives. A person can thus lengthen his life and even reach immor-
tality by practicing various exercises. This is the particularly positive 
Daoist concept of life.
But Daoists do not merely want to lengthen their life, they want to be-
come an immortal, a xianren. In addition to magical potions, the Daoist 
religious way of thinking is also essential here. The Daoists derived the 
possibility of immortality from the mystic character of the Dao and its 
eternal nature. The Dao itself cannot be visualized. It is endowed with 
its own vital energy and its own will power. The Dao created every-
thing in the world and exists within all things, including human beings. 
One can reach the Dao only if one follows certain rules and performs 
certain exercises. If one attains the Dao one also attains the mystic vi-
tal energy and, like the Dao, will have eternal life. The possibility of 
humans to continue to live as an immortal is explained with the help of 
the theory of jing qi shen  
Daoists’ opinion, the three factors jing, qi and shen are the 
fundamental factors of human life. If one dies young it is because the 
jing was spent, the qi exhausted and the shen wasted away. However, if 
one knows how to be frugal with these powers and takes care of them, 
word can
that of the philosopher Zhu Xi 
 
it is possible to attain immortality. The Daoist methods should enable 
the spirit and body to live forever. With these methods the individual 
should be able to overcome the boundaries of life. According to the Dao-
ist concept it is possible to achieve immortality through transforma-
tion. Master Ge Hong 
part of heaven and earth. Therefore, the dead can be revived and one 
can transform a man into a woman.”  One is able to transform one-
self into another shape such as a bird or another creature. In the Daoist 
point of view, life can be prolonged through the ingestion of herbs or 
one to have a long life. Master Ge Hong adds: “One can care for the body 
with herbs and medicine so no diseases can develop from within nor 
infect it from without. In this way one can have a long life.”
The Daoist schools are as diverse as the sources of Daoism them-
selves. Only the two most important of these schools of Daoist religious 
Zhengyi-pai 
, the “correct” or “true school”. It developed out of the Tianshi-
dao  school and is based on Mount Longhu in the Jiangxi prov-
-
ers are allowed to have a family. The leadership of the Tianshi School 
is hereditary. Its followers revere the shenxian, the immortals and the 
spirits. They paint magical paintings and pray using magic formulas 
in order to beckon the spirits and banish evil demons. In Daoist reli-
gious services, in which prayers are said, good fortune is summoned 
and bad luck is warded off. The patriarch, the highest religious leader of 
the Zhengyi-pai school, is called the “heaven’s master of Zhang” Zhang 
Tianshi . Zhang is venerated as having been the founder of the 
Daoist religion in the later Han period. The title was bestowed by the 
emperor and is hereditary. 
The second school calls itself the “School of All Truths”, Quan zhen-
dao . It was founded by Wang Chongyang , who was origi-
nally a Confucianist, during the Jin -
ing met a xianren he gave up his vocation and converted to the Daoist 
religion. He attempted to combine Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism. 
For this reason he required his followers to recite the works Daodejing, 
  by Ge Hong is a supplement to the 
cantongqi. It contains above all a detailed description of breathing exercises that 
must be observed when producing the immortality potion.
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Xinjing  (the Xiaojing  (the Confu-
cian classic on Chan 
Buddhism. The Quanzhen School does not concern itself particularly 
with magic formulas or alchemy. It requires its adherents to follow a 
others. Murder and sexual intercourse are forbidden. In their place one 
is required to fast and sleep very little. All desires are to be eradicated. 
Only then can one recover one’s original spirit. Often the followers of 
this school live many years as hermits in caves on mountains where 
they practise rigid discipline. Jing, qi and shen (primary matter, breath, 
-
der to reach heaven by passing through the fontanel. This is the goal of 
this school. On the way, the body is left behind and can decompose with 
no further thought.
The Daoist Association of China resumed its activities with China’s 
of the followers of the Daoist religion in China. In the same year renova-
tion began in Beijing on the “White Cloud Monastery,” Baiyunguan 
-
astery of the Quanzhen School. In the same year, twenty-three monas-
teries were chosen as major Daoist monasteries, including the above-
mentioned Baiyun monastery and the residence of Master Zhang on the 
Longhu-shan. This is regarded as the seat of the Zhengyi School. Its last 
spiritual head, Zhang Enbo , the leader of the sixty-fourth gen-
residence. Through these activities the Daoist religion is slowly expe-
riencing a renaissance in China. Contacts to Taiwan and other regions 
been reopened, about four hundred in total, mostly in large or middle-
sized cities. Over a thousand small monasteries had been reopened. In 
that year about twelve thousand Daoist priests of the Quanzhen School 
Daoists of the Zhengyi School, living primarily with their families, and 
about ten thousand youth acolytes of the same school. In the meantime 
The development and spread of Daoism was always dependent on 
the favour of imperial patrons and their milieu. The Tang and Song rul-
Daoism, supported the Daoists 
 
Daoists were always loyal to the respective rulers and always consid-
ered themselves to be their subjects. Daoism, especially the Quanzhen 
School, strived for synthesis with Confucianism and Buddhism. It was 
tolerant towards Buddhism, despite the fact that Buddhist and Daoist 
dogma are far removed from one another. Buddhism is striving for a 
future nirvana, Daoism for paradise in the here and now. However, a 
bond between the two positions is particularly useful in a world which 
is becoming ever closer. Daoism is a particularly receptive religion and 
has always been able to adapt itself. Following setbacks in the attempts 
to prepare an immortality potion, it began to concentrate on medita-
tion and the strengthening of the spirit in order to attain immortality. 
The 
a reform with respect to the Zhengyi School. It demanded considerably 
more discipline from those who had dedicated their lives to Daoism, 
a monastic life in a monastery or the life of a hermit on a mountain. 
According to the Daoist concept, the shenxian also live in the earth, in 
mountains and in rivers. Thus, humans make contact with the shenxian 
-
tains which include the Emei-shan and the Qingcheng-shan. These 
mountains are venerated and considered holy, because people believe 
that shenxian live there or that they are the place where Daoists have 
attained immortality. It is said that the founder of the Quanzhen School, 
Wang Chongyang, attained immortality on Mount Hua, and Lü Dong-
bin , one of the “Eight Immortals”,  on Mount Zhongnan. Conse-
quently, mountains have become the object of pilgrimages. 
The belief in a close relationship between humans and the spir-
its reaches into the distant past in China. The idea that spirits live in 
homes in the form of stove spirits, or that there are spirits of wealth or 
of doorways has been held since early times. The idea that immortals 
inhabit the world around us has emerged from the Chinese mentality 
that has been shaped by realistic and pragmatic thinking. Accordingly, 
one does not want to enter paradise only after death, but rather here 
  The “Eight Immortals,” Li Tieguai , Lü Dongbin  and others, appear in 
pieces and on occasion were given the leading roles. The “Eight Immortals” were a 
favourite motif in porcelain painting of the Ming period, for example for birthdays 
and weddings. Due to this they became well known everywhere, and even today 
Eight Immortals”.
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and now. This idea most likely has to do with the living conditions in 
China, conditions that are dependent on the environment. It is well 
known that the Chinese culture emerged from the catchment-basin of 
the Yellow River. Life in this area, because of the adverse natural con-
times humans had to battle with the powers of nature to ensure their 
survival. Daily life meant daily struggle. Hence the wish for a pleasant 
life already in this world is understandable. As documented in the earli-
est texts, the desire for long life and wealth was already formulated in 
Chinese antiquity. Immortality was seen to be eternal life in this world. 
This indicates an acceptance of the real world in which one yearns to 
continue living.
their survival in this region. This is part of the Chinese heritage that 
has become the Chinese tradition. It is just this tradition that has been 
to pragmatic thinking. Daoism has been built on a realistic foundation. 
and remaining healthy. In addition to the spiritual and physical exercis-
es of the individual, good deeds also play an important role. The accu-
-
tion of good deeds is called jide  It is said that good deeds will be 
rewarded in heaven. For this reason there is a strong incentive for such 
The Daoist concept of justice was often the moving force behind the 
numerous peasant uprisings against corrupt leadership and social in-
justices. In these uprisings the peasants carried banners bearing the 
names of Daoist spirits or gods. Thus, Daoism can be regarded as a ben-
efactor of the masses and it recruited many followers in this way. How-
ever, 
to medicine, pharmacy, Qigong , etc., have also resulted in many 
To conclude I would like to outline a few more fundamental Daoist 
concepts, and show how they were not only of importance in the past, 
but are also important in the present and will be in the future. 
 
dao fa ziran . Literally 
this means: “The Dao follows the  But what does ziran
this context it is not a synonym for nature, but rather an equivalent 
of the expression, also of importance, wuwei , which means “not 
interfering.” To be more accurate, ziran is the passive form of wuwei. 
It is a tenet of the Dao or a form of the 
by humans nor by nature. With respect to this ziran-wuwei, in Dao the 
natural development and course of things is perceived as not needing 
interference.  The principal of harmony in the relationship between 
humans and nature derives from this concept. Humans should main-
the laws of nature, and not pursue their own greed as that would seri-
ously upset the balance between humans and nature. Ziran is the main 
concept of Daoism. One who abides by this concept will guide all things 
in the proper direction.
The next important concept is the above-mentioned wuwei. As al-
Laotse’s 
Daodejing it reads: Dao chang . This 
translates as: “The Dao never acts, but there is nothing it does not do.”  
Wuwei is the most important principle of Daoism and is derived from 
the thought dao fa ziran, which means, as explained above, that the Dao 
follows the natural course of events. This natural course is converse-
ly wuwei. Accordingly, one lets affairs develop in their own way. For 
this reason Laotse says: Wo wu wei er min zi hua . This 
means: “Although I do not act, the people step forward themselves.”
It is important here to note that wuwei does not mean that one should 
do nothing at all. Rather it means that one should not guide the course 
words, one should leave things in peace, should let them develop ac-
-
lar manner or to steer them in another direction. The interpretation of 
wuwei in the Huainanzi  expresses this even more clearly: “With 
respect to wuwei, humans should let things take their own course. Only 
then should one act oneself.” Thus, wuwei means that one should let 






Next follows the thought fan zhe dao zhi dong   which 
means: “The Dao moves by returning.” This is a further important Dao-
ist principle, namely, that movement does not advance forward, but 
rather returns to its original starting point. This starting point is the 
Dao. According to the Daoist opinion, humans have moved ever further 
from the 
long lost the ideal condition of a small child. For the Daoist it is there-
fore important to return to this ideal condition. Then one becomes reu-
nited with the Dao. Daoists also believe that this return, namely the 
renunciation of fame, wealth and any kind of pleasure, will ensure a 
long life, if not even immortality. Daoists have observed in nature that 
plants and animals have different life spans. Turtles, cranes, pine trees 
and cypress trees all live for quite a long time. They all have a longer 
life span than humans. From this observation they have come to the 
conclusion that life spans are relative. In their opinion, since humans 
are the highest living creature, their life span should be very long and 
potentially they can be immortal.
The Chinese philosopher Jiang Shen – -
ion that fan zhe dao zhi dong illustrates the Daoist trait of searching 
for immortality within oneself. Daoists do not take the view that hu-
mans must control nature in order to attain longevity. On the contrary, 
humans should regulate themselves to lengthen their lives. The Daoist 
sciences and practices do not aim to contain nature, but rather to con-
trol the human ego. It is questionable whether one can actually attain 
longevity in this way. However, in any case this idea may be a possible 
-
styles.
In China today Daoism is experiencing a revival, and in some areas, 
especially in the southern provinces, one could even speak of a renais-
sance. In these areas Daoist priests are dealing with taking care of the 
ill, with funerals, etc. Today there are even Daoist newspapers and soci-
Daoism and there 
is a collection of new scholarly literature.
Since its founding, the Daoist religion has concentrated on serving 
the masses. It became the support and salvation for many peasants. For 
this reason it has survived through the long Chinese history despite 
many hurdles. In the Chinese countryside today, new problems are de-
 
 
veloping because of globalization. The Daoist religion can also offer its 
in Daoism, but it is also a refuge for many intellectuals in times of be-
coming disoriented or unsuccessful. With its help one can retreat into 
nature or into one’s home in the hope of being able to unify oneself with 
heaven and the Dao. One can also cherish hopes of being able to become 
a zhenren (a 
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Writing Times and Spaces Together
Experiments to Create an Early Sino-Buddhist 
Historiography
Max Deeg
One of the most interesting kinds of processes in the history of to a new cultural environment. Numerous theoretical terms of 
religious studies are used to describe this process: synchretism, adap-
tation, change of paradigms, inculturation, ethno-religiosity and more. 
Expressed in these terms is the obvious shift of basic social, cultural, 
and religious notions that occurs when two cultural entities come into 
contact. This shift can be almost one-sided if the giving culture has 
a stronger impact on the reviving culture which has been on a lower 
cultural level before the contact. This was the case with the European 
tribal cultures such as the Celtic and Germanic when they came into 
contact initially with the Roman civilization, and later with Christian-
ity. It is also the case with the peripheral nations of the Sinitic sphere, 
outstanding examples being Japan and Korea. What happened there is, 
at least as far as we can judge from the extant sources, that the receiv-
-
lectual life.
The case is different, however, when a historically mature culture 
culture borrowing from its cultural reservoir only selected items as, 
for example, China’s adaptation of Buddhism from the Indian culture. 
Here it is quite fascinating to see what has been borrowed and how 
that which was borrowed has been changed or adapted to the already 
existing environment, a process usually called the “sinicization” (Greg-
Religion in China
 Max Deeg
 or “  of Buddhism – 
the counter-concept, as it were, of Hu Shi’s “  of Chinese 
culture . While it is clear that Buddhism in China in its mature peri-
od, beginning with, let us say, the Sui period, has indeed undergone a 
change that may be described by the terms just mentioned – leading to 
such typical Chinese schools and “sects” as Huayan  and Chan  
which never had a direct 
to trace the earlier transformation of general cultural concepts in the 
context of both classical Chinese thinking and Buddhist ideas inherited 
from the Indian motherland of this religion.
Two of these general cultural concepts and elementary categories 
of human thinking are certainly time and space, belonging to the cat-
egories which the German philosopher Immanuel Kant has described 
as a priori, irreducible and independent. One would expect, therefore, 
concepts of time and space in different cultures to be similar. I will, 
however, not deal here with the abstract concepts of time and space 
that concerned Kant, but I would like to give examples of how concrete 
historical time and geographical gaps between two cultures were dealt 
with in early Chinese Buddhism, looking particularly at the fourth and 
The absolute meaning willingly ascribed by most human beings 
to absolute dates in the framework of religious and cultural starting 
Jesus Christ, the hajj of 
Muhammad, obscures some problems. Why is it – one could ask – that 
-
tance of time to an event in history that is not even accurately dated or 
determined, and this even though many of these people claim to stand 
totally outside the religious context that gives this date its meaning, as 
for instance Christmas in the Christian tradition being the date of the 
our Western time system is really and universally recognized by other 
traditions and cultures. And whether there are historical examples of a 
only one example of such a problematic discussion: some time ago the 
question was raised in a German-language internet forum that discuss-
es religious matters, of whether there will be more terrorist attacks on 
 Traditionally written Hu Shih indianization” cf. 
  
Islamist” terrorists in 
Islamic 
calendar. 
All these questions may seem to be out of place in the context of Chi-
nese Buddhism, but they are in some way all connected with the prob-
lem of how the Chinese, as a people with an ancient historiographical 
tradition of their own, dealt with Buddhist historical concepts in gen-
eral, and in particular, concerned themselves with the starting point of 
this religion, the life of its founder. The questions may generally show 
us how relative time systems are and have been, and that there is a need 
to come to terms with them if they come into contact, especially if both 
or even if one of them claims a higher degree of “truth” as conveyed and 
legitimized by a religious context. In the example that I will deal with, 
the main point seems to be that socially and culturally used time sys-
tems, which are very often brought into historiographical genres, are 
events that are then transmitted as “history.”
as the attempt to structure time and space into a converging line of 
narration, of writing time and space together. It should be stressed that 
in the discussion of historiography, space for the most part seems to be 
a neglected factor. The reason for this is quite obvious for me: usually 
stream of time in which the events are to be placed. The spatial, that is, 
-
sumed. However, historiography always has a serious problem when 
two traditions that do not come from the same cultural and geograph-
ical environment, from the framework of the same “cultural memory,”  
must be harmonized. The problem then consists in closing the obvious 
geographical gap when parallelizing sometimes entirely contrary time-
tables of two or more traditions and in order to get rid of the vexing 
problem of different time concepts in two different realms of space. To 
accomplish this goal, often the initial step of the compilers of historical 




Before we switch to our direct subject, Chinese historiography, let 
be it only for the sake of a comparative view point. The European his-
toriographers of antiquity (Herodot, Thukydides, Xenophon, Polybios 
of Megalopolis, Tacitus, Sallustus, Caesar, -
monize different cultural strings
history in the well-known and accepted pattern of connecting a cer-
tain event with a certain important personality, usually a ruler. It was 
not until old pagan traditions met with the even more powerful Jew-
ish-Christian conceptions that European historiographers met the dif-
medieval “universal histories” in Europe (Gioacchino da Fiore, Vincent 
 were thus primarily concerned with what their authors 
and readers thought to be world history in the soteriological and es-
chatological framework of 
Old Testament with subjects of the Greek and Roman antiquity or those 
of their own cultural antiquity into one chronological line, very often 
starting from the creation of the world, continuing with the subsequent 
Biblical history of mankind, jumping to the story of Troy, the found-
ing of Rome and the life of 
present. Sometimes the events in the different cultural regions were 
presented in the form of synchronized annals. The inconsistencies and 
gaps in such historiographical concepts and patterns, which are obvi-
-
sis of Jewish “historiography”, antique culture and Christian soteriolo-
gy. Ecclesiastic historiography, from Eusebios of Caesarea on, used the 
antique past, both Occidental and Oriental, to depict the traces of God’s 
masterplan for the world even in a past not yet Christian. Despite the 
strong Christian domination, even pagan history was used by Christian 
authors, as can be seen in the , written by the Roman 
minister of the Germanic-Gothic rulers of Italy, Cassiodorus. Another 
approach to autochthon history is the Heimskringla, the “Circle of the 
Christian author Snor-
 This is especially true for the historiographies of the Roman Empire (cf. Christ 
inserted geographical and ethnographical material, and sometimes tried to par-
allelize the information which they gained about foreign nations with their own 
 in which the mythical past of the Germanic 
gods and forefathers is – in a similar manner to the stories of Chinese 
antiquity – presented in euhemerized form, thus dethroning the old 
Pagan gods in their ancient heavenly abodes and making them rulers 
the similarity between its name and that of one of the old gods, Thor, 
Christianiza-
tion of the Scandinavians. 
Similar phenomena of writing beyond cultural boundaries, or better: 
of combining two cultural histories can be observed in the early histo-
riographical traditions of Buddhist countries such as Tibet, Korea or 
Japan. Tibetan historiography, paradigmatically represented by works 
such as the  ( Bu ston written in 
 (
chronological and Buddhist, starting with the life of -
ing the advent and development of Buddhism in Tibet and continuing 
up to the days of the authors. In Japan and Korea the oldest historiogra-
phies were conceived in two complementary ways: the Japanese Kojiki 
Korean Samguk-sagi 
 (written by Kim Pu-sik th
Japanese Nihongi  (or: Ni-
hon-shoki -
  and the Korean 
 (Chin.  written by the monk  
at the end of the thirteenth century, both start with the pre-Buddhist 
past of the countries, and then also deal, one more and the other less, 
with Buddhist history. These Asian traditions of historiography did not 
have too many problems with the discontinuity of the autochthon and 
Buddhist tradition because they were either cultivated and dominated 
by Buddhism, or had to match the achievements of Chinese culture and 
the introduction of Buddhism with strong secular powers, therefore 
avoiding an absolute concentration on matters Buddhist even to the ex-




Concepts of historiography that are able to jump back and forth in 
two different cultural traditions and layers without feeling a sort of 
discontinuity, as was more or less the case in the medieval European 
and the early Japanese, Korean and Tibetan traditions of historiogra-
phy, were obviously not possible for Buddhism in China, not least of all 
because the Chinese, with their classics, the Shujing , Chunqiu  
and the Shiji , already had an orthodox historiography that Bud-
-
of chronological and historical traditions together – he then also had to 
close the geographical gap between China and India, the motherland of 
Buddhism.
In the early period of Buddhism in China only universalist concepts 
seemed to be able to compete with and to match the classical Chinese 
in a soteriological framework of religion, in our case Buddhism, China 
and India were part of a common scenario. The Buddhist 
able to cope with an indo-centric interpretation as well as a wider geo-
graphical approach, became the matrix in which spaces were brought 
together Buddhist conception of the two soteriologically import-
ant periods, which sandwich the historical present between the age of 
the Buddha kalpa of the future Buddha Mai-
treya, paved the way for a convergence of the time line of traditional 
China that began in the ancient times of the legendary rulers and the 
line of time of Buddhist history from the days of the Buddha, not least 
because they both converged in the future at the climax of the arrival of 
Maitreya (Mile  History was extended beyond the limits of the 
historical present by the powerful instrument of Buddhist prophecy, 
Skt. , Chin. shouji .
To give you just one example for the thesis that the bringing togeth-
er of data from the autochthon Chinese antiquity and the information 
about the story of the Buddha was crucial for at least one kind of inter-
action between Chinese culture and Buddhism, I would like to draw 
attention to the text Lihuo-lun , the , 
a text incorporated into the Buddhist apologetic collection Hongming-ji 
 
 For the complex of 
dating of this text,  it can well represent a relatively early example of 
the contest between ideas seen as being traditionally Chinese and the 
answers of a Buddhist apologist, Master   The apologist 
does not really try to harmonize the standpoint of the traditionalist 
with his own Buddhist one, but the line of argumentation of the de-
baters very often clearly refers to the mythical and semi-mythical his-
tory of China of the Yellow Emperor (Huangdi Yao 
, Shun , Kongzi  ( Laozi . Mouzi’s point and 
manner of argument frequently consists in showing that the old Chi-
nese traditions are by no means any more reliable than the Buddhist 
texts. In the seventh chapter of the Lihuo-lun
following dialogue:
A critic asked: If the Way of the Buddha is so eminently respectable and 
great, why did not Emperors Yao and Shun, or the Duke of Chou , 
or 
Buddhist teaching]. ... Mou-tzu said: ... Yao served Yin Shou and Shun 
Duke of Chou] studied with Lü Wang, 
and Confucius with Lao Tan. Yet none of these persons appear in the 
Seven Classics! ...
One important feature of the quoted passage is that it clearly shows 
that apologists of Buddhism had to deal with the historicity of the Bud-
dha and his teaching in the light of the Chinese traditional past. In our 
example the author is using a well-set example of argumentum ex silen-
tio, a counter-proof derived from the silence of the Chinese historical 
sources.
The thesis presented here is that early Sino-Buddhist non-canonical 
and non-commentary literature often was a program to combine the 
two cultural spaces, the Buddhist religious space with that of China’s 
glorious traditional past. The protagonists of this process were so suc-
cessful in connecting the traditional Chinese space and time concep-
tions with those of Indo-Buddhism, that the later Buddhist historiog-
raphers of the Tang and Song periods could write diachronic sequences 
in the purely chronological  style without serious prob-




deal with this later period, the outlines of which have been thoroughly 
investigated by H. Schmidt-Glintzer in his work on Buddhist sectarian 
historiography , but rather will attempt to look for early traces – ex-
periments as I have called it rather provisionally in the title – of Bud-
dhist chronology and historiography and of the religious environment 
in which these were able to rise.
Writing Pasts and Spaces Together
The beginning of Buddhist time calculation is usually the date of the 
physical death or  of Indian town 
of -
ty and antiquity of their religious tradition from a relatively early peri-
od, were preoccupied with the question of when, according to their own 
Chinese traditional chronology, the Buddha had lived.
It is generally assumed that the historical research of the date of 
the Buddha was connected to two problems with which the Chinese 
Buddhists were confronted: The competition with the Daoists, who had 
come forth with the Laozi-huahu-jing , the Laozi con-
,  forced the Buddhists to prove that 
the Buddha had actually lived before Laozi, and thus they attempted to 
trace his lifetime back as far as possible into the past. This kind of calcu-
lation stood in a certain contradiction to the ideology of the three stag-
es or ages: that of the true dharma, the semblance of the dharma, and 
dharma (zhengfa  – xiangfa  – mofa  In this 
framework Chinese Buddhists wanted to know where their own pres-
ent position in the soteriological process was: According to the dating 
of the Buddha into the Chinese antiquity of the early Zhou dynasty and 
zheng-
fa plus one thousand years of xiangfa,  Buddhism would have reached 




 As in the 
the 
 and the transmis-
sion of the dharma
towards the end of the period of the semblance of the dharma (xiangfa
This led to another trend: the tracing of the arrival of Buddhism back to 
a past beyond the date given in the traditional, well-known story of Han 
Mingdi’s dream of the Golden Man ( jinren -
Buddhist missionaries, She Moteng 
Dharmaratna (Zhu Falan Buddhist 
scripture in China (the , Sishier-zhang-jing 
 All these attempts or experiments may be described as 
actions of writing times together.
The successful early datings in China of the Buddha’s life, his nir-
 and his birth, were made by a process of compatibilisation of the 
old Chinese chronicles and the Buddhist scriptures. The -
 reports in all its versions that a heavy earthquake shook the 
regions in the moment of the “Great Extinction” of the Buddha . The 
legends about the birth of the Buddha also report that the night was 
bright when the Great Teacher was born.
What had to be done now was to check the Chinese chronicles for 
similar kinds of natural phenomena or omina. These were easily found 
in the old Chinese records. This way of dating is presented in early his-
toriographical accounts on Buddhism such as Fei Changfang’s  
-
clopedic history with a discussion of the various dates of the Buddha’s 
Zhuang  of Zhou 
 About other legends of an earlier arrival of 
Indian Shilifang  arriving with other 
monks and s at the court of Qin Shihuangdi -
ported in the .
 The Buddha, in connection with the earthquake at his decision to give up the op-
tion for the prolongement of his life, gives eight causes for such earthquakes, the 
last six of which are – cum grano salis: the descent of the bodhisattva from 
: Wald-
 This date is also adopted in the well-known chapter Shilao-zhi  of the Wei-
shu  (translated after Tsukamoto 
the king of India ( In the night of the eighth 
day of the fourth month he was born from the right hip of his mother. ... The time 
when Zhuang of 
Chunqiu is reported that in the seventh year of Duke Zhuang of Lu, 
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A detailed discussion of all the dates that were usual in Buddhist his-
toriography – including the so-called dotted record (dianji 
 
– can be skipped because extensive work has been done on this topic 
in the volumes edited by Heinz Bechert on the Dating of the Historical 
.  In addition, some years ago a very good condensed discussion 
of the whole complex was published by Hubert Durt.
There is, however, another interesting and early example showing 
kind of computation. This evidence is – as far as I know – the oldest Chi-
nese source of its kind. It is found in Fa xian’s Foguo-ji 
, the Report on , also called Gaoseng-Fa xian-
zhuan  Fa xian, after having crossed the Karako-
rum mountain range (Xueshan  arrived at 
the upper stream of the river Indus at a place that he calls Tuoli  
Darel in northern Paki-
stan. In Tuoli there was a colossal wooden standing statue of Maitreya, 
made by an artisan who had been taken to the ar-
hat in order to create an image of Maitreya. As can be seen from other 
short accounts of Chinese monks who traveled there around the same 
time such as in the fragments of the Mingseng-zhuan  and in the 
Gaoseng-zhuan pilgrim-
age site to visualize Maitreya. Fa xian interpolates an explanation of the 
historical meaning of the Maitreya statue into his narrative thread of 
the journey:
Fa xian if he knew when the Buddhist dhar-
-
India], they all say that there 
the Maitreya statue there were Indian  who crossed this ri-
 of the 
 Another very popular calculation was that of 
the Buddha’s birth into the reign of King Zhao  of Zhou, respectively the date of 
his  into the reign of King Mu  of Zhou
 
 
 On the route from Khotan to 
of 
this statue. Who, other than the great master Maitreya, who will be 
the successor of triratna] 
and let the people outside 
are good reasons that the dream of the emperor Ming of the Han was in 
Important here is that Fa xian does not give the usual calculation go-
ing straight back to the  of the Buddha, but gives the date of 
the transmission of the dharma across the river 
the line between India proper and the regions beyond. Thus, geography 
seems to be just as important for him as mere chronology. The inten-
tion of the story of the colossal Maitreya statue seems to be to show 
that three hundred years after the death of the Buddha, the dharma had 
-
ly, also China and thus this occurred so early that it still fell into the era 
of the “true dharma” (saddharma  zhengfa 
Another striking fact of this report is that Fa xian obviously tries to 
bolster the Chinese computations through Indian traditions: he asked 
the people of the region (  Fa xian’s intentions 
are to show that this tradition was not only invented by Chinese Bud-
dhists, but was also to be found in India.
Fa xian supports his computation by relating an episode that oc-
cured at the end of his stay in Ceylon he 
had the opportunity to see the procession of the tooth-relic of the Bud-
dha. A man who represented the king and rode on the royal elephant, 
 of the Buddha to 
the present.  Needless to say, no chronology of this kind can be found 
in any Indian Buddhist source.
If one tries to determine the reason lying behind the dating present-
ed by Fa xian one cannot rely, however, on later Chinese sources. The 
 mentions Fa xian’s report but obviously does not under-
  (“Since the 
Buddha] has 
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stand the motivation behind its dating and in turn calculates a slightly 
incorrect date: “If one calculates the birth date of the Buddha according 
to the Fa xian-zhuan th year Jia-wu of the reign of Wu Yi of the 
th year Ding-si
kaihuang: Wendi 
years have already passed.”
The pattern that I would suggest to interpret these dates is the 
“writing together of times” of the Buddhist and Chinese history and the 
incorporation of the meaning attributed to each in the framework of 
both Buddhist eschatology as well as the traditional Chinese theories 
of the historical rise and fall of dynasties.
To understand Fa xian’s dates I would thus suggest the following: the 
date of the 
the case of both years indicated by 
the beginning of the reign of King Ping 
kings Wen  or Wu  of Zhou, the traditional lib-
erators from the Shang  tyranny and the founders of the Western 
Zhou
the life and death of the Buddha and with his death the beginning of 
the period of the true dharma in India, the transfer of the Mandate of 
Heaven (tianming  was an appropriate 
date. Seen from the standpoint of Buddhist teleology, the spread of the 
dharma eastward across the Indus during the reign of King Ping is not 
less meaningful: The expulsion of the Zhou and the move of the capital 
to Luoyang  under 
Zhou, which is traditionally seen as being the beginning of the end of 
  
. In his calculation, Lidai-san-
without checking the results, and further takes this to be the date of the 
Buddha’s  rather than Fei Changfang’s computation of the Buddha’s birth. It 
should be noticed that Fei made a similar mistake, because he calculated the birth 
date – not the  – of the would then 
 According to the classical chronology presented by Sima Qian -
 
this dynasty . This was, in the Buddhist time-conception as presented 
by Fa xian, balanced on a soteriological level by the eastward move of 
the dharma. Speaking in Buddhist terms of teleology, the decline of the 
Eastern Zhou corresponded to the decline of the true dharma in the 
second half of its period.
To give one more example for this kind of calculation: the apologetic 
collection Guang-hongming-ji Dao-
xuan  contains a treatise, the Erjiao-lun , the Dispute on the 
Two Teachings, attributed to Shi Daoan  – not the famous Daoan 
of the fourth century, but a monk from the second half of the sixth cen-
tury – in which he presents us with several chronological calculations 
including the one preferred by 
Further: according to the annual record of dharma-master 
-
tical with the 
chou of King Huan of Zhou, he had left his home in the twenty-third year 
Kui-wei of King Huan, had attained enlightenment in the tenth year Jia-
wu of King 
.
This chronology is not any less interesting than Fa xian’s, because it 
seems to indicate a different result from a different temporal point of 
view, although it is grounded on a similar soteriological concept: Pre-




enment of the Buddha, eschatological 
terms one could argue that the end of the three periods of the dharma, 
be it apocalyptic or not, had been expected to take place at the begin-
Buddhist timetables were reshaped 
 As Sima Qian states (Shiji King Ping the house of the Zhou degen-
erated and the strong ones among the feudal lords subjugated the weak ones.” Cf. 
 It may be well possible that the reluctance of the Chinese Bud-
dhist authors to adopt a date of the Buddha falling into the era of the Eastern Zhou 
had something to do with the negative image of that period.
 
. This is also already referred to in the  
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accordingly – as is so often the case when expectations of a near end 
Buddha’s 
dates closer to the historical present and by extending the timetables 
of decay .
Now, to return to the Foguoji: The part of Fa xian’s report which I 
have just discussed is clearly interwoven with a complex of information 
belonging to the same framework of ideas: the timetable of the decay of 
the dharma and the advent of Maitreya, and the underlying conception 
of 
meaning, the meaning certainly being that the mofa period would come 
to an end in only a few years . It also indicates the expectations and 
hope for the future beyond this eschatological timetable. 
Writing Spaces and Future Times Together
Writing spaces together is a process in early Chinese Buddhism that 
attempts to imbed and integrate China as a geographical and cultural 
entity into the Indian Buddhist teleological and soteriological master-
plan. Such an attempt can, for instance, be seen in the protoarchaeolog-
ical discoveries of stupas and inscriptions in China during the reigns 
of various emperors which were ascribed to the ideal Buddhist ruler, 
the cakravartin 
Buddhist holy geography in the time of the famous Mauryan king .
It is again Fa xian who gives us an early report about a tradition which 
obviously tried to embed China into a soterio-eschatological Buddhist 
geography and timetable, this time in rather mythological ranges. Fa-
xian reports that, during his two-year stay in 
Indian monk (tianzhu-daoren 
a  about the destiny of the Buddha’s alms bowl, the  
(
then in Fa xian had seen it in the city of -
 Already clear in the -
riods of zhengfa and xiangfa mofa
 For general considerations on Buddhist eschatological, millenaristic and apoca-
 Ayu-wang , and the monuments ascribed 
to him in Chinese Buddhist and secular writing is a subject upon which more re-
 
, to  , to   , Cey-
 and then back to Middle India (Zhong-tianzhu 
 
Maitreya, and after seven heavenly days will return to earth, to 
 -king Hai-longwang 
Maitreya 
attains enlightenment. After the bowl has disappeared, the dharma will 
decline, the world and mankind will degenerate until men only reach 
The righteous will again practice a moral life until they again live to the 
Maitreya will come down to the earth.  It is 
interesting to note that Fa xian emphasizes that the recitator had pro-
hibited the spoken text to be written down – Fa xian obviously ignored 
this, but his observation nevertheless leaves us open to speculations 
about the original form of the .
Here we can see an attempt to extend the historiographical line be-
yond the present, in this case by again using the tool that seems to be 
typical for the Buddhist manner of dealing with history: a prophecy.
, 
with a geographical knowledge about the regions of Central Asia and 
China and their subsequent incorporation into a soteriological legend 
or myth, could really have been composed and recited in the south-
ernmost part of the Buddhist oikumene, in Ceylon. There is no tradi-
tion, whatsoever, in other, autochthonous southern Buddhist sources 
that would indicate the existence of a legend about the Buddha’s bowl. 
However, in the Great Chronicle of , there 
is a report, that Mahinda’s companion, the 
Sumana, brought the relics of the Buddha to Ceylon in the bowl of the 
Buddha , and according to the same source, the bowl would have been 




tissa the bowl is suddenly back in 
 passim. The 
alms bowl is still said to be enshrined in a small  near Kandy (Gei-
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the King 
that the relic did not have the same value and function in Ceylon as it 
had in other Buddhist regions.  
The legend that Fa xian heard seems to originate from the Indian 
Northwest, from 
works of art to appreciate the importance of this relic . Finally Fa xian’s 
report on the bowl in  is 
the oldest witness for its existence – not mentioning the contradicto-
ry statement in 
should already have been in Kashgar (Shale 
time
Persia,  and according to the Weishu , was even brought to China. 
This capability of the bowl to be in different places, sometimes at the 
same time, had already caused Huijiao 
monk Zhimeng , to state that relics like the  and the bowl of 
the Buddha have supernatural powers.  Although we do not have an In-
dian text on the bowl, the oldest Chinese  catalogue, Sengyou’s 
 Chu-sanzang-jiji s on the subject 
which, unfortunately, are now lost. The best example of the bowl going 
to foreign regions, and maybe as far as to China, is found in the fourth 
century apocryphal Fo-miedu-hou-guanlian-zangsong-jing 
-
dha after the 
black-haired people and will convert them to the dharma and lead them 
to good conduct. The  Za-ahan-jing 





 Biography of Gaoseng-zhuan Chu-san-
zang-jiji 
 According to Xuanzang .  
 
 (“I have enquired into the 
records and the routes of the travelling s and sometimes they are not the 
Buddha’s 
not either. 
 and the bowl are miraculously moving and sometimes 
-
a passage that was probably inserted into the collection later, has the 
Buddha , when the dharma de-
clines, the , his tooth and his bowl will go to the East. The north-
western origin of such legends around the bowl are indirectly support-
ed by the Lianhuamian-jing , 
/ Naliantiyeshe 
, who came from the northwestern region of India, where at that time 
theories about the decay of the dharma were widely known. A direct 
indication of such an origin in northwest India is found in a description 
of the lost , , which was al-
ready lost at the time Sengyou compiled his catalogue at the beginning 
of the sixth century. This account is found in the Buddhist encyclopedia 
 was of North-Indian origin, 
brought to China by the meditation-master 
, and it described the voyage of the bowl from India to China. 
This correponds well to the facts about the  as heard by Fa xian in 
Ceylon.
It is clear from these examples that the pilgrim record of Fa xian is 
structured on references to the same framework of beliefs and ideas: 
upon entering India Fa xian reports on the Buddhist soteriological time-
table, and at the point of leaving India via 
same, entwining them with the help of a calculated number of years. 
Fa xian presumed the 
present in which he lived to be the end of the dharma, so that there was 
only one hope for salvation left: the coming of Maitreya or, as an alter-
native and option, the ascencion to -
tion, to receive this bodhisattva’s blissful teaching.
Conclusion
Finally let us return to the broader context of early Chinese Buddhism. 
As I hope to have shown, it was not incidential that Fa xian started and 
ended his report on Buddhist India with references to the synchronol-
ogy of the Buddha’s  and Chinese traditional history, and to es-
chatological concepts concerning Maitreya. My opinion is that Fa xian 
belonged to the inner circle of the master Shi Daoan 
, which was the reason for his 
journey, seems to indicate this, but it would also explain his special in-
terest in Maitreya and the legends and prophecies centered around this 
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Fa xian would have shared with his presumed master, who 
Maitreya . The 
interest of Daoan in the legend of the Buddha’s bowl is shown, again, 
in the Chu-sanzang-jiji, where, in a list of extracts from different s 
for the daily use of the monks, Daoan quotes the 
, receiving the stone , from the 
Buddha-vita (Taizi  -
lated by Zhi Qian  
The computations of the dates of the Buddha by means of Chinese 
chronology may go back to Daoan as well. As is well-known, he was the 
 catalogue, which is known as Zongli-zhongjing-mulu  
and which is preserved in the Chu-sanzang-jiji
interest was the need for a distinction between true teachings and false 
teachings in the texts in a period in which the dharma was considered 
to be nearly extinguished.
Daoan was also interested in geography, especially that of the pe-
ripheries of both China and India, and especially that of Northwest 
India, exactly the region in which the giant Maitreya was standing as 
a symbol of the dharma-connection between India and the Eastern 
realms, and also as a reminder that the end of the dharma was near. It is 
not yet clear where the basic motivation for Daoan’s famous vow to be 
born in Maitreya’s heaven, 
this – and maybe the compilation of the catalogue – had something to 
do with the idea that the end of the dharma
of the Buddha, 
This probably presupposed historical calculations of the kind that are 
Fa xian’s account.
What I have tried with my two examples is to show that the ear-
ly attempts to create a Sino-Buddhist prototype of historiography by 
parallelizing Chinese and Indian antiquity arose from the pressure to 
harmonize the Buddhists’ own religious past, which was located in In-
dia, with the Chinese sense and need for historical credibility. This was 
reinforced by the belief that the end of the dharma was near, and the 
need, therefore, to determine exactly which period one was living in. 
In order to achieve this, not only histories had to be combined, but also 
 Reported in Gaoseng-zhuan
two basically different sacred spaces. It was this need for an inclusivis-
tic sacred geography and its actual creation – to embed China into the 
sacred space of Buddhism – which, ironically, proved to be one of the 
most successful tools for Chinese Buddhists to emancipate themselves 
more and more from their Indian motherland.
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Religious Policy and the Concept of 
Religion in China
Zhuo Xinping
The concept of religion in China corresponds closely to the behav-ior of the Chinese in their social life and their cultural identity in relation to religion. In the process of the modernization of Chi-
na during the twentieth century, religion has been understood by the 
Chinese in many ways. Today there is no single understanding of reli-
gion and it is discussed from various viewpoints. In any case, religion 
is evaluated in its spiritual, cultural and social structural sense. Spir-
itually, religion is seen to be a personal or mystical experience. In this 
sense religion should be a private matter and it is understood to be hu-
man spirituality. Seen culturally, religion is understood to be a partic-
ular tradition of a people or to be an expression of human civilization. 
Religion is namely a cultural phenomenon in the history of mankind. 
Seen from the viewpoint of society’s structure, religion is understood 
as a social organization or a political power. Religion as collective coex-
society. In this case religion is interwoven with the problem complex-
es of political stability, national unity and continuing social amity. In 
this context religion is both considered and accepted a highly complex 
social and cultural phenomenon. For this reason, for most Chinese to-
day religious understanding is a sensitive topic. The religion politics 
of the Communist Party of China (
are closely connected to this understanding. Based on the current im-
provements in religious understanding as a result of China’s opening to 
the outside and recent economic and political reforms, it has become 
possible for religion politics to develop in China today.
Religion in China
 Zhuo Xinping
The Historical Background of Religious Understanding in China
In China, the twentieth century began with an unfavorable climate for 
religion. At the turn of the century, most Chinese had nearly no strong 
religious self-assurance. The concept of religion was also not partic-
ularly clear. The traditional religions such as Buddhism, Daoism, and 
Confucianism experienced a decline in China just in this period. After 
the Opium Wars, Christianity had left a negative impression on most 
Chinese as being an indivisible part of imperialist aggression and col-
onization. In the period of social upheaval in which China found itself 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, resistance developed not 
only towards the religious traditions of China’s past but also towards 
Christianity. In the Rev-
The New Culture Movement began shortly afterwards, decisive for the 
entire process of Chinese modernization in the twentieth century. The 
unmistakable and direct expression of the New Culture Movement was 
the 
movement were the introduction of the concepts of “science” and “de-
mocracy” to China and the criticism of imperialism and feudalism. Con-
fucianism, as a feudalistic consciousness and a conservative remnant 
from the Chinese past, was strongly criticized in this context. The Com-
was an “Anti-Christian Movement” as well as an “Anti-Religion Move-
ment” all over China, especially in the intellectual circles of Beijing and 
Shanghai. Many Chinese communists took part in these theoretical dis-
cussions against religion in general and Christianity in particular. In 
such movements as well in the beginning of the communist develop-
ment in China, resistance towards religion was perceptible.
Precisely this trend in the understanding of religion was displayed 
in the attitude of a group of well-known scholars in China. Emphasis on 
the difference between religion and philosophy was characteristic, as 
was the leave-taking of religion in Chinese self-awareness and in the 
cultural development in China. Some intellectual reformers in China 
carried out comparisons between philosophy and religion in which 
they emphasized the special meaning and function of philosophy in Chi-
nese culture. In contrast they regarded religion rather condescending-
  
ly. In their opinion, the Chinese intellectual tradition held philosophy 
in high esteem. It contained the principle of philosophical skepticism, 
conscious of formulating questions. Owing to this intention, namely, to 
investigate these questions, rationality was thoroughly employed in 
philosophy. An active and curious mind leads to philosophical discov-
eries and mental development. Since an attitude of faith stands behind 
every religion, this satisfaction in belief hinders mental exploration and 
intellectual curiosity and annuls the necessity for rationality. The de-
cision in the past of the traditional Chinese “literati” to be interested 
in philosophy rather than in religion was therefore praised. Such in-
tellectuals were very happy and content, because the intellectual and 
cultural tradition in China revealed above all a tradition of philosophy. 
In this heritage of ideas there should be no place for religion. One repre-
sentative of this period, Liang Qichao 
“What differentiates China from other nations is that we have no reli-
gion.”  Thus the Chinese intellectuals at the beginning of the twentieth 
century were united in their belief that the Chinese nation was a-reli-
gious and that the Chinese had developed a culture without religion.
Strictly speaking, Confucianism was also considered to be a philos-
ophy and not a religion. In the Ming and Qing Dynasties, Matteo Ricci 
Jesuits who had come to China stated for the 
Confucianism was not a religion but was rather only a 
set of traditional customs. They said this in order to avoid the Chinese 
“Rites Controversy”. At the beginning of the twentieth century Liang 
Qichao also stated that Confucianism was not a religion. However, af-
Kang Youwei 
conservative intellectuals in China attempted to see Confucianism as 
the state religion and to reactivate it along these lines. However, this at-
tempt failed, and in the process Confucianism as a religion was judged 
negatively and was highly criticized. At that time Buddhism was not 
considered to be a Chinese tradition but a foreign religious import. 
Moreover, the typical characteristics of Buddhism were regarded to be 
a philosophy and not a religion. Daoism was actually the only native 
religion in China, but it was seen in its connection with folk religions 
or even with superstitious practices, traditional customs, and habits 
of the Chinese people. For this reason Chinese intellectuals were very 
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proud in their assumption that China was the only nation in the world 
without a religion.
The Chinese intellectuals of that period realized to a certain degree 
that China could not be detached from the religious way of life in antiq-
uity. But in this respect religion was understood to be merely a lower 
or more primitive step in the historical development of Chinese culture. 
The need for a religious way of life in the contemporary development 
of China was thus negated. If there was still religion in China, it should 
be replaced with aesthetic education. For the Chinese the process of 
Cai Yuanpei 
president of Beijing University during the period of the new cultural 
movements, published his famous talk entitled “Replace Religion with 
Aesthetic Education.”  Cai understood religion to be an old-fashioned 
pedagogical method. He admitted that every nation had experienced 
periods in which education rested wholly in the hands of religious or-
ganizations. Earlier, religious education had encompassed the basic 
elements of intellectual, moral, physical, and aesthetical education. 
developments. Religion played an ever smaller role in the understand-
ing and self-realization of the individual and his environment. Mystical 
phenomena could now be de-mythologized through human reason and 
-
-
er, were no longer suited to the needs of modern society. Religion had 
lost its importance in moral, spiritual and physical education. Religion 
was still of value only in the teaching of aesthetics. But Cai Yuanpei was 
of the opinion that even here education must depart from religion, be-
cause if one held on to religion in the teaching of aesthetics, connec-
tions to the intellectual and moral aspects of religion would easily oc-
cur. This in turn would stand in the way of pure aesthetic perception. 
In contrast, this new education in aesthetics should be free, progressive 
and universal. For Cai, replacing religion with aesthetics education was 
necessary for the modern development of human society. Religion was 
only a temporary product of human history, and the era of religion had 
already passed. Cai Yuanpei, in this anti-religion movement, also criti-
cized Christianity strongly. For him, it did not seem necessary for China 
to have a religion. In this period most Chinese intellectuals emphasized 
that the traditional culture of China should be molded by philosophy. 
And this culture would be superior to all other cultures that were car-
ried by a religious spirit. Although there were reactions and arguments 
from the Christian churches, in China the rejection of religion was over-
riding.
Pointing Out the Social Aspects in the Term Religion in China
Religion is translated into Chinese as “zongjiao” . The term zongjiao 
is actually made up of two words, namely zong  and jiao . Originally 
jiao was used very often for religious forms in Chinese history, as for 
example the names in Chinese for Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism 
which are, respectively, ru-jiao , fo-jiao  and dao-jiao  Jiao 
is a Chinese word that carries the parallel meanings of religion, preach-
ing, upbringing and instruction. However, in the original concept of jiao 
there was no obvious semantic level that indicated “religion”, but rather 
jiao most commonly meant instruction and upbringing. The following 
expression for the origin of jiao is given in the “Book of Changes” (Yijing 
the entire world joined him.” Confucius explained the relationship be-
tween tian dao jiao
“Proportion and Centre” (
-
-
ally ru-shi-dao san-jiao  namely the three religions Confu-
cianism, Buddhism and Daoism, can also be translated as “the three 
teachings of Confucius, Buddha and Dao”. The origin of the combina-
tion zongjiao is found in the context of Buddhist expressions. Buddhism 
called that which the Buddha said “ jiao”, and that which the disciples of 
Buddha said “zong”. Jiao is therefore the “teaching” of Buddha, whereas 
zong are the schools resulting from this teaching. To reiterate, in Bud-
dhism zongjiao is merely the Buddhist doctrine. In this tradition jiao is 
not normally understood as religion, but rather as the enlightenment of 
the Chinese.
Only at the beginning of the twentieth century did the European idea 
of religion enter the Chinese language, by way of Japanese, as  
With this introduction of European theology, the term religion received 
a complex of meanings in China. In this understanding of religion the 
Chinese usually emphasized the concrete social existence of religion 
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in the form of groups of people or social organizations. When speaking 
of religion, one meant primarily the social structure and the sociolog-
ical function of religion. It is for this reason that the Chinese religion 
philosopher and Christian thinker Wang Zhixin 
at one point said: “When we think of religion we are reminded of tall 
temples, majestic churches and all the well-structured and well-or-
-
sults from a supreme spirit. Originally the word ‘religion’ didn’t only 
mean a system, but also human feelings of devotion and worship. In 
our translation of the word religion with zongjiao, the term has lost 
some of this original connotation. When we hear the word zongjiao we 
tend to imagine a structured organization with which a certain por-
 With this understanding of religion as a 
social structure and organization, the Chinese intellectuals considered 
only a minority of the Chinese population to have a religion. In this, the 
concepts of “spirituality” and “belief” were clearly separated from that 
of “religion”. To be more precise, this understanding of religion devel-
oped at the expense of humanity’s religious spirit and of the existence 
of religious interests beyond religious organizations. Another theolog-
ical philosopher and Christian thinker, Xie Fuya 
drew the following comparison in this respect: “There are, in fact, large 
differences between the Western concept of religio and our zong jiao. If 
we look for synonyms for the word religio in Chinese dictionaries, the 
word dao is possibly suggested. Two connotations are associated with 
harmony between the individual and the cosmos resonates in dao, but 
it also includes aspects of activity, and the conforming of the individual 
to society.”  Until today, the focal point of the understanding of religion 
of many theoreticians of religion in China has rested primarily with the 
study of religious organizations or institutions. In China, a faith with-
out a social organization or structure is not recognized as a religion, 
or as a perfected form of religion. Religion, spirituality, and faith are 
clearly distinguished from one another here. In this sense, religion is 
religious practices and religious organization. 
 
 
The Religious Politics of the Communist Party of China
The Communist Party of China ( -
mosphere of the new cultural and the anti-religion movements. From 
its founding, the CPC’s understanding of religion was closely tied to 
the party’s political and economic considerations. In addition, its un-
Marxist and Leninist 
religious theories. However, with the founding of the CPC the following 
principles were very clear and decisive for its relation to religion:
-
munism and religion. However, the CPC would not combat religion 
directly. Religious phenomena had surely their economic, social, and 
existential reasons. The CPC should be aware of these reasons, and, 
at the outset, reform and improve the society that was responsible 
with feudalism and imperialism should replace the battle against 
theocracy and superstition. 
communists and religious followers, on the basis of mutual respect, 
feudalism. At the ideological level there was no compromise or sim-
ilarity between the CPC and religion. At the political and practical 
level however, there was indeed a consensus between the two and 
namely one of the most important secret weapons of the CPC during 
the Chinese revolution.
Religious beliefs were namely the private matter of religious fol-
lowers. The CPC’s duty should be the development and reform of 
society. With the progress and improvement of Chinese society, re-
ligious followers will have no further use for their beliefs, and thus 
will give up their religious beliefs of themselves. In this process of 
social development and historical progress, religion will gradual-
ly disappear from human history. For this reason it is unnecessary 
and improper for the 
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After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, religious freedom 
was theoretically guaranteed in the new constitution. The principle of a 
emphasized by the CPC. During this time, the CPC had a theory of the 
had a mass characteristic as well as national, international, complex, 
and long-term characteristics. At the same time, however, a reform or a 
conforming of religion itself to the new society should also be called for. 
All religions in China must shift from their connection to the old Chi-
nese society to conformity with the new socialist society. This means 
that religion must overcome, on one hand, as in Buddhism and Daoism, 
its feudalistic elements, and on the other, as in Christianity, its impe-
rialistic pressures. In reality, religion was considered for a short time, 
the establishment of Chinese socialism. After the Cultural Revolution, 
especially since the opening of China to the outside and its economic 
, “About 
the basic viewpoints and basis politics in relation to religion in the so-
cialist period of our nation,” was published by the CPC. This document 
demonstrates a new starting point for religion politics and the under-
standing of religion through the opening of China to the outside. In the 
new state of social development of China and its relations abroad, the 
CPC maintains the standpoint of “extreme care”, “absolute seriousness”, 
the proper treatment of such religious problems by the CPC affects the 
stability of society, the unity of the nationalities in China as well as the 
To elucidate the basic viewpoints of the CPC’s religion politics in this 
period, the following ten points must be noted:
-
ligion will exist for a long time in socialist society. In socialism, reli-
gion may not be abolished or developed by the government.
have not only the freedom to believe in a religion, but also the free-
dom not to believe in a religion.
-
ence between theism and atheism must not be seen as a political 
dichotomy. The correct relationship between the two should be sol-
idarity and cooperation in politics and mutual respect of beliefs. 
protect normal religious activities and their lawful interests, and 
prevent and repress unlawful and criminal activities in the use of 
religion.
within the people. However, under certain circumstances it is also 
possible that antagonistic discrepancies arise. These two dissimilar 
discrepancies must be rigorously differentiated and dealt with ap-
propriately and carefully. 
-
tration into religious practices through foreign enemy powers. The 
interference in China’s religious affairs by any religious organiza-
CPC, the government, and the religious believers in China. Their 
positive role should unfold to its fullest extent.
-
tematic education that includes administration. 
-
cialist society. The circle of religion should keep its activities within 
the lawfully allowed framework. 
-
nity of the law, the interests of the people, the unity of the national-
ities, and the unity of the state.
These principles are primarily portrayed on the political and social lev-
el. However, some basic theoretical considerations about the existence 
and function of religion in China are present in the new situation:
most fundamental question concerning the understanding of reli-
gion is that of the nature of religion. According to Marxist under-
“reversed world”. In this context, Lenin understood the thesis “reli-
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gion is the opium of the people” to be “the cornerstone of Marxism’s 
entire weltanschauung on the question of religion”. However, with 
religion in socialist China today. If religion is a “reversed awareness 
really a dilemma in the discussion about the nature and existence 
of religion in today’s China. One must either accept this thesis and 
thus criticize and deny our own social basis, or simply cautiously 
theoretical circles. This debate, called the “opium war between 
north and south China”, brought the analysis of Marxist statements 
about religion a step further, and had a positive effect on the under-
as a spiritual belief or ideology. Thus the question stands: Is religion 
necessarily the unavoidable adversary for the Marxist or socialist 
-
na today for the Marxist theory of religion to come to a consensus 
or compromise, but the principle of “progressive development with 
time” and “progressive renewal with time” in today’s Marxism with 
Chinese characteristics brings us new hope. The primary distin-
guishing feature of the dialectic method in Marxism is the empha-
sis on the movement, development and continual transformation of 
Every period has its own conditions. Not only ideas and thoughts, 
but even epistemological norms are continually renewed. In histor-
ical development both religion and Marxism can and actually will 
continually renew themselves and change. In the future, a consen-
sus of the two will be thereby also possible. This can guarantee the 
ultimate normalization of the relationship between them.
China. That is to say, the concept of religion is apprehended either 
from the viewpoint of its ideological beliefs or judged by its social 
-
sensus, one rather examines the meaning and value of religion from 
the viewpoint of its social function. In this understanding, however, 
both the positive and negative functions of religion are stressed. 
Included in religion’s positive functions in socialist China are name-
ly its function of psychological conformity, social integration, the 
socialization of individuals, and the awareness of equality, culture 
and good manners. However, the possible negative functions of re-
ligion are also not ignored, such as conservatism, fatalism, fanati-
cism, the psychological repression of reality, the division of society 
through the emphasis on individual denominations instead of social 
unity, etc. Here the subjective evaluation or differentiation between 
correct and incorrect is not mentioned, but rather only an objective 
description of religion’s positive or negative function for society. 
The active adaptation of religion to Chinese society is namely to de-
velop its positive functions and avoid those that are negative.
broad masses. In this respect one must answer the question: Is re-
-
ligious faithful also a part of the broad masses that President Jiang 
Zemin  emphasizes in his theory of the “Three Representa-
religion’s “intermediary condition”, in modern society the political 
function of religion is normally indirectly realized as being “ a-polit-
ical”. The principle in contemporary society is, for most states, the 
separation of religion and politics or of religion and government. 
politics. It should not be entirely clear whether it exists separately 
from politics or inseparably. On one hand, one stresses the differ-
ence between religious world views and the current mainstream of 
the socialist ideology, and on the other hand, religious organization 
has a very strong political consciousness. This is a contradiction 
that does not seem to be in harmony with the present day devel-
opment in China. At the moment one talks about legislation for re-
without a consensus on the basic concept of religion and religious 
understanding. To put it clearly, in this state of affairs one does not 
understand whether such legislation should protect the rights and 
duties of believers or limit religious activities.
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New Developments in Religion Politics and the Understanding of 
Religion in China
matters and religion politics in China was convened. At the conference 
President Jiang Zemin listed three characteristics of contemporary 
world religions:
-
ligion will exist for a very long time and will have lasting effects. 
Marxism holds the view that, with the development of social pro-
ductive resources, the progress of civilization and the increase of 
-
ual reduction of the basis and prerequisites for religious existence, 
-
tinction of classes and states.
prerequisite for the existence of religion is faith in broad masses of 
the population. This mass character of religion very often gives rise 
to tremendous social force. If handled correctly this force can have 
a very positive role in the development and the stability of society. 
If not, it can have a negative and even destructive function. This 
crucial point is dependent on the effective establishment and ad-
ministration of religion.
real battles and is therefore an important factor in international re-
lations as well as in world politics. Through their expansion, some 
of the world’s large religions are already multi-national religions. 
In this sense religion is not only an important factor in internation-
al relations and in world politics, but is also interwoven with their 
-
not handled correctly, religion can churn up a stormy sea in inter-
national affairs, and can give rise to the so-called “clash of civiliza-
tions”. 
This conference made the fundamental tasks needed for the new cen-
tury in religious matters even clearer. The required work entails these 
-
liefs in the politics of the 
-
and development of a patriotic united front between the CPC and the 
religious sphere.
-
ister named Pan Yue -
nomic Structure Reforms published an article entitled “The necessity for 
the development of Marxist religious theories over time”. In this article 
he described his understanding of the relationship between the Commu-
opium for 
and as “wisdom for the next life” is that the Communist Party should not 
spiritual recompensation is irreplaceable. One must respect the spiritu-
special functions for the population as, for example, psychic, moral, and 
cultural functions as well functions in the service and well-being of the 
and rational relationship between religion and the government as well as 
between religion and politics. It is namely possible that they work very 
well with each other. Quoting Lenin, he even implied in his article that re-
ligious believers, inasmuch as they are part of the political consensus and 
work together on the united front, would be allowed to become members 
of the Communist Party. His opinion immediately set off heated debates 
and also sharp criticism in China. The differences of opinion regarding 
religion can once again be clearly observed. It is interesting to note that 
this article had very positive reactions in religious circles on the Chinese 
mainland and also received fantastic speculations in Hong Kong and its 
vicinity.
To conclude we should observe that religious politics and religious un-
derstanding in China today stands at a crossroad. The deliberation about 
religious matters in China is primarily motivated by political and social 
interests. If religion, both in China and abroad, can contribute positive-
ly to Chinese development and transformation, then we certainly have 
wide possibilities for the active acceptance of religion by the CPC and the 
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Chinese population, not only in the sense of politics, society and culture, 
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Chinese Jews and Jews in China
Kaifeng – Shanghai
Irene Eber
In both imperial and modern China, Jews were a small minority in comparison to the larger Moslem and Christian minorities. At most there may have been several thousand Jews in past ages and possibly 
-
nities have invited considerable scholarly attention over the years, and 
their histories of remoter periods and more recent times have raised a 
number of questions. One of these, and the one to be taken up in this pa-
per, is how the Jews in Kaifeng  and in Shanghai, each at a different 
time and a different place, accommodated themselves to the Chinese 
environment. By Chinese Jews, I mean primarily those who settled in 
Kaifeng in the twelfth century, the initial group being augmented by 
newcomers probably over the next two hundred years. By Jews in Chi-
na, I have in mind the disparate groups who arrived in Shanghai after 
the Sephardi 
Jews,  then Russian, and later Central European Jews. 
Although we speak of Kaifeng Jews, it must be remembered that 
at least until the seventeenth century, Jewish communities existed in 
Ningbo , Yangzhou , and Ningxia . The more recent Shang-
hai communities were similarly not the only ones. There were also or-
ganized communities in Harbin and Tianjin , although they were 
  I thank Professor A. Altman for his careful comments on this paper and the Tru-
man Research Institute of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem for its partial sup-
port of this research.
 Sephardi communities were widespread throughout the Mediterranean countries, 
North Africa, the Balkans, but also in portions of Western and Central Europe. 
Sephar dim have distinctive rituals, differences in liturgy and some traditions that 
differ from those of the Ashkenazim. Most of the Sephardim who came to Shanghai 
hailed originally from Iraq and are often also referred to as Baghdadis.
Religion in China
 Irene Eber
smaller. In this paper I will discuss only the Kaifeng Jews, as data about 
the other communities is lacking, and the Shanghai communities.
Beginnings of the Kaifeng Jewish Community 
Jewish merchants, having come overland, probably traded on the 
Chang’an  market during the Tang dynasty.  They might also have 
reached China by sea, sailing together with Arab merchants to Guang-
zhou 
conclusively. Nor is there evidence for the presence of an actual Jewish 
community during the Tang dynasty. The existence of a later Jewish 
community in -
the information on these is fragmentary.
synagogue was built in 
Jews had arrived to warrant a house of 
prayer. It can be assumed that they were merchants who came in small 
groups over a period of time together with other merchants headed for 
cotton merchants from India (Tianzhu 
cotton began to be cultivated only during the Northern Song dynasty 
in the Yangzi (Changjiang  delta and was not yet widely available 
throughout the empire. Where precisely they came from in India is not 
known, nor can we be certain that they were Indian Jews.  Quite like-
ly they arrived in Kaifeng before the Jurchen (Ruzhen 
 A selikhot or penitential prayer written on paper and dating from the Tang dy-
nasty was found in Dunhuang . As paper was not in general use in Europe at 
that time, it must be assumed that it was written in China by someone who left 
Persians 
and so-called Semitic merchants and musicians are well known. Among them are 
Jews from farther west, 
or even from Franco-German lands.
The stelae were inscribed and erected to commemorate special events in commu-
synagogue 
was the erection of the Zhao family archway. The Chinese texts can be found in 
 Merchants from different places tended to band together for sea voyages, consti-
-
 Chinese Jews and   
which would have endangered their merchandise, either during the 
hostilities, or even shortly thereafter. It is nevertheless clear that they 
built their synagogue when Kaifeng was under foreign rule and when it 
was no longer the capital.
The attraction to merchants of Song -
ishing commerce. With more than one million inhabitants within the 
city walls and its suburbs, Kaifeng was an “open” city, with none of the 
constraints that had characterized earlier Chinese cities. As argued 
persuasively by Heng Chye Kiang, 
culture with commerce and consumerism a part of urban life.  In this 
new kind of city with its unrestrained commercial and entertainment 
establishments, a group of foreign -
-
because trading relations between the Jin  
 The fact that they 
built a synagogue after Kaifeng had come under Jin control (together 
-
tions continued to be favorable and that they had settled permanently 
in Kaifeng.
No doubt, relations with other Jewish communities were maintained 
in the Jin period and especially during the subsequent Yuan dynasty. 
Mongol pe-
riod, Jews from other parts of the vast Mongol empire may have set-
tled in Kaifeng and in other cities. However, we know nothing about 
them, how they perpetuated their Judaism, how precisely they made 
further information is not until three centuries later, from the Ming dy-
inscriptions is very fragmentary. The information from these, useful 
to this topic, can be summarized as follows. The Jews had assumed, or 
were permitted to assume, Chinese surnames in the early years of the 




Ming dynasty. Jews from other communities contributed to the recon-
struction of the 
of the prosperity of communities other than Kaifeng and of contacts 
between communities. Two scrolls of the Torah were provided by Ning-
bo Jews, which furthermore, supports the assumption that it, too, must 
From Communal to Family Identity
The Jesuits have provided more concrete information about the Kai-
feng Jews in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. A famous 
Ai Tian , who had 
come to Ricci 
Ricci assuming that Ai Tian was Christian 
and Ai Tian thinking that Ricci was Jewish – is well known and needs 
no further comment. More importantly, in the wake of this meeting a 
number of Jesuit fathers visited 
Beijing and Guangzhou by order of the Yongzheng 
 
-
ful community. Its members led rich Jewish lives in addition to being 
active in Chinese society, with a number of families reaching elite sta-
-
cracy. A drawing of the synagogue, based on sketches prepared by Jean 
 Un-
fortunately, nothing is known of the fate of the Jews between the last Je-
Protestant visitor, W.A.P. 
whose dramatic description of the visit still makes enjoyable reading.
Clearly, however, by the mid-nineteenth century the Jewish commu-
nity had been declining for quite some time. There was no longer a head 
(zhangjiao 
Circumcision was also no longer practiced and knowledge of Hebrew 
had ceased. Abstinence from pork was apparently still practiced, possi-
bly under synagogue had, however disappeared. 
 
 The drawing is of the -
Li Zicheng -
ting the Yellow River dykes in the waning days of the Ming dynasty.
 
 Chinese Jews and 
some time thereafter.
This brief outline raises a number of questions. How had the Jews 
maintained their Jewish identity for seven centuries with minimal or 
their numbers were not augmented from outside of China for some-
thing like three centuries, how were they able to maintain a numeri-
the Chinese society, which had erected no barriers against them and 
apparently did not discriminate against 
concerning the maintenance of Jewish identity in the strength of Jewish 
practices, or rather in those aspects of Chinese culture and society that 
-
ing I shall argue that it was a unique combination of both.
The acquisition of Chinese surnames, mentioned earlier, may be con-
sidered a major step for Jewish integration into Chinese society. This 
occurred at more or less the same time that the Chinese family organi-
zation into lineages was adopted. Such a transition was not a major step 
for these Jews, since most or all were undoubtedly Sephardi, whose cus-
tom it was to organize into clans. Moreover, Sephardi Jews practiced 
polygamy, which, depending on their means, they continued to practice 
in Kaifeng. Their memorial or genealogy book of some centuries lat-
Jewish and other wives as Chinese.  Possibly 
they took Chinese wives due to the scarcity of Jewish women. Be that 
as it may, it suggests more importantly a more rapid population growth 
than if they had been monogamous.
But Chinese lineages differ in several ways from what is understood 
by the term clan. A lineage generally traces its origin to one ancestor, 
goes by one surname, is domiciled in one locality, and holds some proper-
ty, including a burial ground, in common. Evidence for the assumption of 
such lineage organization by the Kaifeng Jews comes from two sources: 
inscriptions on the stelae and -
tions “seven surnames” (qixing 
jia  Secondly, family cemeteries 
of the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, Ohio.
reproduced in White.
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came into use. Indeed, even if a Jewish cemetery had ever existed in 
Kaifeng, it has long disappeared. And precisely when this custom was 
event, it occurred well after the lineage family organization was preva-
lent. Wang Yisha refers to several family cemeteries in Kaifeng’s suburbs 
and adjoining hamlets, among which the Jin  and Li  cemeteries each 
have a “foremost” grave, marked “Old Ancestor’s Grave”.  Graves thus 
original ancestor of the lineage.
with a larger and amorphous Jewish community beyond China’s bor-
-
natic group. As long as lineages remained Jewish, individual Jews were 
unlikely to abandon their Jewish identity. Although Jewishness could be 
abandoned and forgotten by an entire family, especially if that family 
left Kaifeng, Jewishness continued within the lineage as long as a fam-
ily remained intact and was domiciled in the same locality. There is, 
furthermore, no evidence that the Jews ever were a community in the 
sense in which we know other Jewish communities, with institutions 
and their designated functions. Indeed, these were not needed as the 
lineage performed such functions on behalf of its families. Therefore, 
instead of identifying with a Jewish people, Kaifeng Jewish identity be-
came a family-centered identity. 
This transformation was accompanied and reinforced by how they 
Jewish practices, namely as similar to those of a religious sect. Like 
Chinese sects, the Jews were called a jiao , which may be variously 
translated as religion, religious sect, or teaching, and this is how they 
referred to themselves in the inscriptions. When the word Israel (Yici-
 
of a people, but refers to the founding or establishment of the teach-
ing.  The inscriptions, furthermore, refer to the Jews as “followers of 
the teaching,” that is as a sect.  But their Chinese neighbors apparently 
 
Ancestor’s grave was at the apex 
of a triangular arrangement of graves.
 
 
 Chinese Jews and 
Tiaojin-jiao 
Jiaojing-jiao lanmao huihui 
 (blue cap 
Jean-Paul -
ing sect” was bestowed on the Jews by the “idolaters”
that these names were not of their own invention. 
As admirably described by Daniel Overmyer popular sectarianism, 
Buddhist, 
Daoist, Confucian, and 
Chinese empire, including the North China Plain.  It was a localized 
and highly fragmented phenomenon and the sects were known by a 
variety of names. Part of the rural as well as the urban scene, sectar-
ians shared a number of characteristics that were not too dissimilar 
from those of the 
as dietary customs.
Which practices the Jews kept can be learned from the inscriptions, 
the various Jesuit reports, and the few manuscripts that have been re-
covered from Kaifeng. The Jews observed the major festivals, including 
th of Av, which commemo-
rates the destruction of the Temple. They prayed three times a day with 
a Torah portion, and on special oc-
casions as required, read the haphtarah (
the Kosher slaughter was 
-
though a shokhet
was also practiced, but again a mohel (expert in 
mentioned. According to Donald Leslie, it is doubtful that they managed 
to keep the Jewish calendar in order, as periodic adjustments have to 
be made. It is, therefore, also doubtful that they observed the festivals 
at their proper times.  They had, of course, prayer books and scrolls 
of the Torah, but whether they had books of the Talmud is uncertain.  
They followed rabbinic practices while praying, and one might conjec-
 
 Talmudic books, but writes that 
rabbinates.
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ture that they had some Talmudic books in the early days that were 
later lost. Jewish practices were in some instances (Passover in spring, 
reinforcing the sectarian identity. Gradually, therefore, the connection 
to a foreign and universal religion was severed and ties were estab-
lished to native and local religions. Therefore, not only in appearance 
but also in their life-style, the Jews were neither strangers nor outsid-
ers in Chinese society. The Judaism allowed Kaifeng Jews 
to retain a Jewish identity, and it allowed them to practice a kind of 
It is obviously easier to say something about the practices that con-
tinued to be in use for close to eight hundred years than it is to discuss 
describing the beliefs these Jews held. A book by Zhao Yingdou 
– a Kaifeng Jew actively involved in community affairs – of ten chapters 
with the suggestive title Mingdao xu  (Preface to the Illustrious 
extant.  However, the inscriptions indicate that the basis of their belief 
continued to be monotheism. There is no mention of Chinese deities in 
the inscriptions, and Shangdi  occurs only when quotations from 
the Chinese Classics are used, in particular on the horizontal and ver-
tical tablets.  Heaven (Tian  is used generally when God is referred 
to, although Di   
Yet, there is also ample evidence in the inscriptions that monotheism 
was combined with Chinese moral precepts, such as the cardinal vir-
tues of xiao zhong ren 
righteousness (  
Aside from questions of belief, attempts to establish succession and 
transmission, as well as to provide Kaifeng Jewish history with a Chi-
nese context are especially noteworthy. The succession always begins 
with Adam, moves on to Abraham, as the founder, and continues from 
Abraham to Noah after Adam,  and 
troubled, as would be later Protestant missionaries, whether the term Tian truly 
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Ezra.  In the earliest in-
scription, Adam is referred to as Adam-Pan Gu ,  that is as one per-
son, and Abraham is said to be of the nineteenth generation after Adam. 
Adam came originally from India (Tian-
zhu Abraham’s establishment of 
th year of the Zhou 
th
calendar, and one wonders why they were chosen. For Ezra no dates are 
teaching to the Han dynasty.
Time and space (even the mythic time of 
ingredients that have helped move Jewish history into a Chinese histor-
ical context. The important personages now have dates that coincide 
with the early Chinese history of the Zhou dynasty. Adam, moreover, 
though he is a progenitor and not a founder, is given a recognizable or-
igin in India instead of an unfamiliar place. Therefore, Abraham, as his 
descendant, can also be placed in a known geographical area. Finally, 
the arrival of the religion in the Han dynasty provides the necessary 
starting point for Jewish development in China. Were there other writ-
ings that developed these ideas more concretely, ideas that are stated 
-
ed on the basis of the stelae is that the creation of a Jewish-Chinese 
history contributed to, and was part of the process of 
After 
Kaifeng, leaving accounts that Michael Pollak has appropriately called in 
a chapter heading “Outright Lies, Tall Tales, and a Few Truths.”  But no 
matter what the shortcomings of these visitors’ stories were, whether 
they spoke to few or many, those with whom they spoke continued to 
think of themselves as 
Jewish have been revived through outside contacts. Jewish visitors to 
 According to one of the Chinese creation myths, Pan Gu is the giant from whose 
body the world was created.
 I am grateful to Max Deeg who, in his excellent conference lecture and essay in this 
volume, has helped me pinpoint the two aspects of time and space.
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Kaifeng have imported knowledge about Jewish practices, onto which 
some members of erstwhile Jewish families (especially the Shi  Jin 
, and Zhao -
tions in an attempt to reinvent Judaism.  “Descendant of Jews” (
 But according 
to the legal (halakhic -
essarily establish the Jewishness of the person, as descent is determined 
by the status of the mother.  But, as Pollak, points out, it is unlikely that 
non-Jewish women who married Jewish men were converted after the 
last  Thus present-day Kaifeng individuals who 
identify themselves as Jews can be accepted as halakhically Jewish only 
if they were to formally convert, although it goes without saying that the 
halakhic Israel 
and in the diaspora. 
It is possible, however, that some might be considering conversion. In 
recent years, a few young Kaifeng men have been mentioned as studying 
at Jerusalem religious schools (
Kaifeng as teachers 
Shi Lei studied Hebrew 
and Jewish subjects at Bar Ilan University.  An Institute of Jewish Studies 
has been established at He’nan University . Presumably it will 
attract Kaifeng descendants as students, who would like to study their 
how long lasting, or how genuine this interest in Judaism is. Can it lead to 
an actual revival of Kaifeng Judaism and what characteristics might such 
Jewish in Chinese Kaifeng meant as-
 Shi Zhongyu, for example, remembered that during the spring festival his father 
wrote Chinese characters with chicken blood on the door frame of his house “to 
guard against the devil.” With minor variations this story is repeated by others. 
Some remember Japanese soldiers searching for Jews in -
 A photocopy of a Shi family member’s registration card is in the author’s posses-
sion.
 EJ Mishnah tractate Qidushin Talmud states suc-
cinctly that the offspring of a gentile woman (married to a 
her status, to which 
Talmudic injunction is based on the bibli-
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serting particularity within a society consisting of particular groups. It 
did not mean religious separateness. In present-day Kaifeng, the formal 
assumption of Judaism would have different implications and could have 
different consequences.
The Shanghai Jewish Communities
Whereas the Kaifeng Jews were not truly a community, Judaism being 
family centered and sectarian, the case of Shanghai is different. From 
Shang-
hai, communities which, except for the fact that they were Jewish, had 
little else in common. Sephardi Jews (or Shanghai 
from Iraq via India, were English speakers, and established their homes 
and business enterprises in the International Settlement. Russian Jews 
came next, some by way of 
-
sion, while the poorer among them went to live in Hongkou , which 
was part of the International Settlement north of Suzhou Creek . 
The Central European refugees, mostly German and Austrian but also 
-
Europeans settled in Hongkou, although some took up residence in the 
International Settlement. A fourth and distinctly different group ar-
Jewish writers 
and intellectuals, a number of Polish and Lithuanian rabbis, and several 
religious schools together with their rabbinic teachers.  This group of 
mostly 
carved out a Shanghai existence for themselves vastly different from 
German-speaking Jews in Shanghai – aside from a small group of Yid-
dish speakers – each group culturally as well as religiously different 
from the other. Numerically, the Sephardi group remained the smallest 
with something over one thousand people. The Russian group was larg-
obtain Curacao visas that, in turn, enabled them to procure Russian and Japanese 
transit visas. They arrived in Japanese shipped 
them to Shanghai.
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twenty thousand Jews. In the treaty port Shanghai, the culturally and 
linguistically different groups of Jews found a congenial environment 
conducive to the maintenance of their differences.
Shanghai was a mosaic of districts, consisting of the Chinese areas, 
the International Settlement, and the French Concession. The Inter-
national Settlement was similarly a mosaic of populations made up of 
many different kinds of Europeans, Asians, and Chinese. The Chinese 
population was by far the largest, and continued to grow as refugees 
Japanese, Indi-
ans, Germans, French, Italians, and others, each forming a kind of en-
clave in the unique treaty port setting. But these were not, as Robert 
Bickers and Christian Henriot write, colonialist communities. The for-
eigners were rather a large collection of various kinds of people pur-
suing their “interests in the interstices of empire, adroitly operating 
on the margins of treaty legality, using extraterritoriality, and the grey 
areas offered by colonial citizenship and settler autonomy, to further 
their own end.” The treaty system, the authors argue, enabled nationals 
to develop new identities,  allowing them at the same time to preserve 
earlier identities such as linguistic and religious. Foreigners, writes 
Betty Wei, and Chinese remained separate, even while working togeth-
er and competing with one another.  The millions of Chinese were far 
from a homogenous population, whether they lived in the Internation-
al Settlement or in the Chinese-administered city. Shanghai’s Chinese 
population was largely made up of people who had left their native 
towns and villages in search of work and livelihood in the metropolis. 
Together with the masses of destitute refugees who arrived after the 
-
posed of disparate ethnic groups.  
Communication within each group, Chinese and foreign, was main-
tained by means of newspapers and radio broadcasts. In addition to 
Chinese newspapers, English dailies and an array of weeklies in Rus-
sian, Polish, German, and Yiddish were available. Among the Jewish pa-
pers, some weeklies served the non- -
who hailed originally from Jiangsu  Province, north of the Yangzi.
 Chinese Jews and 
cally addressed religious or secular Jews. The subject of publishing will 
be discussed in greater detail below. 
Synagogues, Rabbis, and Observances
The Shanghai Jewish communities were not only culturally diverse, re-
ligious differences created additional fragmentation, especially within 
the Ashkenazi community, into secular, observant, and ultra-religious. 
This fragmentation duplicated, of course, the European Jewish religious 
Bagh-
anti-Semi-
no political authority able or empowered to enforce uniformity and 
conformity, and thus variations and differences could be maintained 
and perpetuated.
The three Jewish groups, Baghdadi, Russian, and Central European, 
maintained separate synagogues. The earliest were those of the Sephar-
di She’erit 
-
placed by two splendid structures: 
by Silas Aaron Hardoon.  By the early years of the twentieth centu-
ry, enough Russian Jews had arrived in Shanghai to feel the need of a 
congregation of their own. They did not build a synagogue, but used 
the premises of the Sephardi She’erit Israel synagogue. Ohel Moshe (Oi-
Synagogue was constructed in the French Concession.  
The approximately twenty thousand Central European refugees fully 
Judaism, now transplanted into the 
treaty port context. Aside from the Central European and Polish secu-
larists, the refugees represented the entire spectrum of Reform, Liber-
al, and ultra-Orthodox Jewry. Due to their diversity and their sojourner 
status, building a 
festivals and the high holy days they used various premises, while for 
 Silas Shanghai personality who, perhaps in-
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the ultra-Orthodox rabbis and their students Beth Aharon was made 
available.
During the nearly one hundred years of Jewish populations in 
Shanghai, rabbis, who were responsible for the communities’ spiritual 
to speak the language of their congregants and they would have had to 
come from abroad in order to have received rabbinic training. For the 
rabbi presented special problems because, in ad-
dition to familiarity with Sephardi liturgy and customs, he had to be an 
English speaker in order to represent the status-conscious community 
in the International Settlement.  The Baghdadis eventually compro-
requirement. The Russian community was more fortunate. Rabbi Meir 
Vladivostok, came to Shanghai 
-
ty-one years.  More research is needed to better understand the reli-
gious diversity of the Central European refugees. Rabbis were certainly 
among them, but customs often differed within what may be broadly 
described as Reform Judaism,  and splinter groups tended to develop.
Except for the staunchest of secularists, the Jews celebrated the 
major festivals and observed the high holy days. Practices varied, de-
pending on cultural background and religious fervor. Simhat Torah, for 
example, the conclusion of the yearly cycle of Torah reading, was cele-
brated as joyously with song and dance by the Hasidim of the Mir Yeshi-
va as if they had never left their homes.  Whereas the ultra-Orthodox 
continued to maintain strict Sabbath observance, most of the Jewish 
population did not, which was a constant irritant to the Orthodox 
community. Many of the Sephardi businessmen, who had been strictly 
whom were merchants and storekeepers, did not close for the Sabbath. 
Neither did the Central European refugees desist from trying to make 
a living.
 Reform congregations, for example, might or might not have separate seating for 
men and women, head covering for men, a choir, an organ, and the like. The general 
term “reform” does not adequately describe these differences.
 Chinese Jews and 
Kashruth -
gest by the Sephardi Jews, even after other observances had been aban-
doned. This included ritual slaughter, abstaining from forbidden foods 
the Russian and the Central European communities were more lax. 
Yet, in the shelters (Heime
upon arrival, kosher kitchen facilities were maintained, and the organi-
zations responsible for refugee welfare made every effort to adhere to 
dietary laws.  It is not clear how the problem of matzoth (unleavened 
three years of war when wheat shortages developed. The ultra-Ortho-
dox group would have been especially affected, as rituals concerning 
dough and baking had to be strictly observed. 
Community Organizations
Bagh-
dadi and Russian communities had each established institutions and 
charity, burial, and other communal matters. These were, however, not 
settle the refugees. Some form of cooperation between the two estab-
lished communities was necessary and both rose to the challenge, with 
the Sephardi community taking the lead, perhaps because they felt the 
pressure of the British more keenly than did the Russians. Even before 
ever larger shiploads of refugees landed in Shanghai, the Shanghai Mu-
nicipal Council had indicated that it could not be responsible for the 
Jewry.  As a result, several new organizations for relief purposes were 
established. Here I shall discuss one community organization and two 
aid organizations only: burial societies, because of their importance in 
communal life, and two organizations responsible for refugees’ aid, the 
Committee for the Assistance of European Jewish Refugees in Shanghai 
 
 HICEM stands for HIAS ICA-Emigdirect. The organization was supported by the 
Hebrew Sheltering and 
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The ritual preparation of the corpse and burial have an important 
place in Jewish observances, and burial societies occupy a central posi-
tion in all Jewish communities. In Shanghai, the Sephardi burial society 
(Hevra Kadisha
cemetery on Mohawk Road (now Huang-
pu  
dead in the Sephardi cemetery in a separate 
section until they acquired their own cemetery on Baikal Road (now 
Ashkenazi burial 
society and 
cemetery on Columbia Road. 
Due to the high mortality rate among the refugees, a fourth cemetery 
 In life as well as in death the three 
communities maintained their separateness. Unfortunately, the four 
  County, 
in the environs of Shanghai, and have since disappeared.  
The Committee for the Assistance of European Jewish Refugees was 
committees and brought together Baghdadis, Russians, and refugees.  
Prominent businessmen active in Shanghai commerce assumed a ma-
jor role, raising funds both locally and abroad. It is to the credit of men 
like 
without experience in social welfare, nonetheless saw to it that the ref-
ugees were given shelter and were fed. The standing of these men in 
Jewish Colonization Associ-
it moved to Shanghai. The CAEJR was supported by the JDC and by funds raised in 
Shanghai.
“Central European Jewish Refugees who Died in 
which shows that nearly twice as many men died than women in Shanghai and that 
infant mortality was comparatively higher than that of older children. The higher 
Jewish men in Shanghai. A 
more detailed analysis of the list should reveal further useful data. 
 
cemeter-
ies had been moved. About current efforts to recover some of the gravestones, see 
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the business community enabled them, furthermore, to maintain con-
tacts with the Shanghai Municipal Council and the Japanese authorities 
on behalf of the refugees.  The committee ceased to function after the 
start of the Ellis Hay-
im, were interned by the 
Japanese authorities ordered the relocation of stateless refugees to the 
“designated area,” or ghetto, in Hongkou, they also ordered the Rus-
sian communal association to assume the care of the refugees. The new 
committee was known as the Shanghai Ashkenazi Collaborating Relief 
Association, or SACRA.
Meyer 
engaged in an unprecedented rescue operation that was just short of 
heroic. First in Harbin and then in Shanghai
Japanese, Birman 
disseminated information about China and helped move refugees in 
and out of Shanghai. He wrote thousands of letters to relief agencies 
throughout the world, trying to help locate and relocate refugees. De-
documents required by the Shanghai Municipal Police, ship passage for 
visa holders, and the like. Birman tirelessly explored every avenue, fol-
lowed every lead, both of how to bring Jews to the safe haven of Shang-
hai
refuge once routes from Shanghai increasingly closed down.
Educational Institutions and Publishing
Schools for the young developed but slowly and in accordance with the 
needs and growth of the three communities. In the early years of the 
Baghdadi community, Jewish education for boys was taken care of at 
home. They were instructed in prayers and Bible by their fathers or the 
Inuzuka Koreshige  
Ellis Hayim write a letter stating how grateful the 
Jews were for the way the 
Birman’s letters often reveal the desperation that 
must have been felt in Shanghai as war seemed inevitable. For example, on Novem-
Birman wrote that Shanghai is cut off from most countries, and one 
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community’s teacher (melamed
Hebrew school (Talmud Torah
for boys was established on the premises of the She’erit Israel syna-
gogue. In time, this religious school developed into the Shanghai Jew-
ish School with a British-based curriculum and instruction in English. 
Those who could afford it preferred, however, to send their children to 
Baghdadi 
families attended the Shanghai Jewish School.  Some Russian parents, 
particularly those who wanted their children educated in the British 
style, also sent their children to this school. Whereas socially the par-
ents of Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews remained distant, some of the 
younger generation interacted at least during school hours.
Despite the fact that few of the Central European refugees brought 
families with school age children and large families were quite the 
exception,  more school facilities were nevertheless required due to 
endowed a number of educational institutions in China, Asia, and the 
Jewish Youth Association 
(better known as the 
and the curriculum included Hebrew, Bible studies, as well as Chinese. 
The nominal fee charged attracted children from less well-off fami-
lies.  As in the Shanghai Jewish School, the younger generation here 
too had an opportunity to interact.
The -
-
Sephardi Jews to make this voca-
tional school a success.  William Deman, a refugee from Vienna, estab-
lished on his own initiative a business school that offered training in 
 Finally, the Asia Seminar should 
be also mentioned. Creatively organized by W.Y. Tonn, who had pursued 
 
 Large intact families were mostly found among the ultra-Orthodox from Poland. 
For example, according to Birman, in a group of ten rabbis only three were without 
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Chinese studies in Berlin, the Seminar offered instruction in languages 
as diverse as Hebrew, Urdu, Sanskrit, Chinese and 
on. Its lecture series on Chinese thought and art added an intellectual 
dimension to the otherwise drab Hongkou existence.
The rabbis and their students were part of the refugee community, 
yet they lived their lives separately from the others, as indeed they had 
done earlier in -
uania, and still earlier, in Poland. Once they were settled, the yeshiva 
students, under the guidance of their rabbis, resumed rigorous study 
schedules. The distance that separated their way of life from that of 
the secular Jews did not prevent, however, a number of refugee teenage 
boys from joining them, and in the Mir Yeshiva they were apparently 
accepted by both teachers and students. It may have been the strict-
ly regulated life of prayer and study that attracted the youngsters, or 
perhaps it was the better quality food available among the ultra-Ortho-
dox. -
ging devotion to study as well as their maintenance of ritual purity in 
daily life was exemplary.
Study in the yeshiva is the study of texts. Concerned about the scar-
city of Talmudic books for their students, the rabbis decided to repro-
Chinese printer, and over time most of the titles of the Talmud were 
reprinted,  an accomplishment that was hailed as a “historic event” in 
the Yiddish press.
Aside from this undertaking, a considerable number of Jewish news-
printing in German, Yid-
dish, and Russian. Although some of the weeklies or monthlies were 
short-lived, publishing only a few issues before they folded, as a com-
munication effort within each community this publishing activity was 





Bibles with commentaries (Mikra’ot gedolot
 UL
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dressed the religiously observant German refugee population. For sec-
ular German speakers there was the Shanghai Jewish Chronicle, which 
 was 
intended for the more intellectually inclined reader.  Russian readers 
read Nasha Zhizn Yiddish page, later re-
placed by an English page. The religious party, Agudat Yisrael, published 
two Yiddish papers,  (The Jewish 
Dos Vort 
was the English language monthly, Israel’s Messenger, which served al-
most exclusively the 
the Shanghai Zionist Association. More research is necessary to do full 
justice to this impressive publishing activity, of which the above is only 
the barest outline.  Nevertheless, from it we can safely conclude that 
the intellectual level of the three Jewish communities was remarkably 
high, consisting not only of readers but boasting also a considerable 
number of writers, whose contributions were featured in the papers.
The exodus from China after World War II was gradual, lasting well 
Baghdadis, like members of the Kadoorie fami-
ly, who had been pillars of the Shanghai community, resettled in Hong 
Hong Kong Jew-
ish cemetery.  Undoubtedly, many Baghdadis might have considered 
remaining in Shanghai after the end of war, yet the treaty port days 
were clearly over and Shanghai would never be the same. Nor would 
they ever again be able to lead the kind of Jewish lives that they and 
their forbears had created in the treaty port. The Sephardi-Shanghai 
past was transformed into a time and place remembered.
Some of the Central European refugees returned to their countries 
of origin, but most opted for America or Israel, as did the majority of the 
Russian community, while others made their homes in Australia. The 
Judaism they had brought with them from Germany, Austria, or Russia 
had not essentially changed in Shanghai. Wherever they went thereaf-
Asher 
Rozenboim and held by the 
Jewish publications in all of China. Unfortu-
nately, only single issues of most of these papers are available. Some have disap-
peared altogether.
 This is an unusually beautiful and interesting cemetery with its many styles of 
gravestones and varieties of inscriptions, representing the different cultural 
backgrounds of 
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ter, they would again be part of Jewish communities and congregations 
similarly observant or secular. Shanghai seems to have been no more 
than a passing episode of hardship in the lives of the ultra-Orthodox 
and , and they continued a life of study and prayer in their new 
environment, whether in Israel or the diaspora.
The erstwhile Shanghai-landers, as some like to refer to themselves, 
remember their China days with great fondness. If some had felt regrets 
over years lost,  such feelings vanished in time and are not perpetuated 
by the younger generation. In the last two decades, reunions have tak-
en place and tours undertaken to Shanghai to revisit the homes where 
they once lived and where they were children or teenagers. Memories 
-
landers– in particular the refugees among them – and in memoirs about 
their Jewish-Shanghai past.
Judaism in China Today
Except for Hong Kong and an incipient Shanghai community, today 
there are no organized Jewish communities with synagogues and Jew-
ish institutions in China. Those individuals who identify themselves as 
Jewish in Kaifeng today are not Jewish in accordance with halakha. They 
are the descendants of Jews. Can we say that by following the reintro-
duced religious practices they are now “Jewish  But perhaps whether 
Kaifeng Jews are, or are not, halakhically Jews does not matter to those 
who are interested in the revitalization of Kaifeng Judaism. Anson Layt-
ner, for example, speaks of “reviving Jewish culture,” and Len Hew, a 
descendant of the Zhao family, wants to revive the community. I would 
question the term “revival,” however, for it is surely not Qing dynasty 
Kaifeng Judaism that they wish to see revived. Nor is it obvious what is 
meant by “Jewish culture,” and where to draw the line between culture 
and observing religious commandments (mitzvoth
doubt, as these efforts at revival are, they raise a number of questions, 
including those of faith and belief.
Kai-
feng,” in which a group of young Western Jews questions the many complex as-
pects of Jewish identity.
 Irene Eber
Today Jews from Western countries and Israel work in China – about 
Beijing – as transient businessmen and profes-
sionals. The largest number is in Shanghai, estimated at three hundred, 
Jewish Community Center was inaugurated.  
But these Jews are only temporarily in China, remaining there for lon-
ger or shorter periods of time. They do not have synagogues, although 
services take place in Beijing and at several locations in Shanghai. The 
Ohel Rachel synagogue is not used for daily prayer.
Matters are different in Hong Kong. A small but vital Jewish commu-
nity was reconstituted after 
and has, in fact, grown larger than it was between the wars. Consisting 
of Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews, this community represents the entire 
spectrum of Judaism, from orthodox observance of the Habad move-
ment to Reform Judaism. The Jewish Club, donated by Sir Eli Kadoorie 
Community 
Center, and Ohel Leah, the synagogue built by Sir 
is still in use. Even though a large number of Hong Kong’s Jews live there 
only temporarily, its nearly three thousand Jews are an interesting mix 
of descendants of old Sephardi families, Australians, South Africans, 
Americans, Israelis, and British, and their common language is English. 
Thus in this small corner of China, 
Chinese Jews but of Jews in China, many of whom, nonetheless, consider 
China their home.
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Sin and Penance in Fujian Christianity in 
Late Ming Times
Erik Zürcher
The choice of the subject needs a few words of explanation: why sin and penance, why Fujian 福建, and why the late Ming? Firstly, the theme “sin and penance” as it figures in the title of this paper 
is an elliptic formula used for the sake of brevity. It actually refers to 
the whole complex of “guilt – sin – remorse – confession – absolution 
– penance”, as experienced, expressed and practiced in early Chinese 
Christianity. When going through the impressive corpus of contempo-
rary source materials – more than 200 seventeenth-century texts writ-
ten by Jesuit missionaries, Chinese converts, sympathizers and oppo-
nents – one is struck by the central role played by that theme. Of course 
the Christian awareness of sin, the ritual of confession and the sacra-
ment of absolution belonged to the “foreign input”: they formed part of 
orthodox Roman Catholic doctrine as it was propagated by the western 
missionaries. But here we rather are concerned with the receiving end: 
the way in which that complex was received by Christian literati and 
functioned in a Chinese context. 
Secondly, there are good reasons to focus upon Fujian. During the 
last decades of the Ming, Fujian, and especially its coastal zone, was 
one of the most flourishing and most promising theaters of the Jesuit 
mission. This mainly was due to the effort deployed by one remarkable 
man, the Italian missionary Giulio Aleni (Ai Rulüe 艾儒略, 1582–1649) 
after his arrival in Fuzhou in 1625.1 Under the protection of some im-
portant sponsors he established himself in the provincial capital Fu-
zhou 福州, and from there he started his campaign, traveling to almost 
every part of the province. Within ten years Christian communities had 
 1 For Giulio Aleni see Pfister 1932, 126–137; Dehergne 1973; Lipiello/ Malek 1997; 
Menegon 1994; Goodrich 1976; Pan 1994; Lin 1992; Zürcher 1990.
Max Deeg/Bernhard Scheid (eds.), Religion in China, pp. 91–112.
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been established under local lower gentry leadership in the major cit-
ies, with Fuzhou and Quanzhou  as the main centers. 
In the perspective chosen for this paper – the contextualization of 
the Doctrine of the Lord of Heaven as an exotic marginal religion in the 
Chinese milieu – Fujian is especially important because of the amount 
and quality of the Chinese source materials that have been preserved, 
not only Aleni’s own large output of Chinese texts, but also works writ-
ten by Chinese converts, some of which are truly unique in nature.
Thirdly, the rather limited time span covered (the quarter century 
between 
course of events. The terrible devastations wrought by the Qing con-
-
lation of the coastal zone dealt a blow from which the Jesuit mission in 
Fujian never recovered.
The Chinese Context
In introducing the subject, let me not stay too long on the high, oxy-
gen-poor summits of generalization. The feeling of guilt, in the sense 
of the painful awareness of having willfully transgressed the norms of 
moral conduct, of course forms part of human experience, at least in 
all major civilizations. In the religious sphere the concept of sin, in the 
sense of a deliberate violation of rules that are imposed by higher be-
ings or that form part of a cosmic order, is present in all major religions, 
In China self-examination and self-accusation have a long history, 
both within and outside the religious sphere, and much has been writ-
ten about it ever since Wolfram Eberhard, in his pioneering study Guilt 
showed the importance of interiorized guilt 
 Special mention may be made of the eight-juan  Kouduo richao  (Diary of 
Aleni and some 
other Li 
Jiubiao  
Li Jiubiao’s brother Li Jiugong , containing, inter alia, a number of Chinese 
Shensi lu Li Jiugong 
Xichao chongzheng ji 
Aleni by Chinese scholars.
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in Chinese culture. Other landmarks are the studies by Wu Pei-yi on 
self-examination and Cynthia Brokaw on the so-called 
Sakai 
on the Buddhist side, by Yü Chün-fang, and by Kuo Li-ying in her work 
on confession and remorse in Chinese Buddhism.  Thanks to their ef-
forts we can discern the contours of the Chinese indigenous landscape 
in which the Christian practices took place. 
In the Confucian tradition, and especially in Neo-Confucianism, 
self-investigation (xingshen 
-
provement, had always played a very important role. The examination 
of conscience was focused on the observance of social virtues and on 
the elimination of egoistic impulses that stand in the way of their reali-
zation, but it always had a metaphysical dimension as well, for the Con-
conform to the intention of Heaven. In Neo-Confucianism, the practice 
of self-investigation had also given rise to a type of spiritual exercise 
with religious overtones called jingzuo , “quiet-sitting”, no doubt 
Chan Buddhism. Jingzuo introspection was prac-
ticed in the early morning or at the end of the day, in a secluded room, 
sometimes for a considerable time. It was an exercise on mental puri-
formed part of it, but there is no evidence that feelings of acute remorse 
and penance played a dominating role in it. 
However, as Wu Pei-yi has shown, this rather optimistic self-image of 
the Confucian practicant underwent a remarkable change in the latter 
in certain Confucian circles what Wu Pei-yi calls “a deep awareness of 
the human proclivity to evil, an urgent need to counter this proclivity, a 
readiness for self-disclosure, and a deep anguish over one’s own wrong-
doings.” This wave of zisong , “self-indictment”, no doubt bore the 
stamp of the Zeitgeist of the late Ming, a period of social unrest, political 
turmoil, and, in some circles, libertarianism and conspicuous spending. 
It may well have been one reaction to the evils of the time, an intro-
spective counterpart of Confucian moral crusades like the Donglin 
 movement. On the other hand, it also may have been stimulated by 
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contemporary Buddhist or Buddho-Daoist practices of confession and 
self-investigation. It goes without saying that it is highly relevant to our 
subject, for two reasons: the coincidence in time, and the fact that it 
took place in the milieu of Confucian scholars, the primary target group 
of the Jesuit mission. But it also should be noted that in a strictly Confu-
cian sphere, penitence is not coupled with the idea of divine retribution: 
ideally self-cultivation is supposed to be undertaken for its own sake, 
and not as a means to acquire gong  , “merit”, or fu  , “good fortune”. 
In Buddhist and Daoist penitence, the accumulation of merit and the 
quest for good fortune play a central role, as does the belief in a univer-
sal law of retribution supervised or mediated by divine powers. There 
can be no doubt that the origin of lay penitential rites must be sought in 
monastic Buddhism. Since very early times the monks of a local parish 
were obliged to hold fortnightly  meetings during which all 
the monastic rules were recited one by one. The rules are arranged in 
categories in descending order, from the most serious faults warrant-
ing permanent expulsion to minor transgressions that merely deserve 
to be criticized, or just to be noted. The confessional element lies in the 
fact that transgressors are supposed to report their fault when the rel-
evant rule has been recited, and that the presiding monks can decide 
to impose a 
considered indispensable for maintaining the “purity” (qingjing 
of the Buddhist order, without which it cannot function. 
In Buddhism, the increased participation of lay believers, 
both men and women, in religious life stimulated the development of 
collective penitential rituals (chanhui 
laity took part. Like other -
pose. On the one hand, the confession of sins and the declaration of re-
gong
individual believer, resulting in improving his or her karmic destiny. On 
the other hand, the 
the merit thus gained to other persons (or at least of sharing it with 
improve the lot of, for instance, deceased parents. Chanhui meetings 
also have an important devotional aspect, for the force of karma (which 
-
ipant, but through the mediation of benevolent superhuman powers 
and forgiveness. In all this the role of the priests is essential: the priests 
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perform the ceremonial, they recite the confessional texts on behalf of 
the participants, and they transfer the merit to others. Their expert li-
turgical knowledge and their state of ascetic purity give them access to 
the divine powers. The latter are not only prayed to, but “invited”, and 
are believed actually to be present during the ceremonial. 
An important further step was made by the popularization of the 
century A.D., and that in the course of time has become a standard el-
ement in Chinese Buddhist life. During this ritual, the candidate indi-
vidually makes the vow to follow the Bodhisattva career before three 
witness. Since the Bodhisattva ordination is impossible without moral 
confession regard-
ing all the forty-eight forgivable sins listed in the formulary, with utter 
sincerity and devotion, six times per day, before the images of Buddhas 
and Bodhisattvas. Absolution – in the sense of a guaranteed remission 
of sins – is not conferred by a monk but by the divine powers them-
xiang 
revealed to the practicant in a vision or in a dream. If after a full year 
the sign does not appear, the practicant’s karmic burden is too heavy, 
and the initiation has to be postponed till the next life. In this ritual, the 
act of penitence and the quest for forgiveness have become individual-
ized, but the form of the confessional always is stereotyped and gener-
alized. The practicant seeks redemption from sins of a certain category 
sinful 
deeds actually committed are mentioned. In fact, in the Buddhist per-
spective it would make no sense to do so, because the vast majority of 
sins committed are supposed to date from former lives and cannot be 
remembered by the penitent.
In religious Daoism, 
method associated with healing, the patient meditating on his sins and 
the Daoist master acting as an intermediary asking the divine powers 
to remove the pollution. However, already in early medieval times this 
was supplanted by chanhui rituals closely patterned after Buddhist 
examples. The belief in rebirth and karmic retribution became incor-
porated into Daoism, the main difference being that the ultimate aim 
pursued by the believer is not Buddhahood but becoming an Immortal. 
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On the other hand, the belief in “divine controllers” (deities reporting 
and the idea that there those acts were carefully recorded appear to be 
of Daoist origin and to have been taken over by Buddhism.
sin even-
tually became the doctrinal basis of a type of moralistic book-keeping 
known as Gongguo ge , “Ledgers of Merit and Demerit”. The oldest 
surviving example is a Daoist text of the twelfth century, but the genre 
and the practice based on it only became wide-spread in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth century, when many Gongguo ge were published, also 
of Buddhist or Buddho-Confucian inspiration. In those later ledgers, the 
supernatural element (divine beings shortening or lengthening one’s life 
is less prominent, although the system always presupposes some kind 
of divine or karmic retribution. The emphasis is on daily practice: each 
one of the positive and negative acts listed is worth a certain number of 
“merits” (gong guo
track of his moral development and to improve his karmic situation. 
The importance of the Gongguo ge for the present subject lies in the fact 
that here, unlike in the Buddhist penitentials, the user renders account 
-
ter the event. It also marks a further stage of individualization: by using 
the ledger one controls the process of merit accumulation and thereby 
the other hand it occasionally was criticized by orthodox Confucians 
because of its “vulgar” emphasis on reward and punishment, and, as we 
shall see, also by Christians, albeit for other reasons.
After this brief survey of contemporary types of moral self-examina-
tion and confession let us turn to the main subject. How did Christian 
ideas concerning sin, remorse and release, and their ritual expression 
in 
There can be no doubt that to non-believers much of it seemed 
strange, but at the same time it was not so totally different from Chi-
nese practice as to be quite unintelligible. The Christian practice of con-
templating one’s own sinful deeds formed part of a program of medi-
tative exercises (called xingxiu , “investigation and cultivation”, a 
Confucian jingzuo, “quiet-sit-
ting”. Christian texts contained detailed lists of categorized sins to be 
used as a moral guide, almost like Gongguo ge. Like Buddhist and Daoist 
 Sin and Penance in Fujian 
believers, Christian penitents appealed to a supernatural power, with 
a priest acting as an intermediary. Sincere remorse followed by expi-
ation was considered a means to accumulate “merit” and to improve 
one’s lot in the hereafter. Especially to Confucian scholars with Bud-
dhist inclinations (as there were many in seventeenth-century 
all this must have sounded somewhat familiar. But on the other hand 
the Christian complex showed a number of features that set it apart and 
to identify some of the most salient distinctive features of the Christian 
practice of gaojie 
“Confucian Monotheism”
sin (zui -
tricably bound up with their belief in a single God, the Lord of Heaven, 
-
verse. He is both ren , “benevolent”, and  , “righteous”. Being be-
nevolent, he loves every human being, even the most obstinate sinner, 
who like all other human beings has been endowed with the freedom to 
choose between good and evil so that he can mend his ways. But, being 
righteous, the Lord of Heaven also is the stern and impartial judge of 
souls. He knows whatever we think, say or do, and, in addition, he has 
written evidence, for all our good deeds are recorded by angels, and 
all our transgressions by devils.  Since he is both the supreme Parent 
and the supreme Ruler, every sinful deed must be considered an act of 
rebellion: the sinner is both “  , 
“disloyal” – the two most heinous crimes in the traditional Confucian 
scale of delicts.
Since the Lord of Heaven is compassionate, sins can be forgiven if 
they are duly regretted, confessed and expiated, but only during the 
present life on earth. After death the situation has become frozen: good 
 As Aleni tells a criti-
cal Fujian scholar: compare it with your examination system. As long 
as you are composing your essay you can make any correction and im-
provement you like, but once you have handed it in, the Chief Examiner 
 The point is already made by Matteo -
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is inexorable: even the slightest mistake will lead to rejection and dis-
grace.  Even having the slightest doubt about God’s righteousness is an 
act of rebellion: Aleni takes one of his disciples to task because he, as a 
parents are tortured in hell.  And when another critic remarks that the 
amount of sin one has committed always is limited, and that therefore 
the unlimited eternal punishment in hell is disproportionate, he is told 
that in view of God’s supreme majesty even the slightest transgression 
is a major offence.  We can understand why outsiders considered Chris-
tianity to be very  , “severe”!
The Priest as a Mediator
Between the 
priest as a mediator and as a ritual expert. He is a foreigner, for till the 
very end of the seventeenth century no Chinese priests were ordained. 
In Fujian Christianity, the role of the 
knowledge was of secondary importance. Since the making of astro-
nomical observations was an imperial prerogative there was no ob-
servatory where they could exhibit their skills, and the Fujian gentry 
showed surprisingly little interest in those matters. To them the for-
duode  (short for saze’erduo-
de  = sacerdote shenfu , “spiritual father”. 
In several ways that role was rather familiar in the Chinese context, in 
spite of its exotic trappings. During rituals the priest’s sacral status (al-
vestments and his use of unintelligible Latin mantras. Even the mys-
tery of the Eucharist may have reminded outsiders of the way in which 
in Chinese cults, a deity or an ancestral spirit is “invited” to descend 
and to be present at the ritual.
Xiong Shiqi  has elaborated the examination metaphor in a -
hua pamphlet entitled  (A Warning Allegory to Urge On the 
Yang Tingyun 
to a commoner it is of no consequence, but if made to the ruler the result may be 
fatal. The same argument in Diego de 
Francesco 
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However, the role played by the Christian priest in the rite of con-
fession and absolution does not appear to have any counterpart in tra-
ditional Chinese religion. In Buddhist penitential rites, the priest acts 
as a messenger reciting the confessional formulas and transferring the 
merit to other beings, but there is no question of his having the divine 
and exclusive authority to remit sins. The uniqueness of the Christian 
sacrament is stressed by Aleni: although other doctrines may “exhort 
people by good words”, only our doctrine knows absolution, and only 
Christians can receive it.  
The power attributed to the Christian priest required some expla-
nation. In an interesting pamphlet entitled Lingxi 
, “Essentials of Baptism and Confession”, Zhang Geng , the 
leader of the Christian community in Quanzhou, answered some of the 
questions that had arisen, apparently even among believers. One of the 
questions is: “If I feel sincere remorse and the Lord of Heaven forgives 
-
and listen to our confession, while we are kneeling down – is that not 
Zhang Geng draws an interesting parallel (bor-
rowed from Mencius confession the priest’s position is com-
parable to that of the shi, the boy-medium who in the ancient ancestral 
ritual impersonated the soul of the 
that situation even elder relatives would kneel down and honor him.  
Elsewhere Yang Tingyun and Aleni give the dogmatically correct ex-
planation: the priest is authorized to confer absolution, for it is the Lord 
of Heaven himself who has entrusted the remission of sins to Saint Pe-
ter and hence, through apostolic succession, to the Pope, who again has 
conferred it upon all priests.
Confession and Moral Self-Improvement 
Confession only is effective if preceded by careful self-investigation 
that leads to a clear awareness of one’s faults and to the inner feeling 
care of spiritual life to the 
just as he has entrusted the administration of worldly affairs to the ruler and his 
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of tonghui , “bitter remorse”. The texts contain some guidelines for 
the methodical contemplation of one’s own moral conduct. They appear 
Jesuit Spiritual Exercises, but they also show 
Confucian self-cultivation and jingzuo. The practice 
forms part of the daily observances that every believer is supposed to 
perform. At dawn the practicant meditates and asks for God’s help to 
spend the day without committing any sins. At the end of each day he 
carefully reviews all his acts of thought, speech and body, whatever evil 
he may have done, and whatever good he may have failed to do. In the 
case of minor transgressions he thinks about a way to amend them, and 
the more serious ones are stored in his memory awaiting confession. 
Utmost care must be taken not to forget any sinful act, for no merit is 
gained by incomplete confession. It is therefore advisable to note them 
down in writing. At the end of each month or each fortnight all the ma-
jor faults are inventoried, and if a priest is available an appointment 
must be made.  The daily and monthly inventorying and recording of 
sins is useless if it is not accompanied by an intense feeling of guilt and 
remorse. Remorse can be inspired by fear, but it is better to follow the 
neglected his parents, even if they do not reprimand him.
All this sounds very methodical and programmatic. In fact, the 
Christian community leader Li Jiugong treats confession-and-absolu-
tion (gaojie
these have been forgiven one turns to the lighter ones. In this way one 
progresses until one is free from sin. As an additional exercise, it is ad-
visable to remember the more serious sins one has committed and to 
confess once again.  
Confession should be made as frequently as possible, but actually 
only believers living in or near the few larger cities were able to do so. 
The others had to wait for the rare occasions when a priest visited their 
communities, and at best they would meet a missionary once a year. In 
the meantime, as Fan Zhong  remarks in his 
(
sin again.  
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Of course any suggestion that the Christian confession resembles the 
Buddhist chanhui is to be rejected. Yang Tingyun (an erstwhile devout 
lay 
that the Buddhist ceremonial is no more than an outward routinized 
ritual, not based on genuine self-examination. He also aptly observes 
that in chanhui, sins are listed in only very general terms, and that no 
sinful acts committed by the believers: 
“When chanhui has been completed, they still do not know what their 
confession has been about.”
Occasionally, mention is made in Christian texts of the use of Gongguo 
ge, “Ledgers of Merit and Demerit.” In an interesting conversation with 
a member of a Daoist association, -
tion about one’s own sins is always commendable, but he adds that it 
remains ineffective as long as the practicant does not realize against 
whom he is sinning.  Li Jiugong criticizes the system because in the 
Ledgers both merits and demerits are listed. The inclusion of merito-
rious deeds leads to self-complacency. Christians only note down their 
transgressions: “That is the method to achieve saintliness (zuo sheng 
zhi fang 
In one respect, however, the Gongguo ge system does bear some re-
semblance to the Christian method: in both cases a great number of 
acts (in the -
rized and methodically listed. An extensive survey of 
items, many more than found in any Gongguo ge Aleni’s 
Di zui zheng gui 
arranged according to the Ten Commandments and the Seven Cardi-
nal Sins. In the introductory section, Aleni explains how this part of 
the book must be used. Since it is essential that the penitent be clearly 
aware of any fault he may have committed, including the persons in-
volved and the circumstances, the list is presented as an aid “carefully 
to be consulted item by item”. Minor transgressions are also listed, for 
“the mirror is only wiped clean if even the smallest specks of dust are 
Buddhist penitence is a sheer fraud.
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removed.”  published a shortened ver-
sion of this work in one juan that consists of the list with only a few 
additional paragraphs. This Dizui zheng gui lüe  was proba-
bly intended to be diffused on a wider scale than the original four-juan 
version, as a simple guide to confession.
 inventory fol-
lows the European model. However, since it had to be used by Chinese 
converts, its content has been thoroughly adapted to the Chinese en-
vironment. Especially in sections dealing with religious activities and 
mantic techniques and with social relations (notably the prohibition of 
-
tual behavior, but as a “typology of sin” it is indicative of the formal 
value system that was current among Christian devotees. In what fol-
lows, special attention will be paid to two categories of offences: cases 
of superstitious behavior, and sins related to family life and other hier-
archical social relations.
Sins Relating to Superstition
True to the principles of the monopolistic Mediterranean type of reli-
gion that the Jesuits propagated, virtually all beliefs and practices of 
Chinese religious life were declared anathema and presented as the 
work of the devil. Certain Confucian rituals were deemed acceptable, 
By doing so they naturally sided with the most orthodox and purist 
wing of Confucianism. Since medieval times there had been concerned 
scholars fulminating against Buddhist superstition and 
some Neo-Confucians rejected “vulgar” practices like geomancy and 
the burning of counterfeit paper money, and excluded Buddhist priests 
Yang Tingyun’s Christian biography by Ding Zhilin it is expressly 
said that Yang used Aleni’s DZZG as a guideline for self-investigation and confes-
 Aleni’s DZZGL has been included in the collection Tongku jing ji  (“Scriptur-
João Fróis (Fu Ruowang 
been able to consult another compendium entitled   (“The 
Lazzaro Cattaneo (Guo Jujing 
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from their funerary rituals. But in general even purists accepted the ex-
istence of such practices as belonging to the way of life of the unenlight-
ened masses, and they did not want to eradicate them. Moreover, since 
in the 
never would regard them as being inspired by any Prince of Darkness.
But that vision was very much alive among Christians. Both the Jesu-
its and their converts were convinced that the forces of evil preferably 
used false doctrines, magic arts and supernatural phenomena as means 
to delude mankind. In his Shen gui zhengji  (“Correct Descrip-
 Alfonso Vagnone (Gao Yizhi 
phenomena, such as voices heard in the air, automatic script, images 
coming to life and uttering prophesies, and telekinesis. Possession by 
a demon can manifest itself by glossolalia (an uneducated person sud-
clairvoyance, thought-reading, and enormous physical strength.  For-
swearing pagan beliefs and rituals was a prerequisite for becoming a 
Christian. The act was ritualized: before baptism the neophyte had to 
forsake all his former superstitions, to remove and destroy (by burning 
non-Christian religious texts and talismans.  The ostentatious break 
with the past could not escape public attention, for it also meant that 
-
rated the entrance of their homes and replaced them by the emblem of 
Christ.
In Christian sources, much attention is paid to the description and 
condemnation of popular religious beliefs and customs. More than thir-
ty of these are listed by Inácio da Costa (Guo Najue 
in his Zhuo sumi pian 
 Di zui zheng gui the emphasis naturally is on their 
prohibition: they are listed as “sinful” ( zui 
Commandment, i.e. as acts of rebellion against God himself. They com-
prise three categories of offences: 
 Shen gui zhengji
devil.
baptism Christians are held to remove all 
idols from the altar in their house chapels ( jiatang 
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Firstly, all mantic techniques such as fortune-telling by drawing di-
vination lots and by using the planchette, geomancy, the election of 
sinful.
Secondly, also sinful is any kind of contact with Buddhism or Dao-
ism. It is a long list that includes visiting temples and reciting scrip-
jiao -
uting money to the restoration and decoration of temples and to 
destroying one’s pagan texts and idols before baptism but selling 
them or giving them away, and any personal “contaminating” con-
tact with Buddhist monks, Daoist priests and magicians.
Thirdly, it is a sin to believe in pagan faith-healing and prophetic 
-
-
erhoods sealed with blood.  
We never shall know to what extent these prohibitions were heeded by 
the mass of believers. The very fact that they are listed suggests that 
at least some Christians engaged in such ungodly activities. But in any 
case we may conclude that really conscientious believers were obliged 
to renounce virtually the whole body of traditional religion and reli-
gious lore, and by doing so could not but marginalize themselves as a 
group.
Sins Relating to Social Life
Many sins pertaining to family life and other hierarchical social rela-
tions are appended to the Fourth and the Sixth Commandment (“Hon-
The Commandments are used as headings covering a number of anal-
ogous offences, as also was done in western confessionals. Thus, sinful 
conduct mentioned under the Fourth Commandment is not restricted 
to the relation between children and parents, but is extended to cov-
er relations between other juniors and seniors within and outside the 
family: teacher and pupils, master and servants, and husband and wife. 
Only a few of these sins are explicitly related to Christianity, notably 
committing sacrilegious acts in serving one’s parents and failing to 
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provide religious instruction to one’s relatives. Apart from these, the 
list reads like a survey of traditional Confucian morality expressed in 
prohibitions.
This is not amazing, for both the Jesuits (before the Rites Contro-
represented what is zheng  (“normative, correct, -
ing that it fully conformed to Confucian values and, indeed, could con-
tribute to their realization. Expectably, the most grievous sin in this 
category is lack of sin by not submitting to their 
the laws of the authorities (guanfu 
husband. On the other hand, the master of the house commits a sin if 
he maltreats his slaves and servants, and the husband if he does not 
provide his wife with her daily necessities.  Social inequality is natural 
and intended by God – and if there were no poor, how would the rich be 
The only very important exception is the absolute prohibition of 
 polygamy, i.e. the taking of a concubine. In the list of sins, concubinage 
ranks higher than sodomy, enjoying pornography and visiting prosti-
tutes. It is to be condemned even if no son is born from regular mar-
riage.  On this point no compromise was possible: cases are known of 
very distinguished prospective converts being refused baptism until 
they had sent away their concubine, and if after baptism a member of 
the congregation yielded to social pressure and took a concubine he 
risked being excommunicated.  The condemnation of concubinage was 
 
 
 Aleni: if, 
as sometimes happens, childlessness is due to the husband’s physical condition, 
 A well-documented case of the latter is that of Wang Zheng, the well-known tech-
nologist and “pillar of the faith” in Xi’an, who for some time was excommunicated 
because he, at an advanced age, had taken a concubine under heavy family pres-
sure. He was readmitted only after having sent her away and having made a writ-
ten statement of remorse – a curious document that has survived. It is appended 
to the collection of edifying tales presented orally by Adam Schall (Tang Ruowang 
Wang Zheng , entitled 
  (Daily Record of Miscellanea Made at the 
 Erik Zürcher
a Christian innovation that raised serious problems and controversies. 
-
ligion, because it violated the 
any means to secure male offspring.
The Ritual
The actual ritual of penitence, confession and absolution closely follows 
the European model. The believer is expected to make confession at 
least once a year, in the church, in front of the altar, where the priest 
is seated. He is supposed to have prepared himself by self-investiga-
tion and remorse, “as if facing a stern judge”. He approaches the priest, 
Huizui jing 
his last confession, he recites the formulaic profession of remorse, and 
asks forgiveness. The priest then comments upon the nature and gravi-
ty of the sins confessed, and confers absolution. In case of serious faults 
he imposes a penance. The penitent puts on his cap, thanks the priest 
and leaves.
Unlike the Buddhist chanhui, the Christian confession was individ-
about his sinful deeds and inclinations, and even to disclose his most 
secret feelings and temptations, giving details as to time, place, fre-
quency, circumstances, and persons involved. Especially in the Chinese 
context, this created a psychological barrier of shame and humiliation. 
In his tract about baptism and confession mentioned above, Zhang 
Geng refers to the hesitation felt by many believers: “It is disgraceful 
and shameful to confess your own sins!”, and: “It is disgraceful that con-
fession is so direct and complete!”  Elsewhere Aleni, answering some 
questions that evidently were inspired by feelings of shame, has to dis-
appoint his interlocutor: no, sinful deeds have to be confessed one by 
confession must be oral 
 
believers. For female penitents there must have been special procedures, for the 
missionaries had to be extremely cautious in having any contact – let alone this 
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and cannot be made in writing.
Ashamed of Sinning, not of Confessing”, he tells a story illustrating that 
it is the devil himself who inspires such shame in order to prevent the 
sinner from being saved.  
Penance
The last stage of the procedure is that of penance: the task of expiation 
imposed by the -
done to others. The content varies according to the type of sin. Acts of 
impiety towards God are compensated by religious observances like 
third category, to which much attention is paid, serves to expiate sinful 
self- ku 
(including rigorous fasting and sexual castigation. 
Self- -
known in traditional China. Self-mutilation (notably feeding one’s ail-
were considered laudable expressions of Pilgrims occasion-
ally indulged in at least a show of self-laceration. Burning scars in the 
top of the skull formed a regular part of 
-
turing themselves while collecting alms were a common sight in Chi-
nese cities. Christian ascesis had its own peculiar forms and its own 
inner motivation, but as a phenomenon it was not unfamiliar.
Chinese Christians had their role models near at hand. The exem-
plary lives of saints (a genre of pious literature that was very popu-
lar in ascetics and 
self-torture. In addition, some Jesuits themselves could show the way, 
for self-
as well as by some missionaries in China. In fact, Aleni himself is said 




to appease the Lord’s anger.”  Especially in Fujian, zealous converts 
are said to have indulged in long and bloody disciplines, “carrying iron 
chains” to such an extent that Aleni had to restrain them.  He had to 
do the same with Zhang Shi  (Zhang Geng’s eldest son, baptized 
a thousand lashes during the forty days of Lent.  Flagellation and rig-
orous fasting appear to have been the most common types of bodily 
penance, but reference is also made to other practices such as sleeping 
a girdle made of coarse rope or metal.
Of course we must not assume that the majority of believers went 
penance was no doubt routinized and 
-
al opinion that Christianity was very “severe”. 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have made an attempt to treat one essential element of 
the doctrine of the Lord of Heaven in its Chinese context and to iden-
tify points of convergence and of difference. Late Ming Christianity in 
it formed part of the varied religious landscape of the region. It was 
practiced by small groups that held distinctive and sometimes even 
dissenting ideas centered on the belief in the Lord of Heaven, the divine 
autocrat and controller of human fate in life and death. All the other 
beliefs and rituals current in this Christian subculture bore the stamp 
of a very strong monotheistic creed that had no counterpart in the tra-
ditional Chinese world-view.
The Christian complex of sin, confession and penance shows many 
points of convergence with contemporary traditional trends, ideas and 
practices, as noted above. In a general way it also conformed to the gen-
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with the Confucian puritanical reaction to real or supposed moral de-
cay, laxity and libertarianism.
On the other hand, the complex is illustrative of an alternative, id-
iosyncratic faith and life-style, the deviant character of which was still 
enhanced by its non-Chinese origin, by the presence of western priests, 
and by the fact that the latter derived their power to remit sins from a 
-
eign” ( jiaowang  or jiaohuang , the 
outsiders, Christian rigorousness and the many obligations that seri-
 appear to have been a source 
of amazement and ridicule: “They laugh at us and say that our religion 
makes us suffer.”  Aleni counters this complaint by pointing out to his 
disciple that outsiders do not know about the heavenly reward that is 
in store for devout Christians. Believers have to exert themselves con-
stantly, like scholars who are preparing themselves for examinations or 
callous. The burden of being a practicing member of a Christian con-
gregation may be illustrated by a passage from the Meditations (Shensi 
lu erstwhile disciple Li Jiugong exhorts his brethren 
It often happens that those who just have become followers of the 
Teaching of Heaven are jeered at and ridiculed ... But if we are afraid of 
being laughed at by others for doing good, must we then refrain from 
criticize ourselves. The Scripture says that metal is tested by a blazing 
one jeer, you may be sure that your religious fortitude is too weak. You 
rather should use that ridicule as an incentive, like a horse that runs 
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Christendom,  or – according to today’s Chinese terminology – Ji-du-zongjiao , i.e., the Religion of Jesus Christ, has tried several times to gain a foothold in China in order to settle there 
institutionally in the form of different Christian Churches and de-
Eastern Syrian Church 
(  century, Christendom has 
had various manifestations, and we might actually speak of different 
“Christendoms” in the “Middle Kingdom” (Zhongguo -
denced by the fact that the four missionary attempts (the Nestorian in 
the seventh century, the Franciscan in the thirteenth century, the Jesuit 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, and the Protestant, Cath-
olic, and  were carried 
out quite independently from one another, as well as by the terms at-
tributed to the historical forms of Christendom in the course of Chinese 
history: Jingjiao Nestorian-
ism, i.e., the  Tianzhu-jiao  – the “Teach-
 Here, I use the term Christendom intentionally as it seems to better embrace all the 
Christian phenomena, e.g., the Christian civilization rather than an institutional 
Christendom “stands for a polity as well 
as religion, for a nation as well as for a people. Christendom in this sense was an 
  




Lord of Heaven” (  also called jiujiao 
Jidu-jiao  or Yesu-jiao 
 xinjiao 
 Dongzheng-jiao (the 
Orthodox Church. Since 
the times of the Jesuits, Christianity was also called “Western teach-
xixue 
 (“The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious 
Communist 
Buddhism (Fojiao 
Daoism (Daojiao Islam (Yisilan-jiao Catholicism (Tian-
Protestantism (  Thus, Christendom in China 
today, from the point of view of religious policy, is not regarded as one 
orthodox, zheng 
manifestations: Catholicism, exclusively represented by the Catholic 
Patriotic Association (Zhongguo Tianzhu-jiao Aiguohui 
Protestantism, represented by the Protestant Patriotic Three-
Self-Movement (Zhongguo Jidu-jiao Aiguo Sanzi Yundong 
Orthodox Church ( -
ascribed to minorities (shaoshu minzu , especially, the Russian 
 It might be remarked here that also in traditional 




In contrast to the political point of view, the Zongjiao cidian  
( Shanghai, characterizes 
Jidu-jiao 
groups which recognize Jesus Christ as the Redeemer of the world. The 
  Erik Zürcher describes the Christianity of the Ming and Qing periods as 
“
  For the 
   
Christian religion comprises the Catholic, the Orthodox, and the “new” 
religion (xinjiao, 
The Christian religion, Buddhism, and Islam together are called the 
three big world religions. 
in Palestine and slowly spread within the whole Roman Empire. It be-
lieves that Shangdi (the Supreme Ruler on High, i.e., the Protes-
Tianzhu  (the Lord of Heaven, i.e., the Cath-
mankind has sinned beginning with its progenitor and that it suffers 
miserably in sin and may only be redeemed through faith in God and 
his son Jesus Christ. It regards the collection of the books (taken over 
from the 
Scripture.
In general, Christendom in China – in which manifestation whatsoev-
er – may be characterized as a “marginal” “foreign religion” (  
 Until today, Christians form a very small minority of approxi-
mately only two percent of the Chinese population, and exercise – seen 
from the socio-cultural point of view – only a small amount of regional 
Chris-
tian Churches form units which, due to various reasons, are being sup-
pressed or at least controlled – as was also the case in traditional China. 
In contrast to 
China as a “foreign religion” but was able to strike roots in Chinese cul-
ture, Christendom has never become regarded as a “Chinese religion.” 
Generally speaking, in China, Christendom was and is seen as “Western 
Christendom,” a “Western religion.” This refers to the Christian reality 
in all its manifestations. 
Historiography shows that the various manifestations of Christen-
dom in China were closely connected with the various changes that took 
Opium 
Wars and the Christendom unfolded many fac-
-
sciously or not – an important factor in modernization. It then became 
more and more marginalized, criticized, fought, and eliminated from 
social life. Despite this, it has surprisingly become a spiritual force and 
has again been a factor in the process of modernization in today’s Chi-
  Regarding the question of “marginality” of Christendom in China, which cannot be 
regard to the category “foreign religion” within the Chinese context, see, among 
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na. On one hand, these alternating roles mirror the changes that have 
changes in Chinese Christendom.  
In addition, since the last missionary encounter between Christi-
anity and China at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the 
twentieth century, within Chinese and Christian traditions important 




ligions, efforts towards in-culturation and contextualization, China’s 
opening to the West, modernization endeavors, as well as many others. 
A general understanding of Christian history and ideas has started to 
grow within Chinese society, helped by research and publications on 
Christendom being carried out in China itself. A totally new, changed 
situation has developed which poses the question of religion (zongjiao 
wenti Christendom in China in a new way. After both the 
Chinese and the Christian traditions have been sifted through a sieve 
of criticism and changes, they no longer seem to radically exclude one 
another. Among other reasons, this has lead to the fact that also out-
side the Churches, more and more people are becoming interested in 
Christendom from a historical, philosophical, artistic, or ethical point 
of view. Outside of the Chinese state and party structures, a constant 
decrease in negative attitudes towards Christendom can be observed. 
At the same time, it seems to gradually lose its character as a “Western 
religion” and become (as -
turated ( , 
experts in religious studies have remarked.  Due to quite strong local 
roots and, at the same time, the isolation of the Catholic communities 
from their “non-Christian” environment, Catholicism in some regions 
in China is regarded not only as a religion (zongjiao 
ethnic group (minzu 
  See the remarks of the sociologist 
“Rural Catholicism is less a chosen faith than an ascribed status. … A Chinese rural 
Catholic community is formed by bonds that for most practical purposes cannot 
be broken unless one leaves the countryside. … Chinese Catholicism … is a kind of 
 
In this new context, Christendom in China has unfolded various 
and rather independent manifestations. In China today, we can dis-
tinguish in principle two main manifestations of 
Christendom.
Christendom 
in China include the Catholic and the Protestant Churches in their three 
Catholic Underground Church and the Protestant House 
forms of new religiosity, the so-called “Christian sects or groups” which 
also belong to these institutionalized manifestations of Christendom. 
Due to the reasons mentioned above, the Russian-Orthodox Church is 
not considered here. Anthony Lam from the Holy Spirit Study Center 
in Hong Kong proposes the following categorization of the Christian 
Underground extremists who refuse to cooperate with any govern-




dom as an subject of academic research, i.e., as an academic discipline 
at universities, academies, and institutes. Here, Christendom can in a 
positive sense become a subject of academic research and teaching, but 
also an object of (not only 
According to Chinese academics, these main manifestations of 
Christendom might be subsumed under two other categories, namely, 
that of “folk Christianity” or “popular Christianity” of the majority of 
believers, and that of “elite Christianity,” which also includes “cultural 
Christians.” Christianity” has especially developed in the 
countryside and often takes on fundamentalist or syncretistic traits.  
  For the rural manifestations of Christendom in China, see, among others: “A Study 
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“Elite Christianity” has mainly developed among intellectuals and is 
Christianity.
From the above remarks it is apparent that when speaking about 
“Christendom” this contribution neither exclusively nor primarily re-
fers to the Christian Churches and the theology of the Christian Church, 
but rather is examining the Christian religion or teaching with its nu-
merous historical and ideological facets.
A quite different level is presented by Christendom as an object of 
the government’s religious political control, for which analysts often 
use the category zheng/ xie  According 
to this scheme, three types of religiosity in China can be distinguished: 
practically until today – represented exclusively by Confucianism or 
-
Ca-
tholicism and heterodox and illegal religions (all 
unregistered “sects” and groups, new religious movements, and Under-
ground or 
This contribution tries, phenomenologically, to sketch the main 
manifestations of Ca-
tholicism and 
new Christian religiosity (the so-called 
so-called Cultural Christianity and Christianity as an object of criticism 
and research. Excluded here are the manifestations of Christianity in 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau.
The Church(ed), Institutional Manifestations of Christendom in 
China
Christendom in China 
include the Catholic and 
-
-
legal” Underground or House Churches not recognized by the Chinese 
Chris-
 
tian sects, which must also be included in institutionally-structured 
Christendom.
be represented by a Patriotic Association. In this way, Christendom in 
-
otic Associations, i.e., the Patriotic Association of the Chinese Catholic 
Church and the Protestant Patriotic Three-Self-Movement. All manifes-
tations of 
registered with these Patriotic organizations are considered illegal 
( feifa heretical (xie -




i.e., propagating the Gospel solely with the help of local Chinese person-
zizhi
 Patriotism (aiguo 
Christian Church-
es by the Communist state. This means at least outward consent with 
the current ruling orthodoxy (i.e., the leadership of the CCP and the role 
formulate these principles explicitly.  The subordination of the Chris-
tian Churches under the Patriotic Associations, and of the Associations 
under the leadership of the Party through “cooperation” with the State 
Council’s Bureau for Religious Affairs, until today remains a fundamen-
Christian Churches.
  For the Patriotic Association and Three-Self-Movement, see “La vraie nature de 
l’Association Patriotique des catholiques chinois,” in: Dossiers et 
documents
   See, for example, the statutes of the Catholic Patriotic Association in: China heute 
China heute Catholic Patriotic 
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and Government and do not accept “interference” from abroad, even 
though today there are broad contacts with Churches outside of China. 
The administration of the Church follows the policy of independence 
and autonomy. On the Catholic side, this autonomy is especially em-
phasized by the fact that the Patriotic Association elects and ordains 
its own bishops. These are, in most cases, recognized by the Holy See 
despite the non-existent diplomatic relations between Beijing and the 
Vatican. These independent ordinations cause an incomplete communio 
between the Chinese Catholic Church and the Universal Church. In the 
Communist 
Party, expressed a certain hostility towards Rome and the Pope. Later, 
however, this attitude became more and more moderate. Today, even 
Catholic Church publicly recognizes that the Primate of the 
Pope is part of the Catholic faith.
-
tions of Christendom is known. It is, however, much more complicated 
characterize the present situation of the Churches in China comprehen-
sively, we may name four aspects which more or less represent today’s 
on the 
increasing non-transparency with regard to the so-called Underground 
Church or the Protestant House Churches. They show a simultaneous 
development of extensive “gray areas” between the Underground and 
and innumerable activities that are not proportional to the personnel 
-
ty among all the groups within the Christian Churches.
Through many decades – taking Protestant Christians as one exam-
ple – the Patriotic Three-Self-Movement was the only legal organization 
  Jean Charbonnier remarks in his article “The ‘Underground’ Church” that “quite a 
number of analyses carried out in recent years all agree as to the existence of an 
intermediate group – actually comprising a majority – that is neither underground 
nor patriotic. These members of the faithful practice their religion openly, and 
 
 
of Chinese Protestantism.  This organizational standardization had 
socio-political and historical reasons. In the meantime, however, Chi-
nese Protestantism has developed a nearly inestimable organizational 
variety.  In the meantime, the so-called post-denominational situation 
(the building-up of only one united “Church of Jesus Christ” under the 
leadership of the 
was imposed on the Church, seems no longer to exist.
The social conditions in China today (especially, poverty in the coun-
structure of the Protestant (and also -
tryside: Among their members are many old people, many women, and 
many illiterate persons. This situation has improved somewhat over 
the last decade, but, all in all, these characteristics are still valid.  It is 
understandable that Christians in the countryside attach more impor-
tance to ritual activities than Church dogmas. It is also understandable 
that due to their living conditions they do not care much about theol-
ogy, and that their main focus is on their real interests. Many Chris-
tians, for example, regard the difference between being Christian and 
non-Christian as being the most important distinctive feature. This 
fundamentalism results in the fact that in the Chinese villages there is 
a sectarian thinking and a strong tendency towards a kind of “Christian 
folk religion.”
Christendom has developed differently 
from the countryside. As more and more intellectuals and young peo-
ple come to the Churches, the structure of Christendom in the cities 
-
fects on the marginalized situation of Chinese Christendom as a whole. 
On the other hand, however, the rising number of intellectuals among 
Christians leads to increasing demands towards the Churches.  At the 
  
 For the institutions of the Protestant Church in China, see , pp. 
  According to Sun Li (Shijie zongjiao wenhua
Shanghai. Among the 
the fact that recently there are many educated Christians ( -
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moment, the Churches in the Chinese cities still come up against many 
limiting factors, and the contradiction between the spiritual needs of 
the believers and the lack of Church service is very noticeable. It can 
Christendom in 
Cultural Revolution, Church 
life was allowed again and the Churches initiated various activities. 
They increased their contacts with foreign Churches and broadened 
the range of these contacts. The Chinese Churches have become active 
of the Protestant Amity Foundation in Nanjing and the Catholic Beifang 
Jinde  in Shijiazhuang show.
Protestant “Christians” 
(registered, not registered, baptized, sympathizers, followers of Chris-
Protestants. A report in the  ( -
organized in “House Churches.”
Underground or 
 Chinese Government
The somewhat vague terms “Underground” or “House Church” refer 
to Churches that, due to the political situation, perform their activities 
-
ly. Three conditions, according to Anthony Lam, “must be present for an 
underground phenomenon to take effect. Firstly, the government must 
tu Christianity in 
in Christian believers in 
mainland China, they are better educated and they represent the major tendencies 
in the development of Christianity on the mainland.”
 For  (
and  ( For Beifang Jinde, see “ : Erste 
katholische sozial-karitative Einrichtung.” In: China heute
 
 
has authorised government approval.”  In China, this unique ecclesiasti-
cal phenomenon is not new: it did not develop only after the Communist 
on Catholic missionaries, clandestine communities existed, as the exam-
ple of the life and work of the Austrian Bishop of Nanjing, Gottfried F.X. 





gal, registered, and public religious meeting sites. They are distinct 
-
dings, especially in the cities, and – usually – full-time ministers.
-
gistered meeting places, but, they are not required to be church 
buildings. They seldom have ministers who receive a regular form-
ation.
most often these have been founded by lay people and are in remote 
rural areas. Some of them are not registered with the government 
and their relationship with the Three-Self-Movement is also quite 
Three-Self-Movement, even though they do not belong to the Three-
Self. Others refuse any contact with the Three-Self. The most obvi-
ous common characteristic of such groups is a “charismatic leader” 
at the top.
   of the Underground Church, see further 
Asia News
  For these divisions of the 
passim.
  For 
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House Churches have developed due to many different reasons. 
traditions, others are the result of having dissociated themselves 
from the Three-Self for political or even simply practical reasons. 
The term “House Churches” includes all Christian communities in 
China other than those which are under direct jurisdiction of the 
Three-Self and Christian Council (the so-called Lianhui , i.e., the 
-
sonal networks and are characterized, among other things, by lay 
preachers and the spiritual-emotional character of their services.  
They are, as Zhong Min and Chan Kim-Kwong have observed, “vi-
brant in faith, evangelistic in outreaching, fundamentalistic in doc-
trine, pious in devotion, informal in liturgy, spontaneous in devel-
 
The Chinese authorities, likewise, do not make a blanket judgment of 
the -
the Patriotic Associations, but have not been recognized by the govern-
whose activities, however, are not opposed to the country’s laws and 
Patriotic Associations, not out of political reasons, but due to religious 
join the Patriotic Associations, because they have suffered under the 
“extreme Leftists” in the past and their wounds have not yet healed, or 
-
-
cording to Party documents – are different from the last with regard 
to their situation and nature. Although they should be understood as 
groups of believers who are not subject to the leadership of the Patriot-
ic Associations and are not registered within religious venues approved 
by the State, they cannot be treated as hostile or opposition groups.
 For a characterization of the Protestant groups, see 
  See “Bewertung und Analyse der gegenwärtigen religiösen Situation Chinas,” in: 
China heute Dangdai  
 
The Catholic Underground Church can be considered as a case in point 
for the “underground force” that quite representatively illustrates unof-
Christendom in China today. The division within 
the Patriotic Associa-
tion of the Chinese Catholic Church came into being, which in the same 
-
proval of the Holy See. A small group of bishops, priests, and lay people 
emerged who joined the 
an opposition to the Association and the new Communist state arose.  
Following the 
of China, the gap between the two groups within the Catholic Church not 
only became more clearly visible, but deepened more and more. Decisive 
for this development was, among others, the document of the Propaganda 
Fide -
had not joined the Patriotic Association to perform ordinations of bish-
the priests who did not belong to the Patriotic Association to administer 
the sacraments in all of China.  These privileges contributed to the fact 
that the group “loyal to Rome” became more active than before the Cul-
tural Revolution. It remained, however, unrecognized by the government. 
Conference was founded.
The activities of the Underground Church in China are not completely 
clandestine. As its bishops, priests and nuns do not have governmental 
permission to work, they cannot exercise their ministry publicly. The 
characteristic of the Underground Church, therefore, is its illegality with 
regard to the State and not an “existence in catacombs.” The bishops 
and priests, as well as their activities, are regarded as illegal according 
are legitimate, as they keep the full communion with the Pope. In the 
beginning of the division, the loyalty to the Pope (the so-called loyalty 
  For the history of the 
  For the text of the Facultates
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Underground Church. 
recognized by the Pope and the name of the Pope may be mentioned 
publicly, not only in prayers, “loyalty to Rome” is no longer a criterion 
of differentiation. Since, however, a formal connection with the Pope 
and the Holy See, which does not recognize the PR China, is not possible 
and any activity in this direction is interpreted as being hostile to the 
State, the Underground Church remains clandestine. The existence of 
the Underground Church is today, therefore, rather due to restrictive 
religious policies and the non-recognition of the PR China (and the 
recognition of the Republic of China in Vatican.
-
ing that the 
are often occupied twice.  Both parts of the Catholic Church have their 
own Bishops’ Conference. Neither is, however, recognized by the Holy 
See. Both groups exist without direct connection to the Pope. The Cath-
olic Underground Church in China, claims to be the only true Catholic 
Church in China. Due to these and other reasons, the gap as well as the 
irreconcilability between the two groups within the Catholic Church in 
China is growing. Thus, the reconciliation of the two groups remains 
of urgent concern to the Chinese Church as well as to the Universal 
Church.  
-
of China, especially, after the so-called 
numerous convents have been opened. Non-governmental estimates, 
-
olics in China, with the Underground Church becoming stronger. The 
Catholic 
 With regard to the Catholic hierarchical structure of the Church in China today, see 
of authority.”
 
Christian Groups and Sects
Christendom 
in China in the last decades, innumerable Christian groups and sects 
have been revived or have newly arisen.  They constitute the third 
institutional manifestation of Christendom in China. Within this con-
stantly growing “new Christian religiosity,” which, as yet, has remained 
both little explored and noticed (except by the controlling authorities of 
More detailed material exists about sixteen of such groups or “sects.”  
They bear curious names, and include: for example, the “Shouters” or 
“Yellers” (Huhanpai -
bers in the Provinces of He’nan, Fujian, Zhejiang, Anhui, Hebei, Shaanxi, 
Inner Mongolia, The Established King” (Beiliwang 
in Anhui, Hunan,  “The Teaching of the Supreme Deity” 
(Zhushenjiao 
The Eastern Lightning” (Dongfang Shan-
dian jiao Zhengzhou (
unknown number of members in He’nan, Shandong, Shanxi, Heilong-
The Way of Resurrection” (Fuhuodao 
in 
He’nan and The 
Teaching of Reincarnation” (Chongshengpai 
in He’nan, with, it is said, three million followers in He’nan, Shaanxi, 
Disciples” or 
“Disciples Sect” (Mentuhui Shaanxi, 
 







In present-day China, these groups enjoy a growing number of fol-
lowers. They are characterized by charismatic leaders,  complex and 
redemption. They take up the indigenous forms of Protestantism that 
-
ismatic renewal and Pentecostal movements. Such a consciously con-
structed connection with former Christian groups serves as a legiti-
mization to attract new members. In a certain sense, they also stand in 
the tradition of the Chinese folk religious sects and represent not only 
a major challenge for the Chinese State, but also for institutionalized 
Christendom.  
Most groups are based solely in the countryside. Data about mem-
bership and geographical distribution are only “guesstimates.” Mem-
even “several ten thousands.” Ye Xiaowen , former Director of 
the National Bureau of Religious Affairs, quotes the Ministry for Pub-
 
According to estimates from Hong Kong (Associated Press -
Christian groups have altogether three million 
members. 
The geographical extension of these groups seems enormous. Usu-
ally, they are spread out over several provinces. The “Teaching of the 
Supreme Deity” and the “Community of Disciples” have the largest 
clear strategy for development that is reminiscent of the guerilla tactics 
of the Communist Party during its formative period: from the villages 
to the cities, from the peasants to the Party cadres, intellectuals, and 
other high strata of society. Its members are supposed to get acquaint-
ed with management law, cadres, and similar political affairs.
inspired by Christianity is rare. The data presented in most cases emphasizes a 
poor or peasant background and minimal or hardly-existent education. The writ-
ings of the communities present the life of their leaders in a very mystical and glo-
Chris-
of Protestant, mostly unregistered, House Churches.
  For 
 
 
of a clan or a village: children, juveniles, adults, and the elderly. The 
percentage of young women with a middle-school degree is relatively 
high. Students and young people also form a large group.  Party cadres 
being members of these groups inspired by Christianity, in contrast to 
the Falungong , does not seem to be a problem of regional or na-
tional scope.  
Protestant communities, especially the “House Churches,” often 
serve as recruiting centers for new members of these groups. The main 
reason for much of the attraction is, above all, a lack of knowledge about 
the Christian doctrine. Apart from spiritual promises, some groups also 
offer material incentives to potential members. The members, however, 
are required to offer material property to the leader as a “gift” or “sac-
The Christian groups are characterized by a hierarchical, na-
and duties. The leader of a community possesses absolute authority. 
Besides a complex organizational structure, norms for behavior, dis-
ciplinary measures and sanctions are important elements of these 
groups. In order to strengthen the internal organization, the “Commu-
nity of Disciples,” e.g., has a very exclusive marriage policy: Members of 
the group may only practice intermarriage. With the help of a ban on 
newspapers and other reading materials as well as a ban on television, 
the connection to the outside world is supposed to be cut, and the loy-
alty towards the group assured. To what extent these groups exercise 
 In Teaching of the Supreme 
education. There are hardly any statistics on the socio-economical background 
of the members. Furthermore, we cannot assume that the descriptions we have 
access to have selected representative cases. Daniel L. Overmyer’s statement 
on Buddhist folk religion in traditional China is also valid for today’s situation: 
“The fact that the membership of many groups consisted primarily of peasants 
-
self were peasants” (Overmyer 
  According to an investigation about the membership structure of the “Community 
of Disciples” in one county in 
the “Community.” In one county in 
members of the local “Community of Disciples.”
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circumstantially evidenced.
A central characteristic of the Christian groups is the phenomenon 
of spiritual healing: Illness is regarded as an expression of somebody’s 
being possessed by an evil spirit or demon, or as a result of sinful behav-
ior. Regular medical treatment and, especially, Western medicine are 
rejected.  Prophesies regarding the “Last Judgement” in connection 
with redemption form another aspect of the teachings. The teachings 
of the known groups always include salvation and apocalyptic ideas.
Besides a widely branched organizational network, many groups 
practice a community life in their headquarters. Many activities take 
place during the night. One main activity during the assemblies is “glos-
solalia,” described by the groups themselves mostly as “communication 
with God” or “the revelation of God.” 
The spreading of the teaching, i.e., the recruitment of new follow-
ers, is one of the main activities of all communities. Most of the groups 
make use of various publications – brochures, books, and other media 
– in order to spread their teaching, e.g., at train stations, in trains, or in 
villages, etc. There is not much known about the number of copies of the 
distributed materials. Some groups organize special classes, in which 
members are prepared for missionary work. They often use business 
activities in order to be able to do their missionary work in a concealed 
way: hairdressing salons, car repair shops, restaurants, and wushu-
schools are regarded as discreet and unsuspicious meeting points. To 
what extent the groups are really motivated by the aim of reaching po-
litical power is not clear.
All the groups mentioned here refer to the Bible and to Christian 
ideas, which have developed in China under the inclusion of folk reli-
gious traditions. There is always a latent syncretism present. The exis-
tence of the groups is well known, but their organizational structures 
-
“ -
gious policy and not analytical categories, and therefore not helpful.  
The challenge of the above-mentioned Christian groups for the Chi-
nese Government and also for the Churches is very strong. Moreover, 
 
the emergence and growth of interest in religion in the last decades 
-
manifestations of Christendom in China.
The Non-Church(ed), Non-Institutional Manifestations of Chris-
tendom in China: “Elite Christianity” 
The phenomenon of the “cultural Christians” (wenhua jidutu 
cultural Christianity” ( jidu zongjiao wenhua 
non-institutional Christendom. cultur-
al Christians” are also described as “Apollos” or “Nicodems” of China.
The “cultural Christians” are intellectuals who, mainly through the 
-
ity for the Christian faith or theology. However, they opt to stay outside 
of the Churches, which, according to their opinion do not possess a gen-
uinely theological power, as they either follow the State too closely or 
– as with the Underground – seem to be too “sectarian”. Therefore, they 
cultural 
-
nese society seems to be more distinct than that of the Churches. It is a 
phenomenon that moves the relationship between Chinese culture and 
For these “cultural Christians” Christianity is – if it is permitted to 
baptism 
and a life according to the faith. Only with reservations, the writings 
of these Christians may be described as theological (in the sense of the 
Liu Xiaofeng , who also belongs 
to the “cultural Christians,” says that they only accept and defend Chris-
tianity as a cultural conception, as a weltanschauung. Insofar, they are 
not “true Christians,” because somebody “who accepts the Christian 
 This term goes back to the Anglican Bishop K.H. Ting (Ding Guangxun 
who, when answering the question whether persons like the painter Ding Fang, 
the writer Sun Xiaoling, or the philosopher He Guanghu are Christians, described 
them as “cultural Christians” and said that this was a cultural “expression of being 
a Christian.”
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creed only as a cultural conception indeed cannot be called a Christian. 
Christian-
ity have also made a decision to profess this existential experience.”  
Liu Xiaofeng continues that in China perhaps we cannot help but distin-
guish between Christians outside of the denominations and the mem-
bers of the Christian Churches. Here, he refers to the interpretational 
models of Ernst Troeltsch, Jürgen Moltmann, and the controversies that 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer triggered off with his idea of “religionsloses Chris-
tentum.”  
This interest in Christendom outside of the Churches, especially, 
among intellectuals, is, without any doubt, a theological challenge for 
the Chinese Churches. This new understanding of Christendom, opines 
the historian of religion, Zhuo Xinping, gains its force not so much from 
inside the Chinese Church with all its traditional attachments, but 
above all from a totally new generation, namely, that of the experts in 
religious science, philosophers, theologians, writers, poets, artists, and 
other scholars who are very much interested in Christian culture and 
try to use it in order to reshape and preserve the traditional Chinese 
culture. They regard the -
-
pulse for their own thinking, with its two extremes, the Confucian and 
the Daoist or Buddhist . They see the cultural value 
of Christendom not only in the Occident, but also for China. This, con-
cludes Zhuo Xinping, is meant by the so-called cultural understanding 
of religion in general and Christendom in particular.
The “cultural Christians” see their main task in enriching the Chris-
tian coloring of Chinese culture and fostering the spread of the Chris-
tian spirit of culture, the humanities, and education. In the PR China, 
there are a large number of books, journals, articles, and conferences 
  
  Similar objectives are also known from Christian Europe, e.g., with 
the “Protestantenverein” and the “Cultural Protestantism” (Kulturprotestantismus
The “Protestantenverein” was aiming at the reconciliation of religion and culture, 
and postulated Protestantism as the moral foundation of culture and state. Thus 
Christianity did not realize itself within the Churches, but in the transformation 
into a Christian world. The idea was to form the Protestant culture, to establish 
Protestantism as cultural factor or as a cultural force. In this context, however, 
later on, an accelerated decline of denominational Christianity into a cultural 
 
on philosophy, theology, and the history of Christianity  that verify 
the hypothesis that this “cultural Christianity” has in the meantime 
become a cultural “force” within Chinese society, especially through 
its close connection with academic research on Christendom in the PR 
-
nese Christendom.
Research on Christendom in China during the last two decades has ex-
-
adigms.  A very special aspect of this change of paradigms is the aca-
demic and non-Church research on Christendom by Chinese scholars in 
the PR China, as well as the presence of Christianity as an academic dis-
cipline at universities, academies of science as well as their institutes. 
Since I have described this academic manifestation of Christendom in 
detail elsewhere, I will limit myself here to some remarks only.
First of all, we have to emphasize the fact (or, as some put it: the 
-
phers, historians, scholars of literary and religious studies and other 
disciplines – study Christian thinking and expect from it a stimulation 
of Chinese spiritual life and a moral-spiritual counterbalance to the ma-
terialism that is spreading everywhere in China. They are interested 
in a modern, “enlightened” Christendom. They do research on the his-
tory of -
selves “theoretically” to the many aspects of Christian thought. Similar 
to the time of the May Fourth Movement – as has been explained by 
Liu Xiaofeng  – in China today we have once again a “competition of 
ideas.” Socialism and Communism in China, however, have fundamen-
tally changed the relationship between the Chinese and Christian cul-
Christianity 
and the indigenous tradition of the orthodox Confucianism have turned 
into tensions between Christianity and the new orthodoxy, namely, 
-
ternal” or “domestic” tension between cultural ideas from the West on 
Chinese soil.
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Here it is, of course, not possible to present the whole spectrum of 
the current research on Christianity in the PR China in detail. I once 
again refer to other publications,  and limit myself to some interpreta-
tions proposed by Liu Xiaofeng.
The academic research on Christendom, according to Liu Xiaofeng, is 
a “cultural-theoretical type of Christian thought” that does not consid-
er and transmit the denominational dogmatics, but simply a “Christian 
science” (“Christentumswissen schaft -
ration of this “Christentumswissenschaft” into the universities and insti-
tutes, Christendom becomes a “structural element” of Chinese culture. 
This means that today’s cultural system of the PR China enables the 
blending of -
culturation” of -
pology this also means that the academic research on Christendom will 
eventually become Chinese Christian thought. Liu Xiaofeng is further-
more convinced that alone due to the modernization of China, Chris-
tendom as a “cultural good” has already penetrated Chinese culture. 
The relation between Chinese culture and Christendom as a “foreign 
religion,” therefore, is no longer a dialogue between cultures, but an 
existential dialogue: “The development of Chinese Christendom, from a 
change the traditional relationship between Chinese culture and Chris-
tendom, but also the direction of the future development of Chinese 
culture itself,” says Liu.  The traditional division within Christendom, 
too, which was imported by the missionaries into China and harmed 
the development of Christendom in China, has nothing to do with China 
itself. According to Liu, the phenomenon of “cultural Christianity” is ec-
umenical and corresponds to the universality of Christendom.
Following Ernst Troeltsch, who in his Soziallehren saw Christendom 
holding a threefold social shape – as Church, sect, and mystics – Liu 
Xiaofeng divides the various manifestations of Chinese Christendom 
into similar types. According to his typology, the Catholic and Prot-
Protestant movements that are 
independent from the West may be regarded as the “Churches” of pres-
ent-day China. “Their attitude towards society, government, and nation 
as well as their tendency to be connected with the State power, clearly 
 
demonstrate these characteristics.” -
ly the Protestant “House Churches,” may be regarded as “sects” due 
to their structure as well their nature. However, the Catholic Under-
ground Church is, according to Liu, an exception. The “cultural Christi-
anity” and Christendom as an academic discipline (Christentumswissen-
schaft Liu Xiaofeng, due to their nature and form, belong 
to Troeltsch’s type of “mystics.” He stresses three characteristic points 
-




The Churches in China today do not recognize the “cultural Christi-
anity,” the “sects” reject it. The “cultural Christians,” on the other hand, 
regard the form of faith of the “sects” incomprehensible. Liu Xiaofeng 
believes that the lack of a Chinese “systematic theology” has serious 
negative effects on Chinese Christendom. If, however, “cultural Christi-
anity” in China really gains a foothold and is able to foster the develop-
ment of a “systematic theology” and a Christian philosophy (Liu speaks 
Chinese Christendom, formally as well as with regard to the doctrine.
The question, however, remains unanswered: Will the non-Church 
and non-institutional Christendom in China spread more vividly than 
the Church cultural Christianity” become a dom-
inant future manifestation of Chinese 
Concluding Remarks 
Even though Chinese Christendom in all its manifestations still is re-
garded as a “marginal” “foreign religion,” today, it seems to lose its 
Western character and has become a growing – howsoever character-
ized – sinicized socio-cultural force.  In China, today, there is a dis-
  Wu Xinming writes in this context: “Although Christianity cannot yet compete 
with Buddhism in the matter of sinicisation, contemporary scholars have already 
begun to use the expression ‘Chinese Christianity’ instead of ‘western Christianity 
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course on a “religious culture” (zongjiao wenhua -
ligious spirit of the culture” (wenhua zongjiao jingshen 
and, in this context, also on a “Christian culture” ( jidu-jiao wenhua or 
jidu zongjiao wenhua 
socio-cultural life. Shijie zongjiao wenhua 
 has been published in this spirit. 
The present spiritual situation in China is often compared to the sit-
uation around the May Fourth 
Movement, the credibility of the 
present, the credibility of the Marxist-Communist ideals is swaying. 
According to Liu Xiaofeng, the discrediting of the given ideology, i.e., 
the “crisis of faith” (  weiji 
the cultural ideas, values, and ideals. Through the politics of “Opening 
to the West,” an assimilation of various Western ideas and a search 
this search, various, even contrasting, tendencies of thought have de-
veloped and at the moment, none of them is prevailing. The Christian 
orientation, though small, still is – as Liu Xiaofeng says – a conspicuous 
and amazing sound in the “cacophony of the cultural rearrangement.” 
The revival of religiosity in China today, including the diverse man-
ifestations of Christendom, evidences that what is called religion or re-
ligiosity is truly alive and propagating itself – despite the restrictive 
religious policy and despite the Marxist predictions about the death of 
religion. In China, certain manifestations of Christendom will surely 
die out. Other manifestations of Christendom, however, show that they 
The theologian and philosopher of religion Reinhold 
 This description 
also applies to the role of the resurrecting religiosity being played out 
in China’ to describe the Christianity which has grown up in China during the 
past hundred years, just as for many scholars became accustomed to using 
‘Chinese Buddhism’ to describe ‘the development of Indian Buddhism in China.’ 
Of course, by comparison with the long history of Chinese civilisation, the history 
of Christianity during the period of China‘s development is, after all, very short.” 
In this context, D.L. Overmyer’s remark is 
interesting, namely, that the Chinese scholars often use the term wenhua instead 
of zongjiao or 
(see 
    
 
at least in some segments of today’s Chinese society – including various 
manifestations of Christendom – in the PR China today. Christendom 
in China, thus, has become a phenomenon with an open future, but – in 
the words of Wu Xinming – it has “the ability to bring into play the con-
tribution it should make to the way in which Chinese culture engages 
with other world cultures, for the further enrichment and development 
of Chinese culture itself.”
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The Islamic Revival Movement in China Today
Wang Jianping
Until recently, China’s Muslim tradition received relatively lit-tle systematic study. However, some recent scholarly works in English have begun to address the history and present state of 
Muslims and Islam in China.  In his book Muslim Chinese, Dru Gladney 
Hui  Mus-
lims in post-Mao China – the largest Muslim ethnic minority group in 
China – and a general portrait of China's Muslim peoples. But since it 
appeared, only a few works have dealt with the Islamic revival move-
 In China, scholarly 
recognition of the importance and diversity of China’s Islamic heritage 
has also been slowly growing. According to statistics from the Islam-
ic Association of China, at the end of the twentieth century China had 
a mosques  and 
akhond
khalifas (Arabic for ‘successors of the 
Prophet Muhammad’ – the religious students studying in madaris, plu-
ral of madrasa  and there are at least a thousand 
local -
the author has not seen any special books on Islamic studies that have been pub-
lished regarding the current situation.
 This statistic of the number of mosques in China is apparently an underestimate. 
Religion in China
 Wang Jianping
ordinate Islamic affairs with government authorities under the control 
of the Communist Party.
This paper will discuss the current state of Islam and Muslim com-
munities in China based on extensive reading of periodicals published 
by many Islamic organizations and communities, interviews with Mus-
during visits to many Muslim communities in different parts of China 
over the last decade. It will also build on other studies of contempo-
rary Muslim China that have appeared in Chinese and English in recent 
years.
The Muslim Community in China
Any examination of Islam in China must not overlook the basic orga-
nization of the Muslim community – its grassroots organizations, and 
the basic components of Islamic social life in China. Here a fundamental 
issue is the ‘exceptional’ character of Islam compared to other Chinese 
religious traditions. A fundamental difference between Islam and the 
Buddhist and Daoist religions that have traditionally dominated Chi-
nese society is that Islam is an organized religion and Muslims live in 
a community based on Islamic law (
and temples in which monks live in secluded settings only occasionally 
open to others, Chinese Buddhism and Daoism generally have no ex-
clusive religious communities. Historically, the only exceptions to this 
rule were a few sects which arose at certain times in Chinese history. 
Chinese religions are not ‘organized religions’. In China, as elsewhere, 
Christianity has been a religion centered on church communities. But 
generally Christian churches have focused on spiritual activities, and 
have stayed removed from the economic, social and cultural activities 
that Muslim communities have encompassed. Thus, no other religion in 
China combines spiritual faith with mundane matters as intimately as 
Islam.
Another striking difference between Islam and other religions in 
China is that the Islamic faith is closely related to Muslims 
-
ing to one of several ethnic minority groups. Chinese followers of Bud-
dhism, Daoism and 
  
and national social status. But, as will be explained in greater detail 
below, China’s Muslims belong to ethnic minority groups, principally 
Hui and Uighur (Weiwuer-zu 
The typical Muslim community centers on a mosque, and its mem-
bers enjoy a shared religious commitment as well as economic and so-
cial-cultural activities. In Arabic, such a community is called a . 
In this community all adult male members have equal rights and re-
sponsibilities to participate in communal affairs. Consensus over de-
cisions concerning the mosque is arrived at by a board of management 
headed by a director and several elders. They also take care of routine 
affairs such as -
tion, and daily activities that directly tie the mosque to Muslim life and 
public affairs.
In China the majority of Muslims, except for members of several 
orders, follow the traditional Sunni custom in which each  is a 
-
tween communities. There is no central leadership of these communi-
ties, although there are strong spiritual and cultural bonds between 
them and there is also a widespread Islamic fraternal sentiment. Each 
 is more autonomous than, say, a Han  Chinese village or neigh-
borhood, and other Muslim communities cannot interfere in its affairs 
or restrain its autonomy. 
The  has two parts: a mosque administration board, which is 
made up of members of the community and a madrasa
composed of the people mainly coming from outside the community, 
such as akhonds  (or khalifas.  Most Muslim communities in 
China have customary regulations that stipulate that a cleric, such as an 
imam, should be invited from another Muslim community to supervise 
the religious affairs and religious school of the host community. The 
essential requirements of the imam -
able in the Arabic Quran and 
a virtuous, upright person willing to dedicate himself to Islam and his 
community. The qualities considered necessary for the selection of the 
 Akhond refers to religious clerics who staff mosques and madaris imams or Ak-
honds of madrasa teaching are the chief clerics of mosques.
 Concerning the structure of Muslim communities in China, even in history we can 
observe these parallel divisions among the Hui communities in Yunnan . Cf. 
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director and elderly members into the mosque management board are: 
engagement for their community. Usually, the term for members of the 
Mosque administration and the imam is three years, but their tenure 
can be extended for another term or longer if the community chooses.
The Muslim community is thus centered on the mosque where the 
akhond and other clergy reside and preach. The mosque is a commu-
nal center providing religious services and instruction, as well as im-
portant social, cultural, economic and public welfare functions. Thus, 
Muslims regard the mosque as the soul of their community. In China, 
mosques have often come to be more active and effective units of com-
munity than the villages and urban neighborhood committees that 
dominate the grassroots Han social fabric.
Indeed, as grassroots secular power in China has eroded since the 
mosque-based 
communities of Muslim society have actually strengthened their role in 
communal affairs. Today almost all the important affairs in rural Chi-
na such as family planning, education, village elections, social security, 
and anti-drug campaigns, cannot take place without at least the tacit 
support of the akhond or imam. In Muslim communities the akhond is 
-
akhond. In many 
imam to deliver a speech 
after the 
In Muslim communities the akhond -
of the community. In not a few cases the director of mosque adminis-
tration board is also a village cadre, thus combining the religious and 
secular administrative roles. If the director of the mosque board is not 
-
them from enjoying the same authority in the community. This is one 
 This part in general has been summarized by the author after visits to various 
Muslim communities in China. Other Muslim scholars in Islamic periodicals such 
as Kaituo (Pioneer  (Journal of Islamic 
 and Musilin tongxun  ( -
cussed this issue. 
important reason the state has been losing authority among the Mus-
lim believers in heavily Islamic parts of China.
After decades of restrictions and even harsh repression, the Chi-
nese government began to adopt a more pragmatic policy towards re-
Islam. 
Now growing numbers of Muslims attend mosques to pray and attend 
religious services. Mosques in regions with a strong Islamic tradition 
such as Xin jiang , Gansu , Ningxia , Yunnan , Hebei 
, He’nan  and Shaanxi 
the Friday jum’a prayers. Many pious Chinese 
a day, and in Muslim dominant areas an Islamic ceremony can attract 
more than ten thousand believers to pray and listen to the  (Arabic: 
imam  The mosque black board 
always has posted the long list of the names of the Muslims who pay 
zakat
purposes.
In urban mosques it is also not unusual to see Uighur Muslims pray-
ing side by side with Hui Muslims – a sign that Islamic fraternal feelings 
can cross ethnic boundaries.  It is also not uncommon to see Muslim 
women in heavily Muslim areas such as Kashgar (Kashi Hotan 
(Hetian , Lanzhou , Linxia , Weizhou  and Xi’an  
wearing the headscarves and modest dress many followers believe the 
Holy Quran stipulates. During Ramadan, the fasting month of the Is-
lamic calendar, many Muslims now abstain from food and drink during 
the daytime. 
Even in communities with weaker religious traditions, Muslims 
often observe basic Islamic customs such as refusing to eat pork and 
other foods proscribed by Quranic dietary law, observing Muslim prac-
tices in weddings, funerals and burial services, observing the ritual of 
Shadian , a Hui community in Yunnan, the celebration 
of the Birthday of the Prophet 
annual 
Muslim communities in Northwest China can 
also have such large gatherings for religious festivals, i.e., the Id-Kan Mosque in 
Kashgara and the Hui communities in Linxia of Gansu.
 In Beijing on Xin jiang Street  many Uighur businessmen have opened restau-
rants and shops for commercial activities for people going to the Jingshifang 
 and the Haidian  Mosques for religious services.
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giving Arabic names to new-born children, and following Islamic ritual 
in the slaughter of livestock.
Although the distance between China and Saudi Arabia is consid-
erable, and most Chinese Muslims are poor, the number of followers 
applying to perform the hajj – the pilgrimage to Mecca that each Mus-
lim has to perform at least once – has been growing steadily since 
hajjis in recent 
years,  the actual number of Chinese Muslims making the pilgrimage 
Saudi Arabia on other 
pretexts such as visiting relatives and doing business.
To sum up, with the revival of Islamic consciousness and religious 
traditions in China, most Chinese Muslims can now freely practice the 
basic requirements of Islam, and the number of Muslims determined to 
strictly follow all ‘Five Pillars’ of the Islamic faith is growing quickly.
The Diversity of China’s Muslim Communities
Although Islamic traditions have revived strongly in China since the 
 communities are very diverse in terms of geo-
graphical location, ethnicity, languages, cultural features, and even 
their various doctrinal schools and religious practices.
First, the Muslim population in China is distributed widely but un-
-
palities have Muslim
Muslims.  However, the geographic concentra-
tion of the Muslim population in China is also highly uneven: more than 
two thirds of China’s Muslims live in the country’s northwest, partic-
ularly in the Xin jiang Uighur Autonomous Region (Xin jiang Weiwuer 
Zizhiqu Gansu Province, the Ningxia Hui Autono-
mous Region (Ningxia Hui Zizhiqu Qinghai 
Province. The other third of the Muslim population is largely concen-
trated in predominantly Muslim areas in a number of other provinc-
es: He’nan, Hebei, Yunnan, Shandong , and Anhui .  Although 
 The number of hajjis who performed a pilgrimage to 
Islamic Associ-
ation of China 
most of China’s regions outside the northwest have very small Muslim 
they dominate certain urban neighborhoods or villages, often close to 
historically strategic geographic sites such as rivers, canals or commu-
nication hubs. This remarkable feature of Muslims’ residential patterns 
is a product of history: many Muslims moved into central inland and 
coastal China during the Yuan , Ming  and Qing  Dynasties, serv-
ing as militia in imperial armies, and they were stationed in strategic 
encampments from which ‘Hui’ Muslim communities evolved.
The Muslim population in China is also ethnically very diverse. 
There are ten ethnic minority groups in China that are classed as Mus-
lim peoples. They are the Hui, Uighur, Kazakh (Hasake-zu , 
Kyrgyz (Keerkezi-zu Dongxiang-su , Uzbeks (Wu-
zi bieke-zu Tatars (Tataer-zu , Tajik (Tajike-zu 
Salar (Sala-zu Bonan (Bao’an-zu . The 
largest group is the Hui – mainly Chinese-speaking Muslims who are 
distinguished from Han Chinese largely by their religion alone – who 
Muslim population in China.
The next largest group of Muslims is the Uighur people, who number 
eight million according to the latest census statistics.  The Uighur are 
followed by the 
Tajik, Uzbeks and Bao’an 
ethnic group is the 
Linguistically, the majority of Hui speak Mandarin Chinese as well as 
the various Chinese dialects also spoken by local 
number of Hui also speak Mongol, Thai, Bai and Tibetan thanks to a 
long history of association and intermarriage with these other ethnic 
groups. Several thousand Hui Muslims live on Hainan , a large is-
land province in the South China Sea, and they speak a Vietnamese-Ma-
has not given any broken down statistics concerning the Muslim population in Chi-
-
cording to the natural growth of these Muslim peoples. Cf. 
-
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lay language inherited from ancestors who came from Southeast Asia. 
The Uighur, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Salar and Tatars each speak their 
own distinctive languages, all belonging to the Turkic-Altai language 
family. The Dongxiang and the Bao’an speak a mixed Turkic-Mongol 
Tajik speak 
an eastern Iranian language.
Although they share a common faith, Muslims in China belong to 
very diverse cultural traditions. The Hui have been more open to Han 
Chinese culture than other Muslim groups. The forefathers of the Hui 
came from Central Asia, Persia, Arabia and western Asia. But after 
many generations of intermarriage with Han Chinese and other ethnic 
groups, and encouraged by assimilation policies imposed by imperial 
governments, most Hui look like Han Chinese. In many ways they have 
absorbed Han Chinese culture and customs in language, dress, and so-
cial habits – with the exception of Muslim practices concerning diet, 
birth, marriages and funerals.
The Turkic-Altai speaking Muslim peoples generally resemble their 
Central Asian counterparts in cultural traditions and customs. The Ka-
zakhs and Kyrgyz retain a nomadic tribal life with traces of pre-Islamic 
culture, including some shamanistic elements. Historically, the Uighur, 
Uzbeks and Tatars were mostly sedentary peoples who lived in set-
-
cial traditions. The Dongxiang, Salar and Bao’an lead a life of farming, 
-
graphically isolated areas with mixed economic activities. The moun-
tain-dwelling Iranian culture and 
is similar to their ethnic counterparts in Tajikistan and Afghanistan.
Islam in China is to some extent divided by the same doctrinal di-
visions and divergent religious practices to be found in the rest of the 
Muslim world. The majority of Muslims in China adhere to the 
School , the one of the four s, or theological-juris-
tic schools, in Sunni Islam. But among Chinese Muslims there are divi-
sions between mysticism and non-
the Ikhwani School  and the traditional Qadim (Gedimu , from 
  Ikhwani (Yihewani -
habit (  
between the Sunni and 
Muslims in China are adherents of Sunni Is-
lam. But at least of one third of the Sunni Muslims in China are follow-
ers of various 
China: Jahriyya (Zhehelinye , , Qa-
diriyya (Gadelinye Kubrawiyya (Kuburenye . 
There are also some smaller orders such as Shaddhliyya (Shazilinye 
, Suhrawadiyya (Suhelawadiye Chistiyya (Qie-
sidiye  and Qalandariyya  (Gelandaiye 
group among the main four 
followers. But it is sub-divided into many sub-orders and schools. The 
Jahriyya also is divided into several groups with a total membership of 
Qadiriyya has a membership of about half a million. The 
smallest Kubrawiyya, whose adherents mainly belong 
to the Dongxiang ethnic group in 
Hui, Dongxiang, Salar and Bao’an 




group is the Qadim, the traditional group which has accommodated lo-
cal cultures in its faith. At a conservative estimate, the Qadim or the 
traditional Sunni group has at least ten millions followers in commu-




three generations after the death of the Prophet Muhammad.
There are several major differences between the Ikhwani and the 
Qadim or the traditional Sunni group. One of them is that the Ikhwani 
oppose to ritual tomb pilgrimages, veneration of the dead and celebra-
tion of the Maulid (the Prophet 
practiced by the Qadim. The Ikhwani group regards these practices 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, later on they developed into a 
distinguished group differing from the Wahhabiyya.
Qadim and the Ikhwani groups are based on the tables provided 
by Ma Tong ’s work with my estimation data including other Muslim peoples 
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as Chinese or indigenous acculturations and deviations from the righ-
teous path of Islam. China’s founding 
by the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia they encountered during 
their hajj there, and they came back to China vowing to expunge alien 
Chinese practices from Muslim communities and restore Islam in China 
to the true way of Allah. The Ikhwani group is also opposed to all forms 
of 
“Down with menhuan  (Chinese for  
(Arabic, referring to the tombs of the  Nowadays, ‘purist’ 
Chinese Muslims who wish to practice a more ‘orthodox’ Islam often 
belong to Ikhwani communities. Unlike the term Wahhabi, the Ikhwani 
School of the Hui Muslims does not have negative connotations of po-
liticization and radicalism, and in fact Ikhwani groups are tolerated by 
the Chinese government.
The major differences between 
following: First, a 
such central leadership, and no hierarchical structure that spans local 
communities.  Second, the leaders of 
pass their power onto designated successors, in most cases chosen from 
their own kin or disciples. By contrast, non-
mysticism (tariqa, Arabic for ‘the way toward 
Islam. In their rituals they emphasize dhikr (chanting accompanied by 
-
Quran and the Sun-
na, and they reject the ritualistic and meditative practices of the 
Fourth, , or tomb (mazar, Arabic, re-
fers to the tomb of a Turkic Muslim 
complexes holding the graves of the orders’ founding saints, and 
disciples believe in karama – miracles accomplished by saints (wali 
pilgrimages to tombs as 
 This is only considered relatively, not absolutely since in the special time and spe-
cial circumstance, i.e., in the time of the Muslim insurrection against the oppres-
sion of Chinese imperial authorities, the non- Qadim Muslims 
could formulate a central leadership or a prominent Muslim leader who led all 
Muslim rulers. The most remarkable example is 
Du Wenxiu Ma Dexin -
nese th
their most important rituals, even more important than the pilgrimage 
to Mecca. Some 
natures equivalent to the Prophet Muhammad or even Allah. However, 
the non- Ikhwani, reject these practices as 
tomb venerating as a heresy.
There are also many other divisions that differentiate China’s Mus-
lim communities. More than half of China’s Tajik Muslims in China fol-
low Seventh Imam sect in the -
gard the Aga Khan as their spiritual leader, and pay annual tribute to 
his representatives from abroad. Many Uighurs in Yarkand (Yeerqiang 
, today Shache Xin jiang are followers of the 
Twelfth Imam Islamic world. In 
addition, a small number of Hui in Xin jiang and Gansu follow Twelfth 
Chinese Muslims display a wide range of day-to-day religious prac-
tices. The sedentary Hui, Uighur and Uzbek Muslims pray regularly in 
mosques, and pious 
Kazakh and Kyrgyz Muslims pray possibly one or two times a day in 
their tents. Fasting during Ramadan is widespread among Muslims in 
Northwest China, but Hui who live in coastal China often observe only 
a few days’ fasting or do not fast at all. The Turkic Muslims of western 
China celebrate the Islam-
ic festival. But the Hui mark the end of Ramadan as the most important 
Islamic festival. Many Hui communities in southwest China even treat 
Maulid, the Birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, as the biggest Islamic 
festival.
While the Hui have adopted many Chinese customs and cultural 
habits, the Turkic and Tajik Muslims retain the traditions of Turkic and 
Iranian Islam, including some pre-Islamic elements drawn from sha-
manism, Manichaeism, Buddhism and star-worship.  In the cities and 
towns Muslims often drink alcohol, but in regions with strong Islamic 
traditions drinking is regarded as a grave violation of Islamic law. In 
 On the Shi’a among the Hui in Xin jiang, I got the information from my trip to the 
Xin jiang Hui surnamed Yu , now doing trade in Beijing, claims 
himself to be a Shi’a and assures me that there is a small group of Shi’a among the 
Hui in Yili  of North Xin jiang. On the Shi’a Hui in Gansu, I got the information 
from my colleague Prof. Feng Jinyuan 
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western China many Muslims take it as a religious duty to send their 
children to study the Arabic Quran and Islam in madaris, but full-scale 
madrasa education in the eastern part of China is considerably rare. 
Many Muslims in central and eastern China understand being Muslim 
to 
Turkic Muslims in China’s west Islam is a whole way of life, and they 
must follow the Quran and Sunna in their entirety. Among the 
groups the different orders sometimes clash each other just for a small 
variety in the tone of chanting the Quranic text, the method of medita-
tion or in some ritual formation.
The Impetus to Unity Among China’s Muslim Communities
Although the many factors described above offer a picture of tremen-
dous diversity in Islam in China, there is also clearly a trend towards 
greater unity among these Muslim communities, particularly over the 
past two decades of economic reform. There are several factors encour-
aging greater unity among China’s Muslim communities.
Umma
The sentiment of umma (Arabic, ‘Muslim 
links otherwise disparate Muslim communities together as they all 
strive to survive in a non-Muslim society. If one visits a mosque in 
Shanghai, China’s largest commercial and industrial city where many 
Uighur businesspeople travel to do business, one often sees Uighur 
Muslims praying alongside Hui Muslims. The Uighurs do not have their 
own mosque, and so the two communities pray together. In many other 
big cities, such as Beijing, Guangzhou , Xi’an, Lanzhou and Shenzhen 
, it is common for Muslims of various ethnic backgrounds to pray 
together. The same applies to Hui travelers in 
mosque for Hui Muslims, they attend a Uighur mosque to pray. In 
madaris in Beijing and elsewhere throughout China, Uighur khalifa sit 
beside Hui khalifa in the same classroom studying the Quran and other 
Islamic subjects. Some Lingming Tang  and 
some sub-orders of 
among the different 
regional mobility grows, this kind of cross-ethnic religious mixing is 
also growing.
Occasionally, this trans-ethnic religious sentiment has also given 
Muslims in Beijing, Shanghai, 
Lanzhou, Kunming , Urumqi (Wulumuqi Xi’an and Xin-
ing  protested against a Chinese book Sexual Customs which had 
passages insulting to Islam. The public rallies brought together Uighur, 
Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Dongxiang, and Salar Muslims with Hui Muslims. Un-
der great pressure, the Chinese authorities banned the book and put 
the two Chinese authors under house arrest.
Such umma mosque building and main-
tenance and Islamic education. When a local community builds or reno-
vates a mosque, funds for the task are collected not only from the com-
munity itself, but also from other communities and individual Muslims 
even in far distant regions. Likewise, funding for madrasa schools and 
Islamic festivals often comes from a wide variety of sources. When a 
local Muslim community celebrates major Islamic holidays such as the 
Id al-Qurban, the end of the Ramadan, and the birthday of the Prophet 
Muhammad, representatives from other Muslim communities are in-
vited to participate in the festival and may travel thousands of kilome-
ters to attend.
The various Muslim ethnic groups and different Islamic schools de-
scribed above share the same basic religious beliefs and practices, and 
this in itself helps to encourage unity between communities. Any Mus-
lim – Uighur, Uzbek, Tajik, Dongxiang, or Hui – certainly believes in the 
same Quran, the Prophet Muhammad and probably hopes to master Ar-
Muslims follow the same essential Five Pillars of Islam: 
reciting the Islamic credo in Arabic, praying, giving alms, fasting, and, 
if possible, making a pilgrimage to Mecca. The social cement that this 
shared faith generates is seen, for example, in social events that bring 
different groups together. In annual competitions of Quranic chanting 
Sexual Cus-
toms
 Many pieces of the monument stones in various mosques have the inscription 
texts display this point, and the author himself has clearly seen the inter-links of 
Muslim communities concerning building mosque and Islamic festival celebration 
in his many trips to the 
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organized by the Islamic Association of China or by local Islamic asso-
ciations, Uighur Muslims and Muslims from other ethnic groups join 
with Hui Muslims in reciting the Arabic 
Muslims in China.
The basic creed of Islam that Muslims subscribe to is generally the 
-
tural adjustments. In encountering a non-Islamic environment with a 
strong Muslims tend to focus 
on their own communities, and they prefer to mix with other followers 
of Islam rather than assimilating into Han Chinese culture. Muslims ev-
erywhere across China uphold the same dietary customs and dine at 
halal (according to 
also often pepper their conversation with some Arabic or Persian vo-
cabulary, although they may speak Mandarin Chinese or Chinese dia-
lects, especially if they are Hui.  
it easier to socialize with other Muslims and receive hospitality from 
locals Muslims. When Chinese Muslims meet other Muslims, they often 
greet each other with dost salam
The way of Islamic way of life is thus deeply rooted in habits and tradi-
tions that transcend communal boundaries. 
Chinese Muslims have developed strong sympathies for the injustices 
they perceive other Muslims suffering in a predominantly non-Muslim 
society, and they have proven willing to aid other Muslim communities. 
There have been cases of Chinese Muslims acting in concert to resist or 
Yangxin Incident” 
occurred in which Hui Muslims in Yangxin , Shandong, fought with 
Han Chinese after Muslim bans on eating pork were mocked and vio-
lated. Hui from Mengcun  Hebei Province, traveled to Yangxin to 
show their solidarity with their fellow Muslims brothers. When the Hui 
protestors from Mengcun marched into Yangxin their way was blocked 
by armed police. The local government mishandled the incident and six 
Hui Muslim  After word of 
this tragedy spread across China, many Muslim communities in Hebei, 
Shandong, He’nan, Tianjin and even Beijing mobilized and held protests 
demanding the government redress this injustice and pay compensa-
tion for the deaths.  Muslims in other regions donated money to the 
families of those who died or were injured. The central government, 
fearing wider instability, moved very swiftly to assuage Muslim anger 
and dismissed local leaders in Yangxin, including the chief of the police 




ter passed away and there was a dispute over who was his rightful 
temporary closure of the suborder’s mosque. The 
had no place to pray, and other neighboring Muslim communities invit-
ed the mosques, although they belonged 
to different 
It is not unusual for a Uighur Muslim to seek shelter in a Hui mosque 
or community if traveling in central and eastern China. The traveler 
may even receive a few days’ free accommodation from his co-believers 
despite different cultural backgrounds and customs.
The sentiment of the umma can therefore act as a unifying force 
transcending barriers between different communities, groups and 
schools. Indeed, throughout China’s history many Muslim uprisings 
against imperial governments contained different Muslim groups: Hui, 
Uighur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Salar, Dongxiang, and others.
In the wake of China’s economic reforms, overlapping trade, communi-
cations and cultural networks have been emerging in Chinese Muslim 
 The author is aware of this through interviews he held with the participants from 
these provinces at a conference held in 
the author’s interviews with the Hui Muslims from North China during a confer-
ence held by Islamic Association of China (Zhongguo Yisilan-jiao Xiehui 
, 
Guanghe of Gansu, 
 For example, the Muslim uprisings in th th centuries, the 
Muslim uprisings in Northwest China and in th century. See Tan 
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society. 
in the following six scenes:
The Muslim economic network in China: After China opened its door 
-
ly, and Muslims have taken advantage of liberalizing economic policies 
to set up their own business. Many Muslim-owned restaurants, work-
shops, shops, hotels, and companies have mushroomed across the coun-
try. According to recent statistics, in Beijing alone there are at least two 
thousand Muslim-owned enterprises such as restaurants, cafeteria, 
butchers, hotel, kindergartens, and other private businesses.
In many areas of China markets for halal beef and mutton and other 
Muslim foodstuffs, leather, handicrafts, and herbs have absolutely be-
come dominated by Muslims. Many of these private Muslim enterprises 
mosques and Islamic schools. Their 
donations have already given rise to informal Islamic charity founda-
tions serving Islamic welfare and public welfare. Some Muslim busi-
nessmen have founded business syndicates with many branches span-
ning many regions. Sha Pengcheng , a Hui Muslim entrepreneur 
who owns a traditional Hui medical company in Xi’an and exports med-
icine to many countries in Middle East, Southeast Asia and European 
-
sored by Omar Foundation in Los Angeles.  Many Chinese Muslims also 
use their connections with their friends in Islamic countries to do in-
ternational business linking up with international Islamic foundations.
A regional network of transportation, communication and commer-
cial links fostering economic and trade cooperation among Muslim 
communities: Even in imperial China, Muslims were famed for their 
far-reaching transport and commerce networks, such as the Silk Road, 
the Spice Road and trans-Asiatic caravan trade. For Muslims in China, 
as elsewhere, the early career of Muhammad as a trader set an example 
of combining commerce and piety. Traditionally, Chinese Muslims trad-
ed in porcelain, silk, textiles, minerals, tea, jade and other commodities. 
Muslims also developed special secret signs and practices to protect 
with the Deputy Secretary in General of Islamic Association of Beijing (Beijing Yi-
si lanjiao Xiehui 
 News reported by Zhongguo musilin
their trade, and they formed trade guilds to regulate trade and trans-
portation.
Today, China’s Muslims, especially the Hui and the Uighur peoples, 
have inherited a traditional proclivity for trade and commerce.  In 
western China, particularly in mountainous regions such as Yunnan, 
Gansu and Guizhou  where communications are backward, Mus-
lims still dominate the modern ‘caravan’ trade of today. In these and 
other regions, Muslim owners of motor vehicles have developed re-
gional networks carry passengers and goods. The trading traditions of 
China’s Muslim communities, and their wider religious networks, have 
-
between Muslims across the country.
A network of production and distribution of Islamic goods to meet 
the demand of believers in China: Muslims in China have also developed 
their own networks to make and distribute daily goods used by Muslims 
everywhere. Muslims make and sell halal foods for residents and trav-
elers. Many mosques have shops to distribute special religious items 
such as soap, white caps, cloth to wrap corpses, prayer badges, jewel-
ry, headscarves, prayer carpets, porcelain, incense and incense-burner, 
and Islamic booklets and publications. The commercial links created by 
the circulation of these Islamic goods made by Chinese Muslims have 
formed an Islamic economy that to a considerable degree independent 
of the Han Chinese economy and commercial distribution networks.
The creation of Islamic websites: With the spread of the Internet, 
Islamic communities throughout China have also taken to using high 
technology to communicate. Two dozen or so Islamic websites have 
been set up by the Muslims in China since the last few years.  Most of 
them are devoted to spreading the doctrine of Islam and instructing 
Muslim people in their faith, and there are also a few Muslim-oriented 
commercial and academic websites run by Muslims. Islamic religious 
websites are usually operated by Hui Muslim teachers and students in 
madaris. Much of the content explains the basic tenets of Islam and pro-
motes Islamic culture. The websites also report news from the rest of 
the Islamic 
for example, the reaction of the Muslim world to the ter-
 For 
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rorist attacks and the bombing in Afghanistan afterward.  Quite a few 
articles criticize the spread of materialism in contemporary Chinese 
society, and discuss how Muslims should protect their faith in an atmo-
sphere of spiritual crisis. 
Many young Muslims also socialize in special Muslim internet ‘chat 
rooms,’ and these rooms have also acted as a bridge for forming friend-
three Hui Muslim students from the Zhaotong Madrasa (Zhaotong Jing-
xue xiao  in 
news of the tragedy was posted on Internet, many Muslims from across 
China sent messages of condolence to Zhaotong Madrasa, and also sent 
donations to the families of the deceased and the school.  Many web-
sites have opened discussion forums on topics such as how to be a true 
Muslim, attitudes towards the Chinese language, how to maintain faith 
in a non-Muslim social environment, and whether Muslims are allowed 
to sell drugs to others. These Islamic websites have become another 
channel for reviving and spreading Islamic tradition and culture in 
China.
A network of Islamic publications: In contemporary China a network 
has evolved to produce and distribute Muslim newspapers, magazines 
and books, as well as cassettes, videocassettes and CDs diskette of Is-
lamic materials.  Many Muslim entrepreneurs, driven by religious pi-
ety, have opened Islamic bookshops, publishers, cultural centers and 
libraries to spread Islamic knowledge and strengthen ethnic-religious 
identity. Hundreds, even thousands, of Islamic shops distribute Islamic 
books, magazines and audio-visual materials throughout China. They 
sell material such as recordings of 
(  
prayers by notable imams or Khatib ( -
taries on the history and traditions of Islam, as well as on current af-
fairs such as the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, and the Afghanistan War.
Muslim printing houses in many places, especially in northwest Chi-
na, have published tens of thousands copies of Islamic books including 
  
 Many Islamic publications such as Kaituo, Musilin tongxun, Gansu musilin 
 (Muslims in A min  -
tisement” to sell the Islamic books, cassettes and videocassettes with the Islamic 
contents. 
the Arabic Quran, the hadith, the works of the , the tafsir (com-
mentaries of the Holy kalam
works on history, and instructional handbooks on Is-
lam. These Islamic bookshops, centers and associations have created 
an informal system to distribute ideas and information to all Muslim 
communities nationwide, thus binding together scattered communities 
into an consciously Islamic.
A network of Islamic education has developed which spans differ-
ent Chinese Muslim communities. China’s Muslims communities are so 
widely dispersed and so religiously diverse it is impossible for any one 
community to maintain a system of religious education relying only on 
its own funding, teachers and students. Muslim communities in China 
usually like to invite an akhond from outside to take charge of madrasa 
schooling. On the other hand, a community with a strong Islamic tradi-
tion regards it as a duty to send its knowledgeable, pious akhond to do 
religious work in other communities, even remote ones, to revive and 
spread Islam.
It is not uncommon nowadays, for example, for an imam from Xin-
jiang to travel to Guangzhou in South China to act as an imam of a 
mosque there and give religious instruction in the madrasa. When a fa-
mous akhond opened a course on the Arabic Quran,  and hadith in 
a madrasa in Yunnan, many students came from distant places such as 
Guizhou, Sichuan , Gansu, Ningxia, Heilongjiang , Hai nan and 
He’nan to study under his guidance. The local community also regarded 
it as a duty and honor to accommodate these students from other com-
munities. When they graduate, these madrasa students will probably 
accept positions as imams in their home or other communities.
Often larger communities with strong Islamic traditions estab-
lish big madrasa, and invite prominent Islamic scholars to recruit and 
teach Muslim students. There are also heavily Muslim areas with many 
mosques and madaris boasting famous Islamic teachers who attract 
China’s “Little Meccas” (xiao maijia -
ates out to other Muslim communities throughout their home regions. 
Currently, they can be found in Xin jiang (at Kashgar, Hotan, Yarkand, 
Turfan, Aksu, and  (Linxia, Guanghe and Ning-
xia (Weizhou, Yinchuan , and Tongxin Yunnan (Shadian 
, Kunming, Weishan , Najiaying , and Dali Shaanxi 
( Shanxi  (Changzhi He’nan (Zhengzhou , Sang-
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po , Baizhai , and Gadangdian Hebei (Cangzhou 
 They are widely considered by Chinese Muslims to be central 
places of Islam in China. These “Little Meccas” act as regional hubs in 
a loose nationwide network of Islamic education.  They could poten-
tially play a central role in uniting scattered communities at a regional 
level, becoming regional headquarters for guiding Muslim interaction 
with the majority Han Chinese society and the Chinese state.
The Features of the Islamic Revival Movement in China
The Islamic revival in China over recent decades is vividly displayed 
in the building of many new mosques, in both Arabic style with domes 
and Chinese style with pagodas, and the restoration and enlargement 
of many existing mosques.  These mosques play a fundamental role in 
the religious, social and cultural life of -
er Islamic life without a mosque led by an akhond. Among 
many mazar complexes, mosques and spiritual residences have been 
rebuilt since the government took a more tolerant attitude towards 
 Over the last decade I have visited and photo-
graphed many mosques and mazars throughout China: the deserts and 
oases of South mosques with big domes and tall 
minarets newly built in Yunnan, Gansu, Shanghai and -
tional Chinese temple-style mosques in Shaanxi, Jiangsu , Beijing 
and mosques in the northern Chinese country-
side of Hebei and He’nan.
A mosque is an architectural complex with many religious, social 
and cultural functions.  As China is so remote from Mecca and Medina, 
the centers of the Islamic world, and as many Muslim communities – 
particularly the Hui – are surrounded by non-Muslim majorities, Chi-
nese mosques are widely regarded by Muslims as a particularly sacred 
 On this central place in 
 Concerning the theory of “Little Mecca” in studies of Islam of China, refer to the 
mazar, published by Dawut Rahila, a female 
Uighur scholar in 
sites that play a central role in community life. A mosque complex of-
ten has walls to keep out non-Muslim intruders.  It usually consists 
of a prayer hall, rooms for ritual ablution, a religious school, a khalifa’s 
dormitory, an akhond’s residence, a maita
where the deceased are kept, a meeting room, a courtyard or garden, a 
kitchen, storerooms, and a shop that sells religious books and items, a 
minaret and historic relics such as tomb stones and memorials. In some 
areas mosques include special prayer halls for women. Given mosques’ 
central importance, over recent years many Chinese Muslim commu-
nities build large, elegant mosques, and even small, poor villages can 
mosques in the Arabic architectural style with large domes, tall mina-
rets, and crescent symbols.
The mosque is usually a complex that functions not only as a reli-
gious site but also as a site for education, cultural activities, social and 
economic exchanges, and even martial arts training. Now we turn to the 
revival movement in 
China: education and publications, both closely linked with mosques.
Education 
Islamic scholars in China have argued that in every mosque the madra-
sa, or religious school ( jingxuexiao 
the mosque’s life.
mosques in China, and at least half of them have a madrasa or madra-
sa-style religious school in which the children learn the teachings of 
Islam learning and pious young Muslims are trained to be clerics. China 
schools or Quranic study centers of 
varying sizes and status. Local estimates also suggest that these schools 
Linxia Prefecture, Gansu, has a reputation 
of being a “Little madrasa students 
studying at various Islamic  For China as a whole, at a 
studying in madaris.
 Not only a few mosques put a wooden board on the gate of the prayer hall writ-
ten in Chinese: No non-Muslim is allowed to enter the hall. I observed this kind of 




most widespread, community-run general instruction in Islam.
madaris are sponsored and administrated by the Islam-
ic Association of China, a semi-government body in charge of Islamic 
affairs, and by provincial-level Islamic Associations. The aim of the 
madaris is to train imams or akhonds to serve important Mus-
lim communities or work as intermediaries between the government 
madaris 
across the country: Urumqi,  Yinchuan, 
Zhengzhou, He’nan Province, where more than one million Hui 
Shenyang , Liaoning Kunming, Xining, 
Shijiazhuang , madrasa and a mu-
nicipal madrasa in Beijing.
Some regions and municipalities have also opened the training 
classes for akhond Shanghai, Guangzhou, Tian-
jin, Huhehot (Huhehaote 
studying in these various 
madaris and training classes. madaris have regu-
lar curricula. Besides the Quran and hadith and other Islamic subjects, 
they have introduced modern Arabic as well as Marxist philosophy, 
Chinese history, Chinese language, computer training and English. The 
graduates are granted a diploma equivalent to a college degree.
madaris is far 
less than the demand for graduates from Muslim communities across 
China. The authorities have allowed Muslim communities to collect 
funds and open their own madaris, but these schools must be registered 
with, and supervised by, government religious affairs departments. (As 
this author observed during a trip to Linxia there are also unregistered 
madaris or 
Against this background, thousands of private madaris, large and 
small, have mushroomed all over China. Some prominent private 
madaris can recruit several hundred students and boast impressive 
China Madrasa 
(Zhongguo Yisilanjiao Jingxueyuan 
madaris. For example, the Linxia Arabic School in Gansu Province has 
even established a women’s college as well as a men’s one, and both 
have several hundred students from all over China who come to study 
Islam and Arabic. Other prominent private madaris include the Tong xin 
Madrasa, the Nanguan Mosque Madrasa (Nanguan Quingzhensi Jing-
xue xiao Weizhou Madrasa in 
Xiguan  Mosque Madrasa and Boshuxiang Mosque Madra-
sa in Guanghe  the Najiaying Madrasa 
(Najiaying Yisilan Wenhua Xueyuan , Dali Arabic 
School (Dali Alaboyu Xuexiao , Kaiyuan  Arabic 
School, and Huihuideng  Madrasa in 
 Arabic School, Zhoukou Amin  Arabic School, and Baizhai 
 Arabic School in -
zhi Alaboyu Xueyuan  in Shanxi, Daqi  Mosque 
Madrasa and Xinhua  Mosque Madrasa in Linxia, Gansu.
After more than ten years’ operation, many of these large-scale pri-
vate madaris have a stable body of students and teachers, and are well 
equipped with computers and photocopiers. Some of them even have 
their own libraries containing thousands of Arabic books from Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and other Islamic countries.  Certainly, most 
private madaris in China are very small, with only several students 
(khalifa akhond (or imam doctrine 
in the courtyard of a mosque.
The textbooks and curricula of these private madaris vary greatly 
depending on their locations and the religious traditions of the akhonds 
who run them. Some use modern Arabic textbooks and new teaching 
traditional madrasa schooling methods that have been passed on by 
akhonds for many generations.  Most graduates students of private 
madaris work as clerics in their hometown mosques. But many students 
choose other occupations, although they usually remain faithful Mus-
lims and play some core role in the affairs of their communities.
The last type of madrasa-style Islamic education is the general Is-
lamic education offered by many communities. For instance, there are 
mosques which offer classes during the 
 Based on the author’s personal observation in Linxia and Lanzhou of Gansu Prov-
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winter and summer school vacations. There are also occasional classes 
taught by akhond for kindergarten children, adults or university stu-
dents. These schools, classes and short-term programs do not aim to 
train the clerics but rather provide their students with basic knowledge 
of Islam: to teach them how to perform ritual ablution, how to pray, how 
to recite the core passages of the Quran.  The impact of these shorter 
the Muslim identity of many participants, and some Muslim clerics have 
pointed out in articles how participants can experience a spiritual re-
birth.
All the funds for private madaris and the primary Islamic educa-
tion come from alms donated by Muslim believers. The results of this 
privately-supported network of Islamic education are striking: even 
in cosmopolitan cities like Beijing, Tianjin and 
many children studying the Quranic phases and basic Islam teachings 
at mosque schools during the summer vacation.
With the resurgence of Islamic consciousness and the strengthening of 
Muslim identity, and also the growing role of the mass media in Chinese 
society, Chinese Muslims in China are increasingly publishing their own 
newspapers, magazines and periodicals to spread their ideas.
Lin Song , a professor of Quranic studies at the Central Univer-
sity of Nationalities (Zhongyang Minzu Daxue 
periodicals sponsored 
and published by Muslims in different parts of China.  Many of them 
nationalism and 
religious ideology among China’s Muslim communities, particularly 
Hui communities. These periodicals are entirely supported by dona-
tions collected from believers nationwide, and many editors of these 
periodicals are volunteers. Most editors and contributors are the Hui 
Muslim intellectuals, students and clerics. A few titles, such as Kaituo
Gansu musilin (  Musilin tongxun (Muslim 
 or  (Journal of Islamic 
.
 Personal interview with Prof. Lin Song Beijing. For a more 
detailed introduction to these periodicals published by different Muslim organiza-
covers all China. The longest surviving such magazine is more than 
Mostly subscribers receive them for free.
The contents of these magazines are very rich. These periodicals ad-
dress subjects such as Islamic education, Islamic history, and Islamic 
columns cover Quranic studies, hadith, discussions 
of Islamic doctrine such as kalam  law, Quranic 
commentaries on community news, and news reports from the Islamic 
world. They also address controversies in China’s Muslim societies. For 
instance, Muslim intellectuals and clerics have debated crucial issues 
such as Islamic education reform, how Islam should adapt to the mod-
Hui communities, and how to revive Islamic tradition.
Increasingly, these magazines have also begun to address sensitive 
political issues. A recent issue of Amin , a magazine published by 
a madrasa in Zhoukou , He’nan Province, strongly criticized the 
aggressive policies adopted by Ariel Sharon against Palestinians and 
criticized American foreign policy in the Middle East. The magazine ex-
pressed the solidarity of He’nan's Hui Muslims with the Palestinian peo-
ple, supporting their struggle against Israeli occupation.  A magazine 
published by Tianmu  Hui community in Tianjin even appealed to 
the Islamic Association of China to organize a Muslim Volunteer Army 
to go to Palestine and stand by side the Palestinian people against Isra-
el as it killed the Palestinian youths in the occupied land.
These Islamic magazines and newspapers have helped to foster the 
growth of Islam nationalism in China, and sometimes voiced a radical-
ly Islamic response to the West and secular Chinese society. Thus the 
emergence of these Islamic periodicals has not only helped to link up 
networks of Muslim communities throughout China, it has also given 
identity.
  See A min
Not only Amin but also other Islamic periodicals in China have similar articles or 
express the same views, as for instance, Shanghai musilin  (Muslims in 
Kaituo, Gansu musilin, or Musilin tongxun.
 “Qingyuan shu” Tianmu musilin 
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Movements 
The new push of the Ikhwani movement: The Wahhabi school of Is-
lamic  
It became the 
it spread across China and converted many Qadim communities into 
Ikhwani ones. The Ikhwani movement was encouraged by Hui Muslim 
warlords such as Ma Hongbin Ma Hongkui 
Ma Buqing Ma Bufang 
–  and it developed rapidly in northwest China. Ikhwani 
doctrine even became the dominant stream of Islam in the northwest 
during that period.
Islam as 
religious activities were allowed to 
resume, the Ikhwani movement again developed momentum. Ikhwani 
activists have sponsored pilgrimages to Mecca, study in Arabic coun-
tries by Chinese Muslim youths, and missionary work in China by cler-
gy from Arabic countries.
Many Ikhwani activists advocate purifying the Islamic way of life 
among the Muslim communities Qad-
which diverge from the orthodox path, and they have demanded the 
Islam of Mecca founded by the Prophet Muhammad, Chinese Ikhwani 
activists have also torn down traditional temple-like mosques and re-
placed them with Arabic-style architecture.
-
als and other rituals. They demand women wear headscarves in public, 
and even ask young girls attending public schools or college to wear 
headscarves. They have also admonished Muslims to abstain from any 
alcohol and opposed young students indulging in pop music, movies, 
mixed dancing, and unhealthy television programs. Some extremists 
 The author personally observed in his trips to Yunnan and Gansu that many his-
torical Chinese style mosques were demolished by Hui Muslims, particularly the 
Ikhwani groups, and were rebuilt with the mosques in Arabic architectural style 
on the same sites.
have even destroyed the decorations on mosques structure and Islamic 
historical relics.
Among the ethnically Turkic peoples of the Xin jiang Uighur Auton-
omous Region the 
Wahha biyya, however, the local Uighurs who are the members of this 
group entitled themselves with the Ui-
ghurs who oppose this group labeling them as the -
ment has been intertwined with a nationalist campaign for an indepen-
dent Eastern Turkistan. There it has vocally condemned 
practices and pro-Beijing tendencies in social and political life, and it 
has also attacked the implementation of family plan programs among 
Turkic Muslims. Some Ikhwani followers even advocate a fundamen-
talist theory of jihad Han Chi-
 The Xin jiang government fears that a strong 
Ikhwani presence in southern Xin jiang could spark instability and 
Wahhbiyya organizations and disbanded any Wahhabiyya communi-
ties, dismissing their clergymen, even jailing them in the ‘Strike-Hard’ 
campaign against national separatism. The central government of Chi-
Islamic Association of China to issue a new 
sermon ( nationalist separatism 
among Uighur clergymen.  The Xin jiang Chinese government has also 
organized training classes to instruct Uighur imams and akhonds in the 
theories of Marxism and Mao Zedong on religion, and to instruct them 
in combating religious extremism and separatism.
Revival of Islam among Qadim communties: Although most Chinese 
Qadim communities (in the Uighur areas, they are entitled as “the tra-
ditional Ikhwani 
(or the Wahhabiyya labeled by the government in 
 Many Ikhwani communities even have prohibited their religious students to watch 
TV or read Chinese literature in Linxia of Gansu where the Ikhwani movement is 
 See   ( Uighur 
text circulated among the 
wa’z speech collection in Uighur language have been printed 
and distributed to Uighur clerics in 
, the deputy Chairman of the Islamic Association of China (personal in-
terview, 
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they have also experienced a revival of -
ifestations of this re-Islamization include the following:
Renewed enthusiasm for Quranic study among Muslims: Before the 
Muslims could know how to chant 
the Quranic version in Arabic or Uighur language, however, there are 
are able to recite or are studying the Quran at 
present.  Among the Hui and other Muslim peoples, many commu-
nities have opened part-time classes to study the Quran taught by 
community akhonds.
Sending Islamic missionary teams from religious centers, large ma-
daris, communities with strong Islamic traditions to distant villages 
and communities: The Linxia Arabic School has sent several groups 
of the missionary teams made up of madrasa teachers and students 
across northwest China, they have also journeyed a thousand kilo-
meters to Yunnan in southwest China for Islamic missionary work. 
The teachers and students spread Islamic teaching among the Hui 
communities in these regions and promoting renewed Islamic con-
-
vers (umma
Anti-drug and anti-alcohol campaigns launched by religious activists 
among the Muslim communities: In Xi’an and in Tianjin the Muslim 
communities 
 They campaigned for local Islamic restaurants and shops 
to stop selling any alcohol, and urged Hui Muslims to give up alcohol 
and censure those who broke Islamic law. Many Muslim communi-
ties in Gansu, Ningxia and Yunnan have launched strong campaigns 
haram  Muslims in these com-
-
munities describing it as a disgrace for Muslims to engage in such 
crimes.
 Cited from Khahna , an Uighur scholar (now residing at Cambridge, Massa-
Confucianism and Islam, 
A resurgence of Muslim identity among young people: Confronted 
with widespread Han prejudice against religious believers as back-
ward and ignorant, many Muslim young people are proud of their 
identity as Muslims.  Many young Muslim girls wear headscarves 
and modest Islamic clothes in public, sometimes enduring contemp-
tuous glances from non-Muslims. Many Muslims 
assurance in their faith when confronted with a Chinese society 
Their faith teaches them that at the end of the world God will judge 
all people and punish evil and reward good, and also that Islam will 
certainly defeat materialism and shaitan
battle.
The revival movement among Ikhwani and Qadim 
groups in China, various Chinese 
revival movement during the past decade. This -
A more coherent organizational structure has emerged among var-
ious 
disciples. Many orders have built strong, fortress-style monasteries 
(
instance, the Lingming Tang, a Qadiriyya 
Order in 
-
rigation works, ponds, power lines, a cattle farm, vegetable gardens, 
and small workshops.  The Lingming Tang has several branch-mon-
asteries in other parts of China, and their leaders are nominated by 
the suborder’s leader Wang Shoutian . Shaykh Wang regu-
larly travels to his 
communal affairs. He has several akhonds devoted to madrasa edu-
 Many Lingming Tang in having a hierar-
chical organization: a leader, his representatives in different areas, 
other subordinates in scattered communities, disciples who imple-
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ment the leader’s religious instructions, and staff who work for the 
Prominent s or walis exercise absolute power over their 
followers. In communist society the Party once wielded absolute po-
wer. In the wake of the religious revival of the past two decades, 
however, in 
the  or murshid murid
disciple of a 
must absolutely obey the . So a -
lowers – often a large force – thanks to the closed boundaries of 
organization.
Forming tight social and religious networks: Many 
developed networks of followers that span counties, regions and 
provinces. The Jahriyya, Qadiriyya have communities 
that spread throughout most parts of China. Through centralized 
leadership, these 
net of organizational, communications and economic networks. Be-
cause of their mystic nature and sometimes clandestine ways, other 
groups – even non-
their networks. The experiences of repression in imperial times and 
persecution in recent decades have led 
for protection and support. This makes some -
spect in the eyes of government authorities. In recent years there 
have been clashes between local authorities and 
organized large scale activities, including tomb (mazar
by Xin jiang and amal (Arabic: charitable deeds, espe-
cially in the memory of deceased 
in Hui and Dongxiang Muslim communities.
example, at the Odam Mazar in the southern part of Kashgar, Xin-
jiang, an annual mazar
of Uighur and other ethnici-
ties.  Such mazar veneration activities usually last several days and 
have become a most prominent event in Uighur society. Amal ser-
vices among the communities have also expanded 
Xin jiang 
Yarkand had a population of 
mazar
in scope and importance. In  most of 
Yang Shijun , 
the Qadiriyya order.  The Jahriyya order has also 
held large-scale amal for its deceased 
different parts of China. 
The External Relations of Muslim Communities in China
Han Chinese
Muslims Han Chinese make 
society, China’s Muslims 
their seeming invisibility. One is that Islam, as a religion with non-local 
-
other is that most Muslims live in marginalized regions, especially in 
northwest China, where deserts, barren hills, and mountains dominate 
the landscape, and economic resources are limited. 
Although Chinese Muslims have tended towards caution in dealing 
with the Han majority, they have also enjoyed some advantages in es-
tablishing a foothold in society. In particular, Muslim communities have 
implemented by the Communist Party. The national minority policies 
Sta-
lin’s policies in the Soviet Union. Under them, Muslim peoples in China 
have enjoyed the several advantages:
Disproportionately high representation in political bodies such as 
People’s Congress and Political Consultative Committee, Communist 
Party Congress and organizations, the United Frontier Department 
(Tongzhanbu , and government organs such as the State 
Bureau of Religious Affairs (Guojia Zongjiao Shiwuju 
 and State National Minorities Committee (Guojia Shaoshuminzu 
Weiyuanhui . This “special status” is particu-
 Zhongguo musilin
 Wang Jianping
counties that grants some self-governance to Muslim and other mi-
norities.
To a lesser or greater degree, most Muslims in China are enjoying 
a loose restriction in the family-planning program that nearly all 
Han Chinese must abide by: one family and one child. Urban Muslim 
families, and other ethnic minority families, can usually have two 
children, and rural Muslim families can have three children. (Nor-
mally, an urban Han Chinese family can only have one child is al-
lowed, and a rural Han Chinese family can have two children if the 
Ethnic minority groups can send their children to schools, colleges 
and universities with considerably lower entrance scores than Han 
Chinese students.
In government departments, institutions and the state-owned 
enterprises, Muslims and other ethnic minorities enjoy more favora-
ble treatment than their Han Chinese counterparts in the allocation 
of living allowances, job promotions and housing.
In civil legal disputes and even crime cases, if a case involves two dif-
ferent ethnicities, often the party who is an ethnic minority receives 
favorable consideration.
countries, China’s ethnic minorities also suffer racial and religious 
discrimination. And unfortunately, the preferential policies granted 
to minority nationalities have also generated backlashes. They have 
reinforced the ethnic identity of Muslim peoples and also provoked 
antagonism against Muslim and other minorities.
After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Cen-
ter in New York and the Pentagon, as in other countries in Europe and 
North America, many Muslims in China felt tremendous pressure and 
suspicion from the mass media that often gave the misleading impres-
 In the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, for example, the Hui only occupy one third 
of Ningxia’s population. The regional governor, however, should be a Hui and the 
main posts of the government usually are taken by Hui cadres. This is also similar 
to Xin jiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolian etc regions and prefectures.
  Many Han Chinese in Xin jiang complain that they are actually discriminated by the 
have arguments with the ethnic minority groups. This is one of the main reasons 
for them wanting to emigrate back to Inland China. I personally encountered not 
a few complains from Han Chinese during my traveling in south Xin jiang in the 
sion that Islam is equivalent to fundamentalism, terrorism and extrem-
ism.  Many Muslims, including young people and clerics, complained in 
interviews and conversation that they felt discriminated against by the 
press and television. Many Muslims became fearful their relations with 
Han Chinese could be seriously damaged by negative media coverage.
In this hostile atmosphere of ignorance and misunderstanding, 
which to some extent predated in China 
have begun to turn to their religious traditions for consolation.  Some 
of them have become more isolated and radical. This is especially true 
of Uighur Muslims, -
lims and Afghanistan and the Central Asian republics. Many of them 
refuse to discuss their views about these issues.
Chinese Muslims have a complex relationship with their government, 
controlled by professed atheists who disavow all religions. Many Mus-
lims take a pragmatic approach towards the Communist Party-run gov-
must accommodate its demands and strive to survive under it while 
also enjoying the government’s preferential minorities program. The 
relationship between Muslim peoples and the state is often a bargain-
ing process, or game of cat and mouse, that has evolved over recent de-
cades. 
China’s Muslims minorities and 
therefore enjoy some privileges in political, economic and cultural sta-
-
lim communities are organized in combining religious activities with 
economic, social, cultural and educational functions. The Chinese gov-
ernment has sought to use these two factors to contain nationalist-reli-
gious ferment in Muslim communities and restrain radical Islam. It has 
  For instance, an article published by the  
recently labeled Islam as backward, anti-reform and anti-modernity. The tone of 
this paper was so offensive that the Islamic Association of China appealed to the 
 
Xin jiang, 
particularly when talking to 
some young college students and grassroots level cadres in the Uighur society ex-
pressed their feelings and opinions more freely.
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also made great efforts to implement constitutional and legal goals to 
assimilate ethnic minorities, including Muslim peoples, into a harmo-
nious national family committed to China’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.
Guided by this two-pronged strategy of containment and absorp-
tion, the Chinese government has unhesitatingly cracked down on any 
ethnic separatist movements and religious extremist activities, but has 
also taken a lenient attitude towards the law-abiding social, econom-
ic and cultural activities of Muslim peoples. Taking advantage of these 
policies, most Muslims, particularly Hui Muslims, have been generally 
“Chinese law-abiding” while also exercising their legal rights and po-
Thus, when incidents involving the relationship between Muslims and 
non-Muslims occur, such as the pork contamination riot described 
above, Muslims communities throughout the region affected mobilize 
to protect their rights and demand compensation or concessions from 
Non-Muslims and the local government. Usually, in the wake of the inci-
dent it is the -
tion, and the Muslims press forward towards their goals.
Muslim communities have adopted these tactics to protect their of-
of encouraging growing of nationalism, strengthening ethnic identity 
boundaries, and fuelling Islamic sentiment. Communities can deploy 
these forces in confrontations with non-Muslims and the government. 
The state, in turn, fears potentially larger challenges from Muslim 
groups and generally attempts to devise solutions that minimize na-
tionalism and Islamism while appeasing Muslim elites. This often in-
volves a combination of state supervision and ‘soft’ incentives in the 
form of special treatment and status.
China’s Muslim elites have proven skilled at exploiting their rela-
tionship with the state. They can bargain with the government by ap-
pealing to the potential force of the Muslim communities under their 
authority, thus pressuring local Chinese authorities to provide better 
treatment for themselves and their peoples. Here the lessons of Chinese 
-
ernment was weak, China’s Muslim elites developed into semi-indepen-
dent forces or warlords dominating large tracts of territory.
In modern times China has still not overcome the cycle of control and 
resistance that results from these contending state, elite and popular 
way to disorder and instability. The Chinese government thinks that 
its implementing the preferential minorities program could strengthen 
its central power and better control the minorities’ inhabited frontier 
land. Eventually, it does not expect that its policy to appease the Mus-
lim minority peoples only stimulate their nationalism and religious 
toward ethnic minorities and Muslim believers cannot remain stable 
in the long term. They are short-sighted and full of pitfalls, and in the 
future may give way to riots and chaos.
Within the framework of umma all Muslims are brothers and sisters. 
These fraternal ties transcend national borders, ethnicity, language 
and social status. Even in the past, before modern transportation by 
ship and plane made the Middle East much more accessible to Chinese 
Muslims, many of them made the hajj journey to Mecca by traversing 
the Euro-Asian continent or taking a sea route across the South China 
Sea and Indian Ocean.  Returning from the hajj, Chinese Muslims also 
brought back Islamic texts for their home communities, and so their 
access to the Islamic tradition was constantly refreshed.
Today, China has re-opened its doors to the rest of the world, and as 
a leading developing country it wants to develop friendly relations with 
Muslim countries -
ing the League of Arab States, the Muslim World League, and the Islam-
ic Summit Organization. The Chinese government cannot easily afford 
to damage links with these countries and international bodies, and this 
Muslims and their fellow believers in the Islamic world.
Compared with the past Chinese Muslims now have more advan-
tages for fostering relations with Muslim countries. First, there are 
strengthened economic ties. Many Chinese Muslim entrepreneurs do 
business in western, central, and southeastern Asia and African coun-
tries, and much of their business is, of course, done with fellow believ-
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ers. Chinese Muslims even do business with the Muslims in European 
and North American countries.
Beside this economic relationship, many Muslims – irrespective of 
whether they are Hui, Uighur and another ethnic group – participate 
in the annual hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. More and more young Chinese 
Muslim students are studying Arabic and Islam in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Iran, the Gulf States, Libya, Syria, Jordan, Pakistan, Malaysia, the Cen-
tral Asian republics and other Islamic countries. Every year, the Islamic 
Association of China sends scholars and learned men to attend religious 
conferences and symposia, competitions in Arabic Quranic recitation 
and Arabic calligraphy, and other religiously-oriented activities with 
Muslims abroad. The Chinese government, represented by Islamic As-
sociation of China, also maintains regular contacts with international 
Islamic organizations.
These economic, cultural and scholarly contacts with Muslims 
abroad also allow for a great deal of informal interaction. They make it 
possible for many Chinese Muslims to bring back materials such as reli-
gious literature, cassettes and videos, and to spread information about 
China’s Muslim communities to Muslims abroad. These exchanges have 
also exposed Chinese Muslims to new ideas about Islam from abroad, 
including Islamic fundamentalism and radical political Islam. In this 
way, the seeds have been sown in China for the spread of many of the 
ideas that have galvanized other Muslim populations in recent decades.
Chinese government is, however, highly vigilant against religious 
Iranian diplomat 
for improper conduct in spreading revolutionary Islamic ideas among 
Muslim communities in Northwest China.  In quite a few cases Islamic 
missionaries from Pakistan have been expelled for disseminating Is-
lamic fundamentalism in China.  In Xin jiang the
border guard posts are particularly watchful for possible entry of rad-
ical Islamic materials from the Central Asian republics. Local author-
cassettes, and videos promoting dangerous religiously-inspired ideol-
 The author heard these news at the Second International Conference of Iranology 
in 
Hong Kong based newspapers, such as the 
South China Morning Post and the Far Eastern Economic Review
ogies and advocating national separatism among Uighur communities 
in southern Xin jiang.
Conclusion
Muslim society is quite different from other parts of Chinese society in 
its beliefs, ways of life, cultural traditions and social organization. It is 
miraculous that China’s Muslim communities have preserved their own 
identity and avoided assimilation or destruction by the authoritarian 
peoples of China have developed their own semi-independent economy, 
production and market structures, social and cultural networks, edu-
cation system, press and mass media.
This Islamic revival has gained impetus from China’s progress to-
wards modernity and globalization: as China has developed a market 
economy and become more integrated in international commerce and 
affairs, Chinese Muslim communities have accumulated more resources 
to organize and assert themselves. China is constantly vigilant against 
any internal or external challenges to Marxist ideology and the social-
ist regime, and the state has been on the offensive against religious 
fundamentalism and the radical Islamic movement, but Muslim society 
has evolved a strong fabric of religious tradition and social exclusivity, 
and over time China’s Muslim communities have increasingly departed 
from mainstream Chinese society and culture.
These communities have, to varying degrees, resisted the general 
consequences of modernization. While the communal structure of the 
majority Han Chinese has been drastically eroded by commercialism, 
materialism and individualism, the communal ties of Muslims have 
steadily strengthened over last two decades, particularly with the Is-
lamic revival movement and the spread of Islamic education. After en-
try into WTO, China will become an increasingly unbalanced, contra-
Marxist socialist regime. In these circumstances, the state will certain-
Islam, especially spreading 
radicalism and nationalism, merely by offering economic and social 
privileges on the one hand, and threatening to apply force and coer-
 See Turkistan Newsletter, an Internet website information based in Netherlands 
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cion for suppressing the national separatism and religious extremism 
on the other hand.
China’s authorities feel growing uncertainty about the increasing 
China. During the past 
decade the Islamic revival movement in China has developed particular 
momentum in two regions: in Turkic Muslim society it has expressed 
itself through a so-
ciety it has expressed itself through confrontations with majority Han 
The revival of Islam and Muslim society in China may potentially 
pose a serious challenge to China during the country’s historic transi-
tion. If China were to fail to renovate its political apparatus, which gives 
so much power to a highly centralized government, it will experience 
increasingly tense relations with its Muslim peoples. A 
with religious ethnic minorities would cost China precious resources 
and damage its modernization program, as well as risk its denuncia-
tion by Western countries and the Islamic world. However, if the central 
government makes too many concessions to Muslim communities, its 
capacity to control these communities will erode. Whether the revival 
of Islam truly becomes a major source of instability in China will de-
pend on whether the next generation of leaders of the Communist Party 
can navigate between these two possibilities.
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Islam in China
Dru C. Gladney
China’s Muslims face their second millennium under Chinese rule. Many 
of the challenges they confront remain the same as they have for the last 
are new as a result of China’s transformed and increasingly globalized 
terrorist at-
tacks and the subsequent “war on terrorism.” Muslims in China live 
as minority communities amid a sea of people who, in their view, are 
largely pork-eating, polytheist, secularist, and -
theless, many of their small and isolated communities have survived in 
rather inhospitable circumstances for over a millennium. Though small 
Japan, and less than 
other Muslim states. For example, there are more Muslims in China 
than in Malaysia, and more than in every Middle Eastern Muslim nation 
except Iran, Turkey, and Egypt. East Asia is also increasingly depending 
on mainly Muslim nations for energy and cheap labor, thus raising the 
importance of its Muslim diasporic communities for international and 
domestic relations. Japan has a rather small resident Muslim communi-
Eastern and South Asian migrant laborers to Japan’s large industrial 
cities suggest that the total Muslim population in Japan could be near-
ing the one million mark. Though these communities are temporary 
in terms of residency, they have as strong an impact on Japan’s rather 
insular society as the Turkish and Kurdish populations in the Scandina-
 in-
sightfully noted, these long-term Muslim communities have often been 
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the “familiar strangers” found in small enclaves throughout Asia. And if 
Kosovo and Bosnia are to serve as lessons, failure to accommodate Mus-
lim minorities can lead to national dismemberment and international 
intervention. Indeed, China’s primary objection to NATO involvement 
in Kosovo centered on its fear that this might encourage the aiding and 
abetting of separatists, with independence groups in Xin jiang , Ti-
bet, and perhaps Taiwan, clearly a major Chinese concern.
This paper will seek to examine Muslim minority identity in Asia 
-
thor has conducted most of his research, but also because with the larg-
est Muslim minority in East Asia, China’s Muslims are clearly the most 
threatened in terms of self-preservation and Islamic identity. However, 
it is hoped that lessons gleaned from the Chinese case might be useful 
for other Muslim communities in East Asia, and perhaps elsewhere in 
Asia as well. Most relevant is the thesis put forth that successful Muslim 
accommodation to minority status in Asia can be seen to be a measure 
of the extent to which Muslim groups allow the reconciliation of the 
dictates of Islamic culture to their host culture, be it Chinese, Japanese, 
Korean, or other. This goes against the opposite view that can be found 
in the writings of some analysts of Islam in China, such as Raphael Is-
raeli and Michael Dillon, that Islam in the region is inherently rebellious 
and that Muslims as minorities are always problematic to the security 
of a non-Muslim state.
Islam in China
among the people now known as “Hui” , but many of the issues con-
fronting them are relevant to the Turkic and Indo-European Muslims 
on China’s Inner Asian frontier. “Hui teaching” (Huijiao 
term once used in Chinese to indicate “Islam” in general, and proba-
bly derives from an early Chinese rendering of the term for the mod-
ern 
census of China, the total 
Dongxiang 
Uzbek 
Hui speak mainly Si-
 
no- Uighur, 
Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Mongolian speak-
ers include the Dongxiang, Salar, and Bonan (Bao’an -
ed in Gansu’s  mountainous Hexi Tajik speak 
a variety of Indo-Persian dialects. It is important to note, however, that 
-
iation, so the actual number of Mus lims is still unknown, and that all 
-
tation.
While the Hui have been labeled the “Chinese-speaking Muslims”, 
“Chinese Muslims”, and most recently, as “Sino-Muslims”,  this is mis-
leading since by law all Muslims living in China are “Chinese” by cit-
izenship, and many Hui speak many of the non-Chinese languages 
where they live, such as the Tibetan, Mongolian, Thai, and Hainan
Hui. Yet most Hui are 
closer to the Han Chinese than the other Muslim nationalities in terms 
of demographic proximity and cultural accommodation, adapting many 
of their Islamic practices to Han ways of life, which has often become 
the source for many of the criticisms of Muslim reformers. In the past, 
this was not as great a problem for the Turkish and Indo-European 
Muslim groups, as they were traditionally more isolated from the Han 
and their identities not as threatened, though this has begun to change 
in the last forty years. As a result of state-sponsored nationality identi-
have begun to think of themselves more as ethnic nationalities, some-
thing more than just “Muslims”. The 
whom religion (
though many members of the Hui nationality may not practice Islam.
Resulting from a succession of Islamic reform movements that 
Mus-
lims in China today a wide spectrum of Islamic belief. Archaeological 
discoveries of large collections of Islamic artifacts and epigraphy on the 
southeast coast suggest that the earliest Muslim communities in Chi-
na were descended from Arab, Persian, Central Asian, and Mongolian 
Muslim 
Hui and reference to them as “Sino-Muslims”, 
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southeast coast from the seventh to tenth centuries, and then in larg-
er migrations to the north from Central Asia under the Mongol Yuan 
dynasty in the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries, gradually intermar-
rying with the local Chinese populations, and raising their children as 
Muslims. Practicing Sunni, Islam, residing in independent small 
communities clustered around a central mosque, these communities 
were characterized by relatively isolated, independent Islamic villages 
and urban enclaves that related with each other via trading networks 
and recognition of belonging to the wider Islamic umma, headed by an 
ahong  (also written , or aheng , from the Persian, akhond 
late seventeenth century, arriving mainly along the Central Asian trade 
routes with saintly s, both Chinese and foreign, who brought 
new teachings from the pilgrimage cities. These charismatic teachers 
and tradesmen established widespread networks and brotherhood 
associations, including most prominently the Naqshbandiyya, Qadiri-
yya, and Kubrawiyya. The hierarchical organization of these -
works helped in the mobilization of large numbers of Hui during eco-
nomic and political crises in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, 
assisting widespread Muslim-led rebellions and resistance movements 
against late Ming and Qing imperial rule in Yunnan , Shanxi , 
Gansu, and nationalist revolution allowed further 
autonomy in Muslim concentrated regions of the northwest, and wide 
areas came under virtual Muslim warlord control, leading to frequent 
intra-Muslim and 
victory led to the reassertion of central control. In the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century, Wahhabi-inspired reform movements, 
known as the Yiheiwani  (also written , or Yihewani
, from the Arabic Ikhwan = brethren, viz. Ikhwan al-Muslimin 
= nationalist and warlord 
sponsorship, and were noted for their critical stance toward tradition-
alist Islam as too acculturated to Chinese practices, and 
attached to saint and tomb veneration. These movements of -
enced all 
most political expression among the Hui who were faced with the task 
of accommodating each new Islamic movement with Chinese culture. 
Among the northwestern Muslim communities, especially the Uighur, 
their more recent integration into Chinese society as a result of Mongo-
 
lian and Manchu expansion into Central Asian has forced them to reach 
social and political accommodations that have challenged their identi-
ty. In terms of integration, the Uighur as a people represent perhaps the 
least integrated into Chinese society, while the Hui are at the other end 
of the spectrum, due to several historical and social factors that I will 
discuss below.
Uighur Indigeneity and the Challenge to Chinese Sovereignty
-
western border city of Urumqi (Wulumuqi Xin-
jiang 
Tibet alone. Most of these are 
thought to have been related to demands by Muslim and Tibetan sep-
aratists. Eight members of the Uighur Muslim minority were executed 
-
dreds arrested on suspicion of taking part in ethnic riots and engaging 
in separatist activities. Though sporadically reported since the early 
are documented in a recent scathing report of Chinese government pol-
icy in the region by Amnesty International.  A very recent report in the 
Wall Street Journal Rebiya Kadeer, a 
well-known Uighur business woman, during a visit by the United States 
Congressional Research Service delegation to the region, indicates Chi-
na’s random arrests have not diminished since the report, nor is China 
concerned with Western criticism.
As we consider the interaction of Uighur Muslims with Chinese so-
ciety, we must examine three interrelated aspects of regional history, 
economy, and politics. First, Chinese histories notwithstanding, every 
of the Tarim basin, which did not become known in Chinese as Xin jiang 
-
gued elsewhere that the constructed “ethnogenesis” of the Uighur, the 
current national identity of the people today known as the Uighur, is 
a rather recent phenomenon related to Great Game rivalries, Sino-So-
 WSJ
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viet geopolitical maneuverings, and Chinese nation-building.  While a 
collection of nomadic steppe peoples known as the “Uighur” existed 
to twentieth centuries. It was not until the fall of the Turkish Khanate 
– Huihe 
 or Huihu  Uighur Empire. 
At this time the Uighur were but one collection of nine nomadic tribes, 
who, initially in confederation with other Basmil and Karlukh nomads, 
defeated the Second Turkish Khanate and then dominated the federa-
tion under the leadership of  
Gradual sedentarization of the Uighur, and their defeat of the Turk-
state 
became especially lucrative. Sedentarization and interaction with the 
Chinese state was accompanied by socio-religious change: the tra-
ditional shamanistic Turkic-speaking Uighur came increasingly un-
Manichaeism, Buddhism, and eventually, 
Nestorian Christianity. Extensive trade and military alliances along the 
old Silk Road with the Chinese state developed to the extent that the Ui-
ghur gradually adopted cultural, dress and even agricultural practices 
of the Chinese. Conquest of the Uighur capital of Karabalghasun in Mon-
golia by the nomadic 
may have become by then intimidated by the wealthy Uighur empire, 
led to further sedentarization and crystallization of Uighur identity. 
One branch that ended up in what is now Turfan took advantage of the 
unique socioecology of the glacier-fed oases surrounding the Taklam-
akan and were able to preserve their merchant and limited agrarian 
practices, gradually establishing Khocho or Gaochang , the great 
Uighur city-state based in –
The Islamicization of the Uighur from the tenth to as late as the sev-
enteenth centuries, while displacing their Buddhist religion, did little 
to bridge these oases-based loyalties. From that time on, the people of 
“Uighuristan” centered in Turfan who resisted Islamic conversion until 
the seventeenth century were the last to be known as Uighur. The oth-
ers were known only by their oasis or by the generic term of “Turki.” 
With the arrival of Islam, the ethnonym “Uighur” fades from the histor-
Manchu Qing dynasty exerted 
full and formal control over the region, establishing it as their “new do-
 
minions” (
years when it fell to the – -
 The end of the Qing dynasty and the rise of Great 
Game rivalries between China, Russia, and Britain saw the region torn 
by competing loyalties and marked by two short-lived and drastically 
different attempts at independence: the short-lived proclamations of 
an “East Turkestan Republic” in Yining 
  As Andrew Forbes has noted, these rebellions 
and attempts at self-rule did little to bridge competing political, reli-
gious, and regional differences within the Turkic people who became 
known as the 
 (  Justin Rudelson’s  recent work 
suggests there is persistent regional diversity along three, and perhaps 
four macro-regions: the northwestern Zungaria plateau, the southern 
Tarim basin, the southwest Pamir region, and the eastern Kumul-Tur-
fan-Hami corridor. The recognition of the 
“nationality” (minzu Xin jiang under a -
enced policy of nationality recognition contributed to the widespread 
acceptance today of continuity with the ancient Uighur kingdom and 
 nationality. The “nationali-
ty” policy under the 
in the majority. This policy was continued under the Communists, they 
The “peaceful liberation” by the Chinese Communists of Xin jiang in 
Xin jiang Uighur Autono-
recognizing the Uighur as a minority nationality under Chinese rule.  
This nationality designation not only masks tremendous regional and 
linguistic diversity, it also includes groups such as the Loplyk and 
Dolans that have very little to do with the oasis-based Turkic Muslims 
who became known as the Uighur. At the same time, contemporary Ui-
ghur separatists look back to the brief periods of independent self-rule 
under Yakub Beg and the Eastern Turkestan Republics, in addition to 
 For the best treatment of the 
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the earlier glories of the Uighur kingdoms in Turfan and Karabalghasun, 
as evidence of their rightful claims to the region. Contemporary Uighur 
separatist organizations based in Istanbul, Ankara, Almaty, Munich, 
Amsterdam, Melbourne, and Washington, D.C., may differ on their po-
litical goals and strategies for the region, but they all share a common 
vision of a unilineal Uighur claim on the region, disrupted by Chinese 
and Soviet intervention. The independence of the former Soviet Central 
Uighur or-
ganizations in their hopes for an independent “Turkestan”, despite the 
fact the new, mainly Muslim Central Asian governments have all signed 
or support separatist groups.
Within the region, though many portray the Uighur as united around 
separatist or Islamist causes, Uighur continue to be divided from within 
-
tic discrepancies, commoner-elite alienation, and competing political 
loyalties. These divided loyalties where evidenced by the attack in May 
imam of the Idgah Mosque in Kashgar by other Uighurs, as 
well as the assassination of at least six 
Islam was only one of several 
unifying markers for Uighur identity, depending on those with whom 
they were in cooperation at the time. For example, to the Hui Muslim 
Chinese, the Uighur distinguish themselves as the legitimate autoch-
thonous minority, since both share a belief in Sunni Islam. In contrast 
to the nomadic Muslim peoples (Kazakh or Uighur stress their 
attachment to the land and oasis of origin. In opposition to the Han Chi-
nese, the Uighur will generally emphasize their long history in the re-
gion. This suggests that Islamic fundamentalist groups such as that of 
Taliban in Afghanistan (often glossed as “
will have only limited appeal among the Uighur. It is this contested un-
debate over separatist and Chinese claims to the region.
Amnesty International has claimed that the round-ups of so-called 
terrorists and separatists have led to hurried public trials and immedi-
ate, summary executions of possibly thousands of locals. One Amnesty 
International estimate suggested that in a country known for its fre-
quent executions, 
week, most of them Uighur. Troop movements to the area, related to the 
 
nationwide campaign against crime known as “Strike Hard” launched 
separatists in Xin jiang, have reportedly been the largest since the sup-
pression of the large 
uprising in Xin jiang that took place in the Southern Tarim region near 
Baren Township, which initiated a series of unrelated and sporadic pro-
-
ridor into China where Xin jiang shares a narrow border with Afghani-
stan have led to the area being swamped with Chinese security forces 
and large military exercises, beginning at least one month prior to the 
th attack. These military exercises suggest that there was 
growing government concern about these border areas even before the 
th attack. Recently, under US and Chinese pressure, Paki-
stan returned one Uighur activist to China, apprehended among hun-
dreds of Taliban detainees, which follows a pattern of repatriations of 
suspected Uighur separatists in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbeki-
stan.
International campaigns for Uighur rights and possible indepen-
dence have become increasingly vocal and well organized, especially 
on the internet. Repeated public appeals have been made to Abdula-
hat Abdurixit, the Uighur People’s Government Chairman of Xin jiang 
in Urumqi. Notably, the elected chair of the Unrepresented Nations and 
People’s Organization ( Uighur, Erkin 
Alptekin, son of the separatist leader, Isa Yusuf Alptekin, who is buried 
in Istanbul where there is a park dedicated to his memory. Supporting 
primarily an audience of approximately one million expatriate Uighurs 
(yet few Uighurs in Central Asia and China have access to these inter-
web sites working for the independence of “Eastern Turkestan” based 
in Amsterdam, Munich, Istanbul, Melbourne, Washington, D.C. and New 
th, each of these organizations has disclaimed 
any support for violence or terrorism, pressing for a peaceful resolution 
sep-
aratism” and international popularization of the Uighur cause concerns 
Chinese authorities, who hope to convince the world that the Uighurs 
do pose a real domestic and international terrorist threat.
Muslims. Mishandling of its 
Muslim problems will alienate trading partners in the Middle East, who 
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are primarily 
in the northwestern Xin jiang city of Yining, which left at least nine Ui-
ghur Muslims dead and several hundreds arrested, the Saudi Arabian 
Muslims whose human rights are violated”. Turkey’s Defense Minister 
China responded by telling Turkey to not interfere in China’s internal 
affairs. Muslim nations on China’s borders, including the new Central 
Asian states, Pakistan, and 
of Uighur separatists, may be increasingly critical of harsh treatment 
Muslim co-religionists in China.
Unrest in the Xin jiang Uighur Autonomous Region may lead to a de-
cline in outside oil investment and revenues, that are already operating 
at a loss. Recently, Exxon reported that its two wells came up dry in 
China’s supposedly oil-rich Tarim basin of southern Xin jiang, with the 
Xin jiang Region alone, with some of that mon-
ey allegedly going to the Xin jiang Production and Construction Corps 
Harry Wu has claimed employs pris-
on (laogai
from the World Bank to Exxon may not wish to subject its employees 
and investors to social and political upheavals.
Most China-Central Asia trade is between Xin jiang and Kazakhstan 
( Kazakh-
-
cent of its total. About half of China-Kazakh trade is on a barter basis. 
-
hind 
only eclipsed by Russia in trade with Kazakh ex-
-
per day of crude oil from 
of its total imports. Just as Kazakhstan seeks other outlets for its oil be-
sides Russia, China seeks other import sources besides a few countries 
Hu Jintao  signaled the importance 
of the relationship by making Kazakhstan his third foreign trip as the 
 
-
lion Kazakhs in northwestern Xin jiang, there has been no separatist 
incidents among the Kazakhs or efforts to unite with Kazakhstan, de-
Uighur when a 
Soviet split. 
China’s trade with Kyrgyzstan has also increased rapidly, though 
pales in comparison to Kazakhstan and -
gyzstan was Xin jiang’s third largest trading partner, after Kazakhstan 
and Hong Kong, but it has declined in recent years. Nevertheless, the 
strategic importance of the Kyrgyz-China relationship has increased 
due to China’s concerns over the development of US and Russian air-
bases near Bishkek, in Manas and Kant. The SCO anti-
is headquartered in Bishkek, and the Kyrgyz ambassador to China, Mu-
a close relationship.
Uzbekistan’s leading non-CIS 
trading partner. Since then, bilateral trade has increased by as much as 
Uzbekistan China’s second largest Central 
Asian trading partner. Despite the fact that Uzbekistan does not share 
a border with China and they were the last country invited to join the 
SCO, this may be one of the most promising economic relationships de-
Uzbek pop-
ulation will eagerly purchase Chinese goods once remaining border 
restrictions are relaxed and better transportation is built. In addition, 
China’s 
and well-educated. They have begun to play an important role in build-
ing cross-border ties.
Bilateral trade with 
Tajikistan still embroiled in the Afghan 
-
creased due to the Afghan war, its “gas-n-go” military relationship with 
the country may be transitory. China is clearly the only major country 
-
ly with Tajikistan’s vast water and mineral resources. Trade between 
China and Turkmenistan has also risen rapidly. Due to its “positive neu-
trality” policy, Turkmenistan is not a member of the SCO, though ener-
gy trade with China will grow considerably in the near future. China 
is expected to eventually import Turkmen gas to satisfy the growing 
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energy requirements in the northwest corner of the country. The sale 
Turkmenistan-China-Ja-
pan gas pipeline suggests that China’s ties to the country will increase 
dramatically in the next decade. This Turkmenistan-China-Japan nat-
ural gas pipeline, part of the envisaged “Energy Silk Route” which 
demonstrates the potential for cooperation among countries. But it also 
highlights the growing importance of international companies – in this 
of oil and gas development in the region. With a potential price tag of 
ones – would not be possible without foreign participation. Hence, the 
“new Great Game” between China and Central Asia involves many more 
players than the largely three-way Great Game of the nineteenth centu-
ry. Yet these new international corporate forces do not supersede local 
ethnic ties and connections that extend back for centuries.
While the increasing trade between Central Asia and China is note-
–
-
Asian republics, about the same as with Austria or Denmark.  Despite 
the small trade values China is clearly a giant in the region, investing 
in Central Asia’s foreign economic relations. For example, China’s two-
way trade with 
Central Asian republics. This is so even though predominantly Muslim 
Central Asia is of a much higher priority for Turkey than for China. 
It is clear that Uighur separatism or Muslim complaints regarding 
Chinese policy will have important consequences for China’s economic 
development of the region. Tourists and foreign businessmen will cer-
tainly avoid areas with ethnic strife and terrorist activities. China will 
continue to use its economic leverage with its Central Asian neighbors 
and Russia to prevent such disruptions.
 
 
The third aspect is political. China’s international relations with its 
bordering nations and internal regions such as Xin jiang and Tibet have 
become increasingly important not only for the economic reasons dis-
cussed above, but also for China’s desire to participate in international 
Economic Council. Though Tibet is no longer of any real strategic or 
substantial economic value to China, it is politically important to Chi-
na’s current leadership to indicate that they will not submit to foreign 
pressure and withdraw its iron hand from Tibet. Uighurs have begun to 
work closely with Tibetans internationally to put political pressure on 
Ahmet Türköz, vice-director of the Eastern 
Turkestan Foundation that works for an independent Uighur homeland, 
Dalai Lama and Uighur leaders, initiated by the deceased Uighur na-
tionalist Isa Yusuf Alptekin. These international fora cannot force Chi-
na to change its policy, any more than the annual debate in the U.S. over 
the renewal of China’s Most-Favored Nation status can. Nevertheless, 
As a result, China has sought to respond rapidly, and often militarily, to 
domestic ethnic affairs that might have international implications.
Hong Kong, harboring the hope of eventually reuniting with Taiwan, 
residents of Hong Kong and Taiwan will be watching how China deals 
with other problems of national integration. During the Dalai Lama’s 
Taiwan, he again renounced Tibet’s independence, 
calling for China to consider Tibet under the same “two systems, one 
country” policy as Hong Kong, yet the People’s Daily continued to call 
him a “separatist”. Taiwan will certainly be watching how well Hong 
Kong is integrated into China as a “Special Administrative Region” with 
a true separate system of government, as opposed to Tibet and Xin-
jiang, which as so-called “Autonomous Regions” have very little actual 
autonomy from decision-makers in Beijing. China’s handling of ethnic 
and integrationist issues in Xin jiang and Hong Kong will have a direct 
Taiwan. 
minorities, China possesses tre-
mendous ethnic, linguistic, and regional diversity. Intolerance toward 
difference in Xin jiang might be extended to limiting cultural pluralism 
in Guangdong
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spoken and folk religious practice is rampant. Memories are strong of 
the repressions of the 
of diversity, political or cultural, were severely curtailed. If rising Chi-
nese nationalism entails reducing ethnic and cultural difference, then 
anyone who is regarded as “other” in China will suffer, not just the Ui-
ghurs. 
Hui Muslims and Islamic Accommodation to Chinese Society
As a result of the history of Islamic reform movements that have swept 
across China, the Hui continue to subscribe to a wide spectrum of Is-
lamic belief. The variety of religious orders within Hui Islam represent 
a long history of reforms and Islamic movements that resulted from 
interaction with the Is lamic world. The late Joseph Fletcher  was the 
Islamic commu-
individuals who entered China during critical periods of exchange with 
movements grew or diminished with the interaction of China’s Muslims 
and the -
grations as much as gradual and profound exchange between the two 
regions. While this study does not begin to address Islam’s complex 
history in China, an introduction to the context of Islamic reforms is 
necessary for an understanding of the rise of fundamentalism in China. 
Each of these tides can be considered successive reform movements in 
that they all seek to transform Islam in China, accommodating Chinese 
culture with Islamic requirements, in reference to textual and discur-
sive standards in the Middle East as discovered by Muslims from China 
on the hajj or preached by peripatetic Middle Eastern representatives 
of these movements in China. What many of the Muslims in China did 
not recognize, however, was that just as Islam in China had shifted over 
time on the periphery, so had the so-called “center” in the Middle East. 
The somewhat quixotic quest of these Muslims at the distant edge of 
interaction between periphery and center, engendered the rise of a se-
ries of reformist tides that washed across the China Islamic hinterland. 
This is parallel to similar reform movements among all Muslims in Asia 
 
 
that are on its periphery in relation to the Meccan heartlands. Just as 
Muslims in the Middle East “peripheralize” those in the wider diaspora 
as not “truly Mus-
lims in Asia often homogenize all Middle Eastern Muslims as Arabs and 
orientalism”, a rather facetious 
term I employed in an earlier article , to describe the process whereby 
Muslims and minorities exoticize their own communities for purposes 
The First Tide: Gedimu Traditional Chinese Islam
The earliest Muslim communities were descended from the Arab, Per-
sian, Central Asian, and Mongolian Muslim -
cials who settled along China’s southeast coast and in the northwest in 
large and small num bers from the seventh to the fourteenth centuries. 
Generally residing in independent small communities clustered around 
a central mosque, they became known as the Gedimu (from the 
Arabic qadim Sunni, Islam 
that became so standard that few Hui with whom I spoke in the north-
 Iraq war was at 
These “old” Islamic communities established an early Hui pattern 
of zealously preserving and protecting their identity as enclaves en-
sconced in the dominant Han society. Each village was centered upon a 
single mosque headed by an ahong who was invited to teach on a more 
or less temporary basis. These ahongs generally moved on an average 
of every three years from one mosque to another. A council of senior 
local elders and ahongs were responsible for the affairs of each village 
and the inviting of the itinerant imam. Late nineteenth century and ear-
ly twentieth century travelers noted the maintenance of these isolated 
communities. “I know of no strictly farming village where there is an 
 observed, “in 
every case the village is predominantly one or the other. In some in-
stances, the population is composed almost entirely of one group, with 
only a few hangers-on of the other.” He goes on to suggest that due to 
different cul tural, ritual, and dietary preferences that sometimes led to 
–
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frequent northwest traveler noted:
Gansu] the Moslems are 
found in such numbers as to out number the Chinese in the proporti-
on of seven to one. Again, in other districts it is possible to travel for 
days without coming across one Moslem family, and in such districts 
Chinese and Moslems living harmoniously intermingled is but on the 
rarest occasion.  
This islation was mitigated somewhat during the collec tivization cam-
Hui villages were often adminis-
tered as clusters by a single commune. They have also been brought 
closer together through national telecommunications and transpor-
tation networks established by the state, including such umbrella or-
ganizations as the Chinese 
which seeks to coordinate religious affairs among all Muslim groups. 
With the recent dismantling of the commune in many areas, however, 
these homogeneous Hui communities are once again becoming more 
segregated. While these disparate communities among the Gedimu 
were generally linked only by trade and a sense of a common religious 
heritage, an attachment to the basic Islamic beliefs as handed down to 
them by their ancestors, it was the entry of the 
China that eventually began to link many of these isolated communities 
together through extensive socio-religious net works.
The Second Tide: 
late seventeenth century, during the “second tide” of Islam’s entrance 
into China. Like -
tury in other countries,  many of these -
veloped socio-economic and religio-political institutions built around 
the schools established by descendants of early 
institutions became known in Chinese as the menhuan , the “lead-
ing” or “saintly” descent groups.
 
The important contribution that -
tion in China was that the leaders of mosques throughout their order 
owed their allegiance to their , the founder of the order who ap-
pointed them. These designated followers were loyal to the leader of 
their order and remained in the community for long periods of time, 
unlike the Gedimu ahongs who were generally itinerant, not well con-
nected to the community, and less imbued with appointed authority. 
Gedimu -
ed only by trade to other communities. While it is beyond this paper 
to delineate the history and distribution of these menhuan, Joseph 
Fletcher’s cogent introductory discussion of their develop ment is worth 
citing:
Over the course of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth 
centuries a considerable number of these “saintly lineages” came into 
being in north west China, most of them within the Naqshbandi “path”. 
Typically, each saint’s tomb had a shrine, or  (Chinese  
or  
activity. The “saintly lineages” obtained contribu tions from their fol-
lowers and amassed substantial amounts of property. The growth in 
the number and importance of the menhuan represented an important 
change, because they gradually replaced the “old” (
linking together the menhuan adherents all over the northwest. The 
widening compass of social integration that resulted made it easier for 
the “saintly lineages” and other leaders to harness the Muslims’ politi-
cal and eco nomic potential, facilitating the rise of Muslim warlordism 
in that region in the twentieth cen tury.
Many 
decades of the Qing dynasty (mid-seventeenth to the early eighteenth 
Muslims, 
both east and west, during what Fletcher terms the “general orthodox 
Muslims from 
West Africa to Indonesia, and not least of all, on China’s Hui Muslims.  
Exposure to these new ideas led to a reformulation of traditional Islam-
ic concepts that rendered them more meaningful and practical for the 
Hui Muslims of that time. While it is socio-economic organization that 
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Muslims as being too materialistic, 
bound to their mosques, criticized the burning of incense to ancestors, 
mosques 
with Quranic quotations and hadith
condemned the Muslims for wearing traditional Chinese white funeral 
dress and sullying Islam with many other Chinese cultural practices, 
Prophet and his 
Is-
-
cacy of the saint, instead of the daunting memorization and recitation 
of Quranic texts. While theirs was a reformist movement, it was less 
textual than experiential, revealing the power of Allah and his saints 
to transform one’s life through miracles, healings, and other transfor-
mative acts.
menhuan
Hui today, as Claude Pickens , a Protestant missionary in northwest 
menhuan of China: the Qadiriyya, 
Jahriyya, and Kubrawiyya. While these are the four main 
menhuan, they are subdivided into a myriad of smaller branch solidar-
ities, divided along ideological, political, geographical and his torical 
lines. A detailed history of these divisions and alliances would reveal 
the tensions and new meanings created by Hui communities as they 
attempted to reconcile perceived disparities between the indigenous 
practice of Islam in China with the Islamic ideals as represented by 
returned hajji or itinerant foreign preachers who maintained, in their 
eyes, more “orthodox” interpretations of Islam.
It is unfortunate, but perhaps quite natural that Western scholar-
ship has prolonged the confusion of early Chinese writers over the rise 
of Islamic orders in China. As each Islamic reformer 
-
er Islamic orders, these “new” arrivals replaced or converted the “old” 
traditional 
the Qing naturally referred to these communities with their new teach-
ings as xinjiao (lit., “new religion” or “teaching”, not “new sect” 
 
 
the older, they became known as the “new”, or even “new new” teach-
ings (xinxinjiao Ikhwan in 
China. Traditional Islam among the Hui generally was referred to as 
laojiao
at one time, when others arrived were gradually classed as old, laoji-
ao, which is the case with the Naqshbandiyya 
was often the case that those who regarded themselves as maintain-
ing the established traditional beliefs of Islam in China represented the 
reformers as “new”, and thus, suspect, whereas they saw themselves 
as “old”, or more true to their traditions. The reformers, on the other 
hand, generally thought of themselves as the more orthodox, based on 
their more informed, sometimes esoteric, interpretations of Islam due 
to their recent contact with movements in the Muslim heartlands. They 
thus resented the title of “new teachings”, or the even more derisive 
“new new teachings”, calling themselves by the more exact names of 
their orders, Qadiriyya, Naqshbandiyya, Wahhabi, Ikhwan, etc., but the 
names “new teaching” or “new sect” stuck as it was applied by their 
critics who supported the state. Even the name Gedimu, depicting the 
“older” Islamic communities in China, is a not-so-subtle jibe at the other 
Islamic orders as being newer, and thus removed from the traditional 
fundamentals of Islam in China.
These designations became important politically as well as theolog-
ically in that during the mid-nineteenth century northwest rebellions, 
some of which were led by 
all of those movements that had become known as “new teachings” 
in order to root out the more rebellious Hui communities. This is pre-
cisely the rationale whereby all Buddhist sectarian movements were 
proscribed under the general rubric of the “White Lotus” rebellion in 
China, although recent scholarship has revealed that only a few Bud-
dhist movements fell under the shadow of that stem.  Unfortunately, 
Chinese and Western scholars perpetuated these designations and un-
til recently there were no accurate descriptions of Hui Islamic orders 
in China.
appearance of Chinese publications on these groups as well as Western 
–
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and socio-religious complexity.
The Qadiriyya
order was the earliest to enter China proper, as there had been regu-
lar contacts on an individual basis with the 
that had already begun to proliferate in Xin jiang in the early part of 
tariqa (“path”, or 
Qadiriyya menhuan in China is Qi 
Jingyi – Hui as Qi 
Daozu Linxia’s “great 
tomb” (
of Qadiriyya  One of the reasons that Grand Master 
tradition suggests he received his early training under two of the most 
famous Central Asian Khoja Afaq and Khoja Abd Alla. Qi 
Jingyi supposedly met with the revered Naqshbandi leader Khoja Afaq 
Xining Qadiriyya re-
cords the master sent the sixteen year old acolyte home, saying “I am 
not your teacher (
to be passed on to you, your teacher has already crossed the Eastern 
Sea and arrived in the Eastern Land. You must therefore return home 
quickly, and you will become a famous teacher in the land.”  Qadiriyya 
followers today feel that their saint received the blessing of the great 
Naqshbandi Khoja Afaq, while their order was formally founded by his 
second teacher, Khoja Abd Alla, a twenty-ninth generation descendant 
of Muhammad.  Chinese 
Guang dong, Guangxi , Yunnan, Guizhou 
and Linxia, Gansu, before his eventual death in 
Abd al-Kadir al-Jilani is the reputed founder of the Qadiri tariqa, it is 
Abd Alla perhaps studied in Medina under 
the renowned Kurdish mystic, Ibrahim b. –
–
 
who was initiated into both the Naqshbandi and Qadiri tariqas, as well 
as several other 
The appeal of Qadiriyya 
Hui is related to its combining ascetic mysticism with a non-institu-
tionalized form of worship that centers around the tomb complex of 
deceased saints rather than the mosque.  The early Qadiriyya advo-
cated long-term isolated meditation, poverty, and vows of celibacy. The 
head of the order did not marry and eschewed family life, a radical de-
parture from other Islamic traditions in China. Qadiriyya -
ue to attend the Gedimu mosques in the local communities in which 
they live, gathering at the tombs for holidays and individual worship. Qi 
Jingyi was known for his emphasis upon ascetic withdrawal from so-
ciety, poverty and self-cultivation, which involves meditation, fasting, 
prayer, and other contemplative practices. Formalized Islamic ritual 
fasting, pilgrimage, prayer, alms-
giving, and recitation of the shahadah Qi Jingyi 
in favor of pri vate meditation. Qadiriyya maintain: “Those who know 
them selves clearly will know Allah” and “The Saints help us to know 
Allah”. Union with the divine is accom-
plished through meditation and self-cultiva tion, rather than formalized 
public ritual. “The moment of thinking about Allah”, they maintain, “is 
superior to worshiping him for a thousand years”. mysticism in 
China combines many of the similar themes of the Daoist tradition, and 
draws heavily on its metaphysical vocabulary.
A Chinese inscription above the entrance to a Qadiriyya branch 
tomb complex in Beishan Hui cemetery, Linxia, reads: “The Dao 
is Unceasing” (ti dao wu she 
familiar to the Hui in China, Confucian moral tenets, Daoist mystical 
concepts, and Buddhist folk rituals infused with new Islamic content 
pervade Qadiriyya  Although the Qadiriyya menhuan has al-
Hui as “probably 
due to isolation from the Islamic mainstream.” On the other hand, Joseph Trip-
pner argued that these “grave-worshiping cults” give evidence of the pervasive 
that the tombs reveal a wide variety of Hui religious meaning, serving as import-
ant charters that link different Hui communities to their foreign Muslim heritage 
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-
jection of “worldly” political involvement, it set the stage for many 
orders to follow. By stressing the intimate experience of Allah through 
the power of his appointed , 
ideals of Islam, as well as initiating a new sociopolitical Islamic order. 
At once reformist and transformative, it initiated a new tide of reform 
that swept across China.
The Naqshbandiyya
The Naqshbandi tariqa became most rooted in Chinese soil through 
the establishment of two menhuan, the Jahriyya, that 
Islam in Chi-
na and the northwest. As Joseph Fletcher argued, “the history of the 
Naqshban diyya is the history of Islam” from eighteenth to nineteenth 
century China. Fletcher goes on to explain that the reform movement 
emphasized “...a shar’ist orthopraxy, political activism, propagation of 
the religion, and a strong 
subsequent history. ... Two other general characteristics of popular 
mysticism, namely the veneration of saints (misleadingly called ‘saint 
worship’ by non- -




ania, the Naqshbandiyya order gradually spread east across the trade 
over other Central Asian Altishahr, the 
area surrounding the Tarim river basin in what is now southern Xin-
jiang. The Naqshbandi order that gained the most prominence in the 
Tarim basin and played an important role in later eighteenth and nine-
teenth century politics in Xin jiang was the Makhdumzada, established 
by –
his great-grandson 
as Hidayat Allah, who was the saint most responsible for establishing 
 
 
the Naqshbandiyya among the Hui in northwest China.  Khoja Afaq 
Afaqiyya in Gansu, where his fa-
ther Muhammad Yusuf had previously visited and preached, reportedly 
converting a few Hui and a substantial number of the Salars to Naqsh-
bandi Khoja Afaq visited the north-
west cities of Xining, Lintao  and Hezhou  (now Linxia, Chi-
na’s “Little Salar, and Northeastern Tibetan 
Muslims. Two of these early Hui Gansu Muslims became his disciples 
and went to Central Asia and the pilgrimage cities to become further 
trained in the order. When they returned to China, they established the 
two most important Naqshbandi brotherhoods among the Hui in the 
northwest, the Jahriyya.
Throughout its history, the Naqshbandiyya has stressed an ac-
tive participation in worldly affairs.  Their s worked wonders, 
chanted the powerful mathnawi texts of the Turkish mystic Jalal ad-
-
sized both self-cultivation and formal ritual, both with drawal from 
and in volvement in society. Unlike the Qadiriyya, their leaders enjoyed 
families and the material wealth accrued from the donations of their 
followers. They also became committed to political involvement and 
social change based on the principles of Islam. Some of the Naqshbandi-
yya orders in China, advocated, I argue, more of a “trans formationist” 
perspective, in which they sought to change the social order in accord 
with their own visions of propriety and morality. This inevitably led to 
-
ders of the Naqsh bandiyya, especially the Jahriyya, to be singled out for 
suppression and persecution. By contrast, the 
-
nal reform over political change. The different stance that the Naqsh-
bandiyya orders took in China with regard to the state and Chinese cul-
identity and changing sociopolitical realities in the northwest: Under 
one 
of fundamental reform. A brief introduction to these two movements 
is necessary for our understanding of the later challenges to the move-
–
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ments by the Muslim Brotherhood as a means of accommodating their 
interpretations of Islam to a changing Chinese political culture.
The Naqshbandi 
Hezhou, Khoja Afaq played an important role 
in the life of a certain Ma Laichi Hezhou Hui of 
extraordinary talent who went on to found one of the earliest and most 
Naqshbandiyya orders in China, the menhuan. Ac-
cording to Ma Laichi was born to a childless couple after 
they received Khoja Afaq’s blessing, and was later raised and trained by 
one of his disciples, Ma Tai Baba 
gave him his daughter in marriage and passed on to him the leadership 
of the mystical path that he had received from Khoja Afaq. –
Ma Laichi went on the pilgrimage to Mecca, Yemen and Bukhara 
where he studied several -
enced by Mawlana Makhdum, a man of uncertain origin who Fletcher 
hypothesizes may have been Indian. When he returned from his pil-
grimage, Ma Laichi established the most powerful of the men-
huan, the Huasi 
for thirty-two years among the Hui and Salar in Gansu and Qinghai 
, before his death. The menhuan is still quite active and centered in 
Linxia Hui Autonomous Region, Gansu, at the tomb of Ma Laichi, which 
Originating in an earlier Central Asian and Yemeni Naqshbandi Su-
passive participation in society, the veneration of saints, the seeking of 
inspiration at tombs and the silent dhikr (“remembrance”, properly khu-
, the “silent” ones men-
huan throughout China, with mosques in Yunnan, Xin jiang, and Beijing. 
Most Gansu, Qinghai, Ning xia
, and Xin jiang with several of the original 






The second Naqshbandi tariqa, the Jahriyya order, was founded in Chi-
na under the dynamic leadership of Ma Mingxin 
One of the most fascinating detective stories in historical discovery 
is the tracing of Ma Mingxin’s spiritual lineage to Mizjaja, a village on 
the outskirts of Zabid in Northern Yemen, by Joseph Fletcher.  While 
Ma Ming-
xin studied in the Middle East, it was never clear whom he received 
his “New Teaching” from or where he studied. Middle Eastern -
counts recorded the presence of Chinese Muslims studying in certain 
Fletcher was able to put the two together. This was 
an important discovery, as Ma Mingxin’s 
novel, even 
China. This controversy is mainly over Ma Mingxin’s use of the jahr 
in remembrance (“vocal dhikr”, from whence comes the name 
Naqshbandi prac-
tice. After an extensive search through arcane -
Yemen, 
Fletcher discovered that the name of the anonymous 
whom Chinese Muslim records indicate Ma Mingxin was a Naqshbandi 
whose family home was in Mizjaja, the Zabid. Chinese 
indicate that Ma Mingxin studied in Yemen in a 
Shazilinye, whose  was Muhammad Bulu Seni, but did not know 
the full ancestry and origins of the order. Most Jahriyya only say: “The 
root of our order is Arabia, the branches and leaves are in China.”  This 
that az-Zayn had studied in Medina under the famous Kurdish mystic, 
Ibrahim b. 
vocal formulae in the remembrance of Allah ( dhikr -
rani’s students were at the forefront of Islamic reform and revolution-
ary movements throughout the Islamic world.
Under al-Kurani’s student’s direction, it is not surprising that Ma 
Ye-
men and the Arabian Peninsula, with more activist and radical reforms 
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on his mind. While advocating the use of the vocal dhikr, he general-
ly opposed the heavy emphasis upon the veneration of Islamic saints 
which had become popular in China. He also disputed the timing of the 
breaking of the fast at the beginning of the Ramadan feast with the 
Khu-
mosque for prayer. This 
from the conquest of 
trouble among Muslims in Gansu. They arrested 
and executed him as his followers attempted to free him. Three years 
later they crushed another uprising lead by a Jahriyya Tian Wu 
. From this point on, the Qing sought to limit the spread of the move-
ments, outlawing many of the so-called “New Teachings”, primarily the 
Jahriyya. The great Northwest Hui 
Ma Hualong , another Jahriyya murshid
Ma Mingxin. His rebellion was re-
sponsible for cutting the Qing state off from the northwest, making way 
Uighur-led rebellion in Xin jiang under Yakub 
Ma Hualong was captured and executed, supposedly with 
his entire family. His body is entombed in Dongta Township, Jin-
ji , just east of the Yellow River in Ning xia, while his head is re-
ported to have been buried in Xuanhuagang , a Jahriyya center, 
north of Zhangjiachuan  in south Gansu. There is also evidence 
that suggests Du Wenxiu
Hui Muslim rebellion in 
Jahriy ya. Following the failure of these uprisings, the Jahriyya became 
main Jahriyya branch orders, all named after their ritual and historical 




wiy ya.  An Arab, 
 For the origins of the –
 
 He taught in He’nan, Qinghai, Gansu, and died 
in the Dawantou , Dongxiang  prefecture, Gansu province. 
Presently, many of the Dong xiang Muslim minority concentrated in 
that area are members of the Kubrawiyya menhuan.
Islamic Resurgence
The importance and extensiveness of these -
parate Hui communities across China cannot be underestimated. Gell-
ner’s suggestion that “ -
nique of leadership...”  seems applicable to understanding the rapid 
proliferation of various orders during the turmoil of the late eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, when China was faced with widespread do-
mestic social unrest and the advancing encroachment of Western im-
perialist powers. Unlike the isolated “patchwork” Gedimu communi-
ties that had been the norm until that time, 
leadership and organization that could help Hui survive politically and 
economically.
extensive warlords in the 
northwest and disruptive to others. 
ermaili 
of the Jahriyya order’s founder, 
gathered for three days at the site of his original tomb outside Lanzhou. 
The local municipality had intended originally to refrain from partici-
pation in the ceremony, but owing to the unexpected number of partic-
ipants, the city eventually supplied sanitation facilities and food. The 
Provincial Islamic Society subsequently agreed to allow Ma Mingxin’s 
tomb to be rebuilt. Two months earlier, a similar ermaili was held in 
remembrance of Ma Hualong, the Jahriyya rebellion leader. A crowd of 
Urumqi, Kunming  and 
Harbin arrived at his grave in Lingwu  County, Dongta Township, 
focus the tomb provides for galvanizing collective ac tion.
 Ma Tong suggests the 
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Membership in various -
es social interaction, especially among the 
distinguish themselves by dress. Unlike the rounded white hat worn by 
most Hui men, 
black. Many Jahriyya Hui shave the sides of their beards to commem-
orate their founder, Ma Mingxin, whose beard is said to have been shorn 
almost universally unnoticed by the Han majority – for whom a Hui is 
a Hui – in the marketplace northwest Hui can easily identify members 
of the various orders that divide them internally. The exclusivity of 
orders in China illustrates the importance of the question of identity 
and authority for Hui can enter these orders through ritual 
vow or by birth, but seldom maintain allegiance to two menhuan at 
once. This is unlike 
to be less exclusive and allow simultaneous membership in several or-
ders.  
new order is tantamount to a conversion experience for Chinese Mus-
lims, perhaps the only one they will ever have, since most Muslims in 
China entered Islam by birth or marriage.
The Third Tide: Scripturalist Concerns and Modernist Reforms
The third tide in Chinese Islam began at the end of the Qing dynasty, a 
period of accelerated exchange between China and the outside world, 
when many Muslims began traveling to and returning from the Middle 
East. In the early decades of the twentieth century, China was exposed 
to many new foreign ideas and in the face of Japanese and Western im-
perialist encroachment sought a Chinese approach to governance. In-
tellectual and organizational activity by Chinese Muslims during this 
pe riod was also intense. Increased contact with the Middle East led 
Chinese Muslims to reevaluate their traditional notions of Islam. Pick-
Muslims 
who made the hajj, or pilgrimage, to Mecca.
pilgrims boarded a steamer in Shanghai bound 
for Mecca.  Muslims had studied at 
 
 
Cairo’s prestigious al-Azhar Univer sity. While these numbers are not 
hajj from other South-
east Asian 
returning Hui hajji was profound, particularly in isolated communities. 
“In this respect,” Fletcher observed, “the more secluded and remote a 
Muslim community was from the main centers of Islamic cultural life 
in the Middle East, the more susceptible it was to those centers’ most 
recent trends.”
Muslim 
ideas, numerous new Hui -
ter Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan ,
provisional pres ident of the Chinese Republic in Nanjing , the Chi-
nese Muslim Federation was also formed in that city. This was followed 
by the establishment of other Hui Muslim associations: the Chinese 
Muslim Mutual Progress Association ( Mus-
lim Educational Association ( Muslim As-
Muslim Young Students Association (Nan-
Muslims 
( Muslim General Association (Jinan
The 
Löwenthal reports that circulation was low, there were over one hun-
dred known Muslim periodi cals produced before the out-break of the 
Sino-  Thirty journals were published between 
Beijing alone, prompting one author to suggest that 
while Chinese Islam’s traditional religious center was still Linxia (He-
Beijing.  This took place when 
many Hui intellectuals traveled to Japan, the Middle East and the West. 
Caught up in the 
published magazines and founded organizations, questioning their 
identity as never before in a process that one Hui historian, Ma Shou-
qian , has recently termed “The New Awakening of the Hui at the 
end of nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries”.  As many 
of these Hui hajji returned from their pilgrimages to the Middle East, 
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they initiated several reforms, engaging themselves once again in the 
contested space between Islamic ideals and Chinese culture.
The Wahhabi Muslim Brotherhood
Wahhabi ideals in the Arabian Peninsula, returning 
Hui reformers introduced the Ikhwan Muslim Brotherhood to China 
– a religious movement in tune, in some cases, with China’s national-
ist concerns, and in others, with warlord politics. While the Muslim 
Brotherhood elsewhere in the Islamic world has been depicted as an-
ti-modernist and fundamentalist, this is not true of the movement in 
China. “There a fundamentalist, revivalist impulse among returned 
Wahhabi notions” Lipman suggests, “was trans-
formed into a nationalist, modernist, anti-
advocated not only Muslim unity but Chinese national strength and 
consciousness.” 
The beginnings of the Ikhwan movement in China can be traced to 
Ma Wanfu hajj
to teach in the Linxia, Dongxiang area. Eventually known as the Yihei-
wani, the initial reformers were primarily concerned with religious 
scripturalist orthodoxy – so much so that they are still known as the 
“venerate the scriptures faction” (zunjing pai -
haps to replace “Islamic theater” with scripture,  they proscribed the 
venera tion of saints, their tombs and shrines, and sought to stem the 
ahongs and menhuan 
Islam, they criticized such 
cultural accretions as the wearing of white mourning dress (daixiao
mosques with Chinese or Arabic texts. At one 
point, Ma Wanfu even proposed the exclusive use of Arabic and Persian 
instead of Chinese in all education. Following strict Wahhabi practice, 
Yiheiwani mosques are distinguished by their almost complete lack 
of adornment on the inside, with white walls and no inscriptions, as 
well as a preference for Arabian-style mosque architecture. This con-
trasts sharply with other more Chinese-style mosques in China, typical 
of the “old” Gedimu, whose architecture resemble Confucian temples 
in their sweeping roofs and symmetrical courtyards (with the Huajue 
 
Great Mosque in Xi’an Yiheiwani 
also proscribed the adornment of their mosques with Quranic texts and 
banners, whether in Arabic or Chinese, whereas this is the most striking 
marker of mosques and worship centers in the northwest, whose 
walls are often layered with calligraphy and unique Hui-style art.
Many Muslims supported the earliest communist call for equity, au-
tonomy, freedom of religion and recognized nationality status, and were 
active in the early establishment of the People’s Republic, but became 
disenchanted by growing critiques of religious practice during several 
Cultural Rev-
Muslims became the focus for both anti-religious 
and anti-ethnic nationalism critiques, leading to widespread persecu-
tions, 
Yunnan province. Since Deng Xiao ping’s 
Muslims have sought to take advantage of 
liberalized economic and religious policies, while keeping a watchful 
eye on the ever-swinging pendulum of Chinese radical politics. There 
are now more 
and Muslims travel freely on the hajj to Mecca, as well as engaging in 
cross-border trade with co-religionists in Central Asia, the Middle East, 
and increasingly, Southeast Asia. It should be noted here that increas-
ing Muslim activism in China does not necessarily entail increasing re-
ligious conservatism, or the rise of a “Wahhabi”-inspired Muslim tide 
of fundamentalism. Indeed, like the term xinjiao
was a euphemism in the last century to refer to any new Islamic teach-
ing that made its way into China, the term Wahhabi today in China, es-
pecially in Xin jiang, is often merely a general term to refer to Muslims 
who are more conservative, and not necessarily organized into any 
school or sect.
Increasing Muslim political activism on a national scale and rapid 
state response indicates the growing importance Beijing places upon 
Uighurs in Xin jiang marched through 
the streets of Urumqi protesting against a wide range of issues, includ-
ing the environmental degradation of the Zungharian plain, nuclear 
testing in the Taklamakan, increased Han immigration to Xin jiang, and 
ethnic insults at Xin jiang University. Muslims throughout China pro-
tested the publication of a Chinese book, 
Muslims, partic-
ularly their restriction against pork (which Mao once called “China’s 
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government quickly responded, meeting most of the Muslim’s demands, 
condemning the publications, arresting the authors, and closing down 
the printing houses.
Islamic factional struggles continue to divide China’s Muslims inter-
nally, especially as increased travel to the Middle East prompts criti-
cism of Muslim practice at home and exposes China’s Muslims to new, 
often politically radical, Naqsh-
bandi 
support of internal factional disputes in the southern Ning xia Region, 
that had led to at least sixty deaths on both sides and People’s Libera-
was increasing Uighur activism in Xin jiang, declining substantially in 
the early part of the new millennium, and the government’s Strike Hard 
campaign has curtailed any organized Uighur efforts.
Beijing has responded with increased military presence, particular-
ly in Kashgar and Urumqi, as well as diplomatic efforts in the Central 
Asian states and Turkey to discourage foreign support for separatist 
movements. It is important to note that in general Hui, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, 
and other Muslim minorities are not necessarily sympathetic to any of 
these separatist actions among the Uighur, and it is not yet clear how 
much support even among the Uighur there is for violent acts, especial-
imam in Kashgar. 
At the same time, cross-border trade between Xin jiang and Central Asia 
Eurasian Railroad, linking Urumqi and Alma Ata with markets in China 
and Eastern Europe. Overland travel between Xin jiang and Pakistan, 
Tajikistan, Kygyzstan, and Kazakhstan has also increased dramatical-
ly with the relaxation of travel restrictions based on Deng Xiaoping’s 
prioritization of trade over security interests in the area. The govern-
ment’s policy of seeking to buy support through stimulating the local 
economy seems to be working at the present, as income levels in Xin-
jiang are often far higher than those across the border, yet increased 
Han migration to participate in the region’s lucrative oil and mining 
industries continues to exacerbate ethnic tension. Muslim areas in 
northern and central China, however, continue to be left behind as Chi-
 
na’s rapid economic growth expands unevenly, enriching the southern 
coastal areas far beyond the interior.
While further restricting Islamic freedoms in the border regions, 
at the same time the state has become more keenly aware of the im-
portance foreign Muslim governments place on China’s treatment of its 
Muslim minorities as a factor in China’s lucrative trade and military 
agreements. The establishment of full diplomatic ties with Saudi Ara-
Eastern Muslim states enhances the economic and political salience 
of China’s treatment of its internal Muslim minority population. The 
increased trans-nationalism of China’s Muslims will be an important 
factor in their ethnic expression as well as practiced accommodation to 
Chinese culture and state authority.
Internal Conversion
While these various Chinese Islamic associations are as confusing to 
the non-initiate as the numerous schools of Buddhist thought in China, 
what is striking about them is their exclusivity of membership. Unlike 
Middle Eastern or Central Asian Islamic orders, where one might belong 
to two or even three brotherhoods at once, the Hui belong to only one. 
Among the Hui, one is generally born into one’s Islamic order, or con-
verts dramatically to another. In fact, this is the only instance of con-
version I encountered among my sojourn among the Hui. I never met a 
Han who had converted to Islam in China without having been married 
to a Hui or adopted into a Hui family, though I heard of a few isolated in-
stances. Fletcher records the conversion of twenty-eight Tibetan tribes 
as well as their “Living Buddha” by Ma Laichi in Xunhua , Qinghai 
in the mid-eighteenth century. Ma Mingxin uprising, 
the Qing government forbade non-Muslims from converting to Islam, 
-
corded in history. This goes against the common assumption that Islam 
in China was spread through proselytization and conversion. Islamic 
preachers in China, including Ma Laichi, Ma Mingxin, Qi Jingyi, and Ma 
Qixi , spent most of their time trying to convert other Muslims. 
Islam in China for the most part has grown biologically through birth 
and intermarriage.
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Hui Islamic Orders and Chinese Culture 
menhuan in northwest China, and subsequent non- -
possible to enumerate in their complexity. They give evidence, howev-
er, of the ongoing struggles that continue to make Islam meaningful to 
Hui Muslims. These tensions between Islamic ideals and social realities 
are often left unresolved. Their very dynamism derives from the ques-
tions they raise and the doubts they engender among people struggling 
with traditional meanings in the midst of changing social contexts. The 
questions of purity and legitimacy become paramount when the Hui 
are faced with radical internal socioeconomic and political change, and 
exposed to different interpretations of Islam from the outside Muslim 
over Islamic orthodoxy, revealing an important disjunction between 
“scripturalist” and “mystical” interpretations.
In a similar fashion, the study of Southeast Asian Islam has often 
centered on the contradiction and compromise between the native cul-
ture of the indigenous Muslims and the  of orthodox Islam, the 
mystical and scriptural, the real and the ideal.  The supposed accom-
modation of orthodox Islamic tenets to local cultural practices has led 
scholars to dismiss or explain such compromise as syncretism, assimi-
lation and “ An alter-
native approach, and one perhaps more in tune with the interests of Hui 
themselves, sees this incongruence as the basis for on-going dialectical 
Muslim communities.  Following Max Weber,  one can see the wide 
variety of -
struction and programs for social conduct whereby a major religious 
tradition becomes meaningful to an indigenous society.
prompted by and expressed in economic concerns, such as we saw 
above in the defeat of the Xidaotang by the Ma An-
liang Muslim broth-
er’s wealth. Fletcher notes that one of the criticisms of the 
was that their recitation of the Ming sha le  took less time than 
 
 
the normal Quranic suras by non- imams 
were cheaper to hire at ritual ceremonies. He suggests that this assist-
ed their rise in popularity and provoked criticism by the Gedimu reli-
gious leaders.  The 
nian 
generally found economic reasons for criticizing certain Islamic orders 
among the Hui. 
appropriate mosque and waqf (
with great resistance from the menhuan, which had accumulated 
document criticizing Ma Zhenwu , the Jahriyya , the 
following accusations are quite revealing:
According to these representatives, Ma Chen-wu instituted many “A-
mai-lis,” or festival days to commemorate the dead ancestors to which 
the A-hungs must be invited to chant the scriptures and be treated with 
big feasts, thereby squeezing money out of the living for the dead. For 
example, he has kept a record of the days of birth and death of all the 
family members of this followers and has seen to it that religious ser-
vices be held on such days. These include “Grandmother’s Day,” “Wife’s 
On the average, one of such “A-mai-lis” is held every six or seven days, 
among which are seven occasions of big festival.... All the A-hungs of 
the Islamic mosques have been appointed by Ma Chen-wu. Through the 
appointment of A-hungs he has squeezed a big sum of money.... Ma has 
-
zed the Hui people for money.  
and Islamic ideals have led to the rise and powerful appeal of Islamic 
movements among Hui Muslims. I explored one way of looking at this 
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In China there were many attempts to reconcile Chinese culture with 
there are those who reject any integration of Islam with Chinese cul-
ture, such as Ma Wanfu’s return to an Arabicized “pure” Islam. Con-
versely, at the other extreme, there are those leaders of the Gedimu, 
such as Hu Dengzhou , who accepted more of an integration with 
traditional Chinese society. Likewise, Ma Qixi’s Xidaotang stressed the 
complete compatibility of Chinese and Islamic culture, the importance 
of Chinese Islamic Confucian texts, the harmony of the two systems, 
and the reading of the Quran in Chinese. 















































Jahriy ya Yihei wani Gedimu, 
Xidaotang
 
Muslim world, through transformationist or militant Islam, as 
illustrated by the largely Naqshbandiyya-led nineteenth-century Hui 
uprisings. The Jahriyya sought to implement an alternative vision of 
the world in their society, and this posed a threat to the Qing, as well as 
other Hui Muslims, earning them the label of “heterodox” (xiejiao
and persecution by the Chinese state. By contrast, other Hui reformers 
have attempted throughout his tory to make 
such as Liu Zhi’s monumental effort to demonstrate the Confucian 
moral ity of Islam. The Qadiriyya alternative represents res olution of 
this tension through ascetic withdrawal from the world. Qi Jingyi ad-
vocated an inner mystical journey where the dualism of Islam and the 
Chinese world is absolved through grasping the one ness of Allah found 
inside every believer. These various approaches in Chinese Islam rep-
resent sociohistorical attempts to deal with the relationship of relating 
the world religion of Islam with the local Chinese realm.
Figure 3














Another way to examine this range of alternatives is to generalize about 
the Ui-
ghur can be seen to be much more resistant to accepting integration 
into Chinese society than other Muslims groups, in that they are the 
only Muslim minority in China expressing strong desires for a separate 
Uighur desire 
independence. At the other extreme, it could be argued that of all the 
Muslim minorities the Hui are the most integrated into Chinese soci-
ety and culture. This is both an advantage and a disadvantage in that 
they often have greater access to power and resources within Chinese 
 Dru C. Gladney
society, but at the same time risk either the loss of their identity or the 
rejection of other Muslim groups in China as being too assimilated into 
Chinese society to the detriment of Islam. In between there are a range 
of Muslim nationalities who are closer to the Uighur in terms of resist-
ing Chinese culture and maintaining a distinct language and identity 
(Uzbeks, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and 
to the Hui in terms of accommodation to Chinese culture (Dongxiang, 
can be a heuristic way of examining the challenges faced by each Mus-
lim minority in their daily expression of identity and Islam in Chinese 
society. Here it must be clearly noted, however, that there are many ex-
ceptions to this overly generalized pattern, e.g., Uighur (such as Party 
and Hui (such as religious 
lives in strident resistance to Chinese culture. 
The Fourth Tide: Ethnic Nationalism in an Age of Globalization
China is not immune from the new tide of ethnic nationalism and “pri-
mordial politics” sweeping Europe, Africa and Asia in the post-Cold 
War period. Much of this is clearly due to a response to globalization 
in terms of localization: increasing nationalism arising from the or-
ganization of the world into nation-states. No longer content to sit on 
the sidelines, the nations within these states are playing a greater role 
in the public sphere, which Jürgen 
characteristic of civil society in the modern nation-state.  In most of 
these nationalist movements, religion, culture, and racialization play a 
perhaps much of Muslim Asia, Islam will continue to play an important 
ethnicity (i.e., China, Malaysia, Indone-
Muslim activism in China cannot but 
be nationalistic, but a nationalism that may often transcend the bound-
aries of the contemporary nation-state via mass communications, in-
creased travel, and the internet. 
The three previous “tides” of Islam in China, according to Fletcher, 
were precipitated by China’s opening to the outside world. A new tide 
 
is now washing across China’s terrain. No matter what conservative 
leaders in the government might wish, China’s Muslim politics have 
reached a new stage of openness. If China wants to participate in the 
international political sphere of the nation-states, this is unavoidable. 
With the opening to the West in recent years, travel to and from the 
Muslims left China to go on the hajj. This number increased to 
Hui students are presently en rolled in Islamic and Arabic studies at the 
a Hui elder in Xi’an who had just returned from the hajj. He was es-
corted home from the airport in a procession of over a hundred taxis, 
all owned and operated privately by Hui. -
cal Hui, 
northwest Hui Islamic Society in Beijing. The 
Islamic Society arranged his travel to Pakistan, where his visa was 
arranged at the Saudi Embassy (at the time of his trip China had no 
formal diplomatic relations with 
Upon his return he traveled throughout the northwest, preaching and 
lecturing about his pilgrimage experiences and the need to reform Is-
he had since returned three times on the hajj and engaged in frequent 
business-related travel to the Middle East. His trips to the Middle East 
were often sponsored by local and national government organizations.
Encouraged by the Chinese state, relations between Muslims in Chi-
na and the Middle East are becoming stronger and more frequent, part-
ly from a desire to establish trading partners for arms, commodities, 
and currency exchanges, and partly by China’s traditional view of itself 
as a leader of the Third World. Delegations of foreign Muslims regularly 
travel to prominent Islamic sites in China, in a kind of state-sponsored 
religious tourism, and donations are encouraged. While the state hopes 
that private Islamic investment will assist economic development, the 
vast majority of grants by visiting foreign Muslims have been donat-
ed to the rebuilding of Islamic mosques, schools, and hospitals. As Hui 
in China are further exposed to Islamic internationalism, and as they 
return from studies and pilgrimages abroad, traditional Hui identities 
will once again be reshaped and called into question, giving rise to a 
fourth tide of Islam in China. Global Islam is thus localized into Hui Is-
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-
nese-ness and 
These accommodations of China’s Muslims are not unlike those 
made on a daily basis among other Muslim minorities in Asia. The only 
difference may be the increasingly post-modern contraction of time 
and space: accommodations that took over a millennia in China are now 
being required of Muslim diasporic communities in a matter of hours 
or days. For Hui in China, Pakistani and Bangladeshi workers in Tokyo 
and Seoul, and the other wider diaspora, Muslims may be becoming in-
creasingly “unfamiliar” strangers. This does not bode well for the fu-
ture integration of Muslims into the Chinese leviathan. 
References
 – Amnesty International, “Peoples Republic of China: Gross Violations of Hu-
The crescent in North-West China. London: The Chi-
-
–
Hui Muslims in China
“Central Asia and Xin jiang, China: Emerging Energy, Economic, and Ethnic Rela-
tions.” 




ing.“ In: Proceedings of the Fourth East Asian Altaistic Conference. Ch‘en Chieh-hsien 
turuq Unpublished manuscript, 
Harvard University. French version published as “Les ‘voies’ (turuq
Chines”. In: . 
 
Studies 
on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia 
Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia. 
Asian Affairs
 – Ernest Gellner, . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Identity.” The Journal of Asian Studies 
Central Asian Studies
-
ty Identities.” The Journal of Asian Studies 
-
tion in the People‘s Republic.” In: -






. eds. Stevan Harrell and Elizabeth Perry. 
Modern China
. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univer-
-
–
Sino-Muslim Communities.” In: Islam in Asia. ed. Raphael Israeli and Anthony H. 
-
lim Brotherhood in Modern China.” Paper presented at the China Colloquium of 
. Seattle: 
 Dru C. Gladney
The Reli-
gious Periodical Press in China
 





Christ and Culture. New York: Harper and Row, 
The Chinese 
Recorder
Claude L. Pickens, “The Four Men Huans.” Friends of Moslems 
Society in Asia.” L‘Islam en Indonesie
Oasis identities: Uighur nationalism along China’s 
Silk Road
Xin jiang Wushi nian
. Chapel Hill: Uni-
. Oxford: Claren-
Joseph Trippner, . 
Die Welt des Islams
John Obert Voll, . Boulder, 





























Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培  54
cakravartin  42
Candragarbhasūtra  36
cardinal virtues  72
Cassiodorus  32
castigation  107
Catholicism  6, 7, 91, 113–127, 134, 135
Catholic Underground Church  117, 125, 
126, 135
Cattaneo, Lazzaro  102
Ce dai jing yu 策怠警喻  98
celibacy  207
Ceylon  39, 43, 44, 45
Chan 禪  20, 30, 93, 121–124
Chang’an 長安  66
chanhui 懺悔  94, 95, 101, 106
Chan Kim-Kwong  124
Chavannes, Édouard  3
China Madrasa  164
Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association  
114, 117–120, 125
Chinese Protestant Patriotic Three-Self-
Movement  114, 119–123
Chistiyya (Qiesidiye 切斯底耶)  151
Chongshengpai 重生派  127
Chongyi tang riji suibi 崇一堂日記隨筆  105
Chos-’byung (History of the Dharma)  33
Christendom  7, 8, 10, 113–137
Christianity  3, 6–8, 29–32, 52–58, 65, 68, 
91–109, 113–136, 144, 145, 192, 
221
Christianization  33
Chunqiu 春秋  34, 37, 41
Church of Jesus Christ  121
Chu-sanzang-jiji 出三藏記集  44, 46
circumcision  68, 71
clash of civilizations  5, 62
Committee for the Assistance of European 
Jewish Refugees  79, 80
Communist Party of China (CPC)  5, 7, 8, 
51, 52, 57–59, 63, 114, 120, 128, 
144, 173, 175, 180
Community of Disciples (see also Men-
tuhui)  127, 128, 129
concubinage  102, 105
confession  6, 13, 91–96, 99–102, 106–
108, 120
Confucianism  3, 4, 6, 14, 19–21, 52–55, 
71, 93–97, 100–106, 109, 118, 132, 
133, 136, 170, 207, 216, 222, 223
Neo-Confucianism  93, 102
Confucius (Kongzi 孔子)  35, 55
cultural Christianity  117, 131–135




da Costa, Inácio  103
dagoba  43
Dalai Lama  199
Dao 道  4, 13, 16–19, 23–25, 55, 56, 207
Daodejing 道德經  4, 13, 14, 16, 19, 23
dao fa ziran 道法自然  23
Daoism  3, 4, 6, 13–26, 36, 52–55, 58, 71, 
94–96, 101–104, 114, 132, 144, 
145, 207
Daojiao 道教 (see also Daoism)  55
daoren 道人  16, 42
Dao xuan 道宣  41
Darel  38
Dawut Rahila  162
Deman, William  82
Deng Xiaoping  9, 217, 218
Devānaṃ Piyatissa  43
devil  74, 102, 103, 107
Dharmaratna  37
dhikr  152, 210–212
Di 帝  14, 72
dianji 點記  38
diaspora  6, 74, 85, 201, 226
Die Gelbe Post  84
Dillon, Michael  188
Ding Guangxun 丁光训  131
Di Yiddishe Shtime fun vaytn Mizrakh  84
Dizui zheng gui 滌罪正規  101, 103
Dizui zheng gui lüe 滌罪正規略  102
Document 19 (1982)  58, 114, 126
Domenge, Jean  68
Dongfang Shan dian -jiao 东方闪电教  127
Donglin 東林 movement  93










Eastern Lightning (see also Dongfang 







































Guojia Shaoshuminzu Weiyuanhui 





































































































































































Pan Yue 潘岳  63
parinirvāṇa (see also nirvāṇa)  5, 36, 38
Pelliot, Paul  3
penance  6, 91–94, 106–108
Pentecostal movement  128
Persia  44, 66, 67, 150
Pickens, Claude  204, 214
pilgrimage  8, 9, 21, 38, 45, 107, 148, 151, 
152, 155, 168, 177, 190, 207–210, 
214, 215, 225
Pollak, Michael  73, 74
Polybios of Megalopolis  32
polygamy  69
Pope  99, 109, 120, 125, 126
Propaganda Fide  125
prophecy  34, 43, 71, 130
prostitution  105
Protestantism  7, 68, 72, 113–124, 128, 
129, 132–135, 204
Purim  71
Puruṣapura (Peshawar)  42, 44
Q
Qadim (see also Gedimu)  9, 150–152, 
168–171
Qadiriyya (Gadelinye 嘎德林耶)  9, 151, 
171–173, 190, 204–209, 223
Qalandariyya (Gelandaiye 格兰岱耶)  151
qi 氣  16, 18, 20
Qigong 氣功  1, 22
Qi Jingyi 祁静一  206, 207, 219, 223
Qinghai 青海  148, 164, 210, 213, 219
qingjing 清靜  94
Qin Shihuangdi 秦始皇帝  37
qixing 七姓  69
Quan zhen-dao 全真道  4, 19–21
Quanzhou 泉州  92, 99
qubba  152, 171, 203
Quran  8, 145, 147, 152–155, 160–167, 
170, 178, 204, 216, 221, 222
R
rabbi  74, 75, 78, 82, 83
Rabbi Meir Ashkenazi  78
rabbinic  71, 75, 78
radicalism  152, 179
Ramadan  147, 153, 155, 212
relics  43, 44, 163, 168
Religionsfieber  1
religionsloses Christentum  132
Remusat, Abel  3
ren 仁  72, 97
Ricci, Matteo  53, 68, 97
Rites Controversy  3, 53, 105
Rosh Hodesh  71
Rozenboim, Asher  84
Rudelson, Justin  193
Ruiying-benqi-jing 瑞應本起經  46
Rujiao 儒教 (see also Confucianism)  55
ru-shi-dao san-jiao 儒释道三教  55
Russia  84, 193, 196, 198
S
Sabbath  71, 78
saddharma (zhengfa)  39
Sāgara  43
Saint Peter  99
Sakai Tadao  93
Śākyamuni  33–39
Salafiyya (Sailafeiye 赛拉菲耶)  151, 222
salam  156
Salar (Sala 撒拉)  149, 150, 151, 155, 157, 
188, 189, 209, 210, 223
Salar Sufi Order (Sala Menhuan 撒拉门
宦)  157
Sallustus  32
Sambiasi, Francesco  98
Samguk-sagi 三國史記  33
Samguk-yusa 三國遺事  33
Saṃyuktāgama  44
Saṅghayaśas  45
sanjiao heyi 三教合一  4
sanqing 三清  15
Sanskrit  83
Sassoon, Jacob Elias  77, 86
Saudi Arabia  148, 151, 165, 178, 219, 225
saze’erduode 撒澤爾鐸德  98
Schall, Adam  105
Schmidt-Glintzer, Helwig  36
selikhot  66
Sengyou 僧祐  44, 45
separatism  9, 169, 178, 179, 195, 198






































State Bureau of Religious Affairs (Guojia 
Zongjiao Shiwuju 
Suhrawadiyya (Suhelawadiye 










Teaching of Reincarnation (see also 



















United Frontier Department (Tongzhanbu 














wenhua zongjiao jingshen   













































































Zhongguo Jidujiao Aiguo Sanzi Yundong 
Zhongguo Tianzhujiao Aiguohui 


















zongjiao-re  (see also -
Zongli-zhongjing-mulu 
zui 
zuo sheng zhi fang 
